Panel 5

The present article examines recent processes of democratic erosion based on the hypothesis that the phenomenon of backsliding does not primarily result in transitions to autocratic regimes, but rather in the consolidation of forms of illiberal democracy that preserve electoral institutions and formal representative structures while substantially weakening fundamental rights, institutional checks and balances, and accountability mechanisms.

Utilising a quantitative-comparative design, the study integrates V-Dem indicators on democratic quality, civil liberties, and institutional backsliding with governance quality and corruption metrics from the Quality of Government (QoG) Institute, along with data on political representation, parliamentary functioning, and party systems from REPDEM.

The analysis is based on a comparison of national and regional trajectories between 2000 and 2023, using standardized scores, time series, and comparative visualisations to identify distinct patterns of democratic erosion. The hypothesis that state capacity and government performance provide a limited explanation for democratic resilience is empirically tested, as opposed to explanations centred on the degradation of political representation.

The findings enable the differentiation of various forms of backsliding associated with both governance crises and structural regime changes, thereby contributing to the ongoing discourse on the institutional mechanisms that mediate the relationship between democracy, governance, and political stability.

Research on democratic backsliding focuses on populist incumbents eroding norms from office. This paper redirects attention to a neglected critical juncture: what happens when ruling populists lose. I argue that electoral defeat triggers a transformation from populism in power, which is characterized by executive corruption and state capture, toward anti-systemic, anti-pluralist rejection of democratic outcomes and the system. Using V-Party data, I show that Likud’s populism and anti-pluralism scores rose in parallel across its 2009–2019 governing period, with populism consistently higher, while QoG indicators capture concurrent deterioration in corruption perception and rule of law characteristic of populist state capture. I then demonstrate the qualitative shift that electoral defeat produces, analysing parliamentary Twitter communication by Israeli MKs to show an explosion of anti-systemic messaging from Likud representatives after the party’s 2021 loss, as the party moves to a complete rejection of the elected government and to delegitimization of democratic institutions at unprecedented levels. Leaders who claim to embody the authentic people cannot accept loss as legitimate; opposition becomes an incubator for full anti-systemic delegitimization. To develop this argument, I benchmark Israel against the US Republican Party after 2020, Bolsonaro's response to his 2022 loss, and Fidesz’s opposition radicalisation (2002–2010), identifying common mechanisms while highlighting variation.