Boots on the Ground

The Effects of Mass Mobilization on Military Policing

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Abstract

How and under which conditions do pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents across different regime types to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks, specifically crowd control? While previous research has made valuable contributions regarding the effects of military policing, its causes remain underdeveloped, with most studies referring to violence by organized crime groups or terrorist networks. This thesis aims to address this research gap by proposing a new theoretical model. The main argument is that when the aims of mass mobilization events are incongruent with the regime type, the incumbent's ideational commitment to democratic norms, or an ongoing episode of regime transformation, they are likely to be perceived as threatening by the incumbent. The incumbent, feeling threatened, then orders the armed forces to deploy for the civilian policing task of crowd control as a self-assuring show of force aimed at maximizing outwardly projected strength while minimizing perceived threat. From this theoretical model, a number of observable and falsifiable predictions are derived and tested on a dataset covering 2,058 country-years across 74 countries between 1990 and 2020. Fitting the appropriate (generalized linear mixed-effect) models to this data produces results that provide partial support for the propositions of the theoretical model. Specifically, the results support the claim that regime type as well as more fine-grained measures of democratic quality moderate the relationship between mass mobilization events and military peace preservation. A subsequent deviant case study shows that the theoretical model is improved by re-specifying the outcome military peace preservation such that cases in which paramilitary police forces are tasked with peace preservation are excluded no longer coded as a positive cases. The findings of this thesis are of interest not only to scholars of civil-military relations and comparative politics, but also to policy-makers and to society as a whole.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Why This Matters Now

In June 2025, protests against immigration enforcement raids erupted in Los Angeles. In response, President Donald Trump ordered 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to deploy to the city (Dearen et al. 2025; Thayer et al. 2025). Two days later, Governor Greg Abott followed suit and ordered 5,000 National Guard troops to deploy to major cities across Texas, ahead of the 'No Kings' protests later that week (Vertuno 2025). In June 2023, comparable anti-government protests expressing discontent over democratic decline erupted in Poland (Gera 2023; Higgins 2023). However, unlike in the case of the United States, the armed forces were *not* called in to assume civilian policing tasks. In contrast, in July 2024, student-led protests against a quota system for government jobs in Bangladesh turned into a nationwide (and ultimately successful) movement for regime change (Chowdhury 2025). Amidst violent clashes between protesters and the police, the armed forces were called in to enforce curfews, ultimately resulting in hundreds of casualties (Alam et al. 2024; Hossain and Jahan 2024). In contrast, in March 2025, anti-government protests erupted in Türkiye after Istanbul's mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested on corruption charges (Guzel and Fraser 2025; Hubbard and Timur 2025). As in Poland 2023, but unlike in the United States 2025 and Bangladesh 2024, the armed forces were *not* called in to assume civilian policing tasks.

These cases illustrate an important point. Democratic and authoritarian regimes alike experience mass mobilization events. Moreover, both democracies and autocracies deploy their armed forces within their own borders for protest policing. Yet, as illustrated by the four cases above, there is considerable variation in this regard. Some autocracies domestically deploy their militaries for protest policing (e.g., Bangladesh 2024), while others do not (e.g., Türkiye 2025). Similarly, while some democracies domestically deploy their militaries for protest policing (e.g., United States 2025), others do not (e.g., Poland 2023). This observation constitutes an intriguing empirical puzzle and begs the question: *How and under which conditions do pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents across different*

regime types to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks, specifically crowd control? This is the research question addressed by the present thesis.

The answer to this question is of interest not only to scholars of civil-military relations and comparative politics, but also to policy-makers and to society as a whole. This is because previous research has shown that the deployment of the armed forces for civilian policing tasks, i.e., military policing, is not only largely ineffective at reducing crime and improving security (Blair and Weintraub 2023), but is also linked to an increase in repression and human rights violations (e.g., Bayer et al. 2025; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2024; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Magaloni and Rodriguez 2020). Therefore, a better understanding of the causes of military policing is a timely issue of concern to scholars, policy-makers, and society alike.

1.2 Defining Key Concepts

The outcome of interest in this thesis is military policing, specifically military peace preservation. Following Bayer et al. (2025, p. 822), I define military policing as "the assumption of (civilian) police functions by the military", and military peace preservation as a specific manifestation of military policing in which the military is tasked with "crowd control at public events and demonstrations" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 823). I will use the terms 'military' and 'armed forces' interchangeably to denote the three conventional branches of the armed forces, as well as all other uniformed armed organizations and "official units that operate under the direct command of the ministry of defense" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 817). This implies that paramilitary police forces under the direct command of the ministry of defense (e.g., the Italian *Arma dei Carabinieri*) are considered to be part of the military. The main explanatory variables are pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events, which comprise various repertoires of contention, including "demonstrations, strikes, protests, riots, and sit-ins" (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023, p. 1866). More detailed discussions of these concepts can be found in chapters 2 and 3, for the operationalization of these concepts see section 4.2.3.

1.3 Overview of Previous Research

Despite the growing scholarly interest in the contemporary trend of expanding domestic military missions (e.g., Harig and Ruffa 2022; Pion-Berlin 2016; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020; Wilén and Strömbom 2022) and the convergence between police

forces and the military (e.g., Campbell and Campbell 2010; Lutterbeck 2004; Lutterbeck 2005)—and despite the valuable insights produced by this research—certain aspects thereof remain underdeveloped.

First, in the context of research on the increasing police–military convergence, disproportionate attention has been paid to one side of this development, namely police militarization.[1] Moreover, much of this research is centered around the 1033 Program in the United States and its effects on crime rates and the use of lethal force by police officers (e.g., Delehanty et al. 2017; Gunderson et al. 2021; Lawson 2019; Lowande 2021; Stavro and Welch 2024).

Second, the other side of this development, namely military policing, has received considerably less attention. Moreover, within this strand of research, most attention has been paid to the (negative) *effects* of military policing on human rights, democratic quality, and the development of state capacity (e.g., Bayer et al. 2025; Blair and Weintraub 2023; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2024; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Jenne and Martínez 2022; Pion-Berlin 2017).

Third, compared to the effects of military policing, its *causes* have received even less scholarly attention and much of our existing knowledge about the causes of military policing is based on single-case studies and small-N comparative work. Within this strand of research, scholars often highlight pragmatic problem solving by incumbents in response to violence perpetrated by organized crime groups (e.g., Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Harig 2022; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017) and terrorist networks (e.g., Bove et al. 2020; Ivey 2024; Wilén and Strömbom 2022) as two primary causes of military policing.

Yet, aside from a series of journal articles by Pion-Berlin et al. (2022; 2014; 2010) investigating military (dis)obedience in the context of deployment orders to suppress civilian uprisings, there is a striking lack of research on the relation between mass mobilization and military policing.[2] This thesis aims to address this research gap at the intersection of civil-military relations and contentious politics by investigating the effects of pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization on the likelihood of military peace preservation.

[1] Police militarization describes the process whereby police forces adopt tactics, gear, and organizational structures from the military (Kraska 2007), while military policing describes instances in which the military assumes civilian policing tasks (Bayer et al. 2025).

[2] There is a wealth of literature on dictators' endgames (discussed in more detail in section 2.3), however, these studies refer to military responses to orders to violently repress revolutionary uprisings in autocracies. This phenomenon is qualitatively distinct from military policing.

1.4 The Main Argument

To explain how and under which conditions mass mobilization leads incumbents to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks, specifically crowd control, I propose a new theoretical model consisting of three causal mechanisms. Together, these three mechanisms demonstrate how pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events, the explanatory macro-level phenomena, affect the cognitions and actions of incumbents in different regime types at the micro-level, thereby generating the macro-level outcome of interest, military peace preservation.

The first mechanism explains under which conditions incumbents perceive pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events as threatening. To that end, I introduce the notion of regime incongruence, ideational incongruence, and episode incongruence. In short, incumbents are expected to perceive mass mobilization events as threatening whenever the aims of these events are incongruent with the current regime type, the incumbent's ideational commitment to democratic norms, or an ongoing episode of regime transformation.

The second mechanism explains how these threat perceptions generate specific action at the incumbent-level, namely orders for military peace preservation. When feeling threatened, incumbents are expected to adjust their behavior in order to alleviate this stressful and unpleasant situation. Specifically, I argue that issuing deployment orders for military peace preservation operations is a way for incumbents to demonstrate their strength and diminish the perceived threat. At this stage, it is important for incumbents is to anticipate the likely military responses to these deployment orders. They are only expected to issue these orders if they are reasonably certain that the military will (at least conditionally) comply. This is because open military defiance can prove disastrous for an incumbent's tenure.

The third mechanism explains under which conditions these deployment orders are transformed into the macro-level outcome of interest, military peace preservation. Drawing on the civil-military relations literature, I identify several factors that are expected to shape military responses to these deployment orders. Depending on these factors, military responses to deployment orders for military peace preservation operations are expected to range between full compliance, some form of conditional or limited compliance, or even outright resistance or disobedience.

1.5 Research Design

This theoretical model allows for observable and falsifiable predictions to be derived, and I test these hypotheses in a mixed-methods approach. First, using a dataset covering 2,058 country-years across 74 countries between 1990 and 2020, I fit the appropriate (within-between generalized linear mixed-effect) models. These models take the hierarchical structure of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) datasets into account by explicitly modeling country-level heterogeneity, thereby avoiding the untenable assumption about unit-homogeneity. Second, building on the findings of this large-*N* analysis, I investigate more closely a group of country-years for which these models produce false negative predictions, i.e., deviant cases.

1.6 Summary of the Results

The results of the large-*N* analysis provide partial support for the theoretical model. Specifically, while there is not sufficient empirical evidence to reject the null hypotheses regarding episode and ideational incongruence ($H_3 - H_6$), there is enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses regarding regime incongruence ($H_1 - H_2$). In short, I find that as the the size and frequency of pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events increases in autocracies (democracies), so does the predicted probability of military peace preservation. In contrast, as the the size and frequency of pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events increases in democracies (autocracies), the predicted probability of military peace preservation remains largely unaffected. Therefore, with regard to the research question posed at the outside of this thesis, the short answer is this: *When the aims of mass mobilization events are incongruent with the current regime type, they trigger threat perceptions on the part of the incumbent, who then, as a self-assuring show of force, orders the military to deploy to the streets for peace preservation.*

Building on the findings of this large-*N* analysis, I attempt to refine the theoretical model by investigating more closely a group of deviant cases. Specifically, I examine a number of Latin American[3] country-years for which the two best-fitting models jointly produce false negative predictions. Within this subset of deviant cases, I find

[3]Of the 2,058 country-year observations analyzed, there are only 44 country-years for which both of the best-fitting models (Model 2 and Model 4) make false negative predictions. Nevertheless, this number is far too great for a case study design, so I narrow it down further by only considering deviant cases from Latin America (due to the region's front and center role in the emerging literature on military policing). This leaves me with with 12 deviant cases from nine distinct countries.

that countries relying solely on paramilitary police forces, rather than constabularized militaries, are overrepresented compared to their relative frequency in the region. This suggests that the scope of the theoretical model needs to be narrowed to exclude paramilitary police forces from the outcome of interest.

This research makes at least three contributions. First, it contributes to the field of civil-military relations by providing the first systematic cross-national analysis with broad regional coverage of the *causes* of military policing. Second, it addresses a research gap at the intersection of contentious politics and civil-military relations by investigating how and under which conditions mass mobilization events lead incumbents to domestically deploy their armed forces for peace preservation. Third, it attempts to contribute to comparative democratization studies by advancing our understanding of the roles of the military during episodes of autocratization. Though there is insufficient empirical evidence to support this particular proposition, the theoretical model argues that autocratizing incumbents in democracies take advantage of the norm of civilian control by 'pulling' the military into new roles and missions when faced with protests directed against them. As our understanding of the roles of the military during contemporary episodes of autocratization is still limited, further research is certainly required in this regard.

1.7 What is Ahead

The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two provides an overview of the relevant scholarly literature on military policing, aiming to provide readers with a clear understanding of previous research and clarifying how the present thesis builds upon and extends existing knowledge in the field. Chapter three outlines the proposed theoretical model which explains how and under which conditions mass mobilization events lead incumbents to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks. Chapter four discusses the data and methods employed to empirically test the hypotheses derived from this theoretical model. This chapter aims to provide a transparent discussion of the sources of data, the operationalization of concepts and the methods applied, such that readers can independently evaluate and replicate the conclusions reached in this thesis. Chapter five chapter presents and discusses the results of the quantitative analysis and chapter six investigates a group of deviant cases. Chapter seven concludes with a summary of the results, a discussion of the limitations of this thesis, and suggestions for future research.

2 The State Of The Art

2.1 Militarization and Military Missions

Militarization and military missions have long been at the center of scholarly discourse on civil-military relations, and remain among the most important topics in the field today (Pion-Berlin et al. 2024, p. 2). Military policing is intimately linked to both militarization and military missions. This is because militarization is understood as "a function of the extent to which the military takes on different roles and missions, and the extent to which the various resources of a society are placed in the hands of the military" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 818). Therefore, military policing is an example of (societal) militarization in as much as it implies an expansion of military missions and roles to include civilian policing tasks (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 822). Military peace preservation is simply a specific manifestation of military policing, one in which the military is tasked with "crowd control at public events and demonstrations" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 823).

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section two highlights trends and patterns in material, political, and societal militarization, all of which suggest that the world is becoming increasingly militarized. Section three discusses what military policing is and is not by contrasting it with two related phenomena. Section four summarizes the key findings of previous research on military policing. This review of the relevant literature reveals that, while most scholars have focused on the *effects* of military policing, its *causes*, particularly in relation to contentious politics, remain underdeveloped both theoretically and empirically. This is the research gap this thesis aims to address.

2.2 A More Militarized World?

In recent years, state-soldier-society relations have become increasingly militarized (Bayer et al. 2025). First, the past few years have been characterized by a remarkable degree of *material militarization* as global military spending continues to rise due

tensions in Asia and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Tian et al. 2023). Second, the past few years have been characterized by *political militarization* as militaries around the world are gaining renewed political influence. Notable developments include a series of coups in Western Africa (Akinola and Makombe 2024; Mbara and Graham 2023; Opalo 2025) and the recruitment of retired and active-duty military personnel for cabinet or government positions in Latin America (Diamint 2015; Harig 2022) and Asia (Croissant et al. 2024a; Slater 2024). Finally, the past few years have also been characterized by *societal militarization*. During the pandemic, this became particularly evident when countries around the world deployed their armed forces for policing tasks and to provide logistical and healthcare services (Croissant et al. 2023; Erickson et al. 2023). Apart from the pandemic, many armed forces in Latin America (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Pion-Berlin 2016; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022) and Western Europe (Ivey 2024; Wilén and Strömbom 2022) have been deployed for civilian policing tasks in recent years. So, how do we know it when we see it? To answer this question, the next section contrasts military policing with police militarization and dictators' endgames.

2.3 What Military Policing Is (Not)

As Nordlinger (1977, p. 10) once said, beginning an analysis by considering what a subject is *not* can sometimes be more effective than providing an immediate and detailed account of its characteristics. In the case of military policing, two related concepts and topical literatures are worthy of brief discussion: police militarization and dictators' endgames. Both concepts are distinct from military policing, and both have received considerably more scholarly attention. I will discuss these two concepts in turn to clarify what military policing is and is not.

First, over the past two decades, many scholars have noted that the distinction between the military and police forces, as well as between internal and external security, has become increasingly blurred (Campbell and Campbell 2010; Kraska 2007; Lutterbeck 2004; Lutterbeck 2005). The convergence of roles between soldiers and police officers is a two-sided coin: on the one hand, soldiers are becoming more like police officers, and on the other hand, police officers are becoming more like soldiers (Campbell and Campbell 2010). While military policing (the former) describes the domestic deployment of the armed forces for civilian policing tasks (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 822), police militarization (the latter) describes "the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model" (Kraska 2007, p. 503). This strand of

research on police militarization is mostly centered around the 1033 Program in the United States and its (negative) effects on crime rates and the use of lethal force by police officers (e.g., Delehanty et al. 2017; Gunderson et al. 2021; Lawson 2019; Lowande 2021; Stavro and Welch 2024).

Second, military policing is related to but distinct from dictators' endgames. A dictators' endgame is a precisely defined phenomenon which takes place in an authoritarian regime that is faced with regime threatening non-violent mass protests which ordinary security services have failed to suppress (Croissant et al. 2024b, p. 24). The main objective of this body of research is to model military decision-making and explain why some militaries remain loyal by violently repressing protests, while others choose to defy the dictator by staying quartered, siding with the opposition, or staging a coup (e.g., Albrecht and Ohl 2016; Barany 2016; Bou Nassif 2020; Croissant et al. 2024b; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010).

Importantly, although military peace preservation may lead to repression, it is conceptually distinct from dictators' endgames. While the former describes the deployment of the military for the civilian policing task of crowd control, the latter describes "the organized use of large-scale military violence by the armed forces against protestors with the aim of putting down the mass unrest" (Croissant et al. 2024b, p. 18). To further emphasize this distinction, consider the frequency with which these two phenomena have occurred in the past. While Croissant et al. (2024b) identify only 40 dictators' endgames between 1946 and 2014, the M^3-dataset (Bayer et al. 2025) identifies well over 1,300 cases of military peace preservation between 1990 and 2020. Moreover, the M^3-dataset shows that military peace preservation and military repression are only weakly correlated ($r = 0.192$). Thus, military peace preservation and dictators' endgames are clearly distinct concepts.

The purpose of this section was to clarify what military policing is and is not. It demonstrated that military policing, and by extension, military peace preservation, differ from police militarization and dictators' endgames. Having defined the outcome of interest in this thesis, I will now discuss relevant previous research on military policing and highlight the research gap that this thesis aims to address.

2.4 What We (Do Not) Know about Military Policing

Many prominent scholars of civil-military relations have discussed the expansion of military missions to include civilian policing duties in one way or another. Sixty-five years ago, Janowitz (1960, pp. 417–440) already anticipated the constabularization of armed forces around the world, as well as the difficulties of assigning these roles

to militaries, which often perceive them as professionally demeaning. Building on this argument, others have suggested that military policing, especially in the context of protests, threatens democracy and civilian control. According to Finer (1962, pp. 27, 75–79), the civilian leadership's reliance on the military as a domestic police force can causes the military to become frustrated and resentful, thereby increasing their disposition and opportunity to intervene in politics. Nordlinger (1977, pp. 90–92) echoes this notion, arguing that the military perceives police work as demeaning, and resents the government whose incompetence and inability to maintain public order led to their deployment in the first place. In this situation, a coup becomes increasingly likely, as the military expects a different government to "restore order more effectively, thereby relieving the officers of a demoralizing task" (Nordlinger 1977, p. 91). Nevertheless, some scholars have challenged this view, asserting that domestic military missions do not necessarily pose a threat to democracy and civilian control when civilians exercise their oversight and decision-making authority while respecting the non-partisan nature of the armed force (Ivey 2024; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000).

Setting aside the question of civilian control, a growing number of scholars have recently investigated the impact of military policing on human rights violations. This strand of research indicates that military policing does not reduce crime or lead to improved perceptions of security (Blair and Weintraub 2023), and instead leads to an increase in physical violence and excessive use of force (Bayer et al. 2025; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2024; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021), including torture as a means of extracting confessions (Magaloni and Rodriguez 2020). Nevertheless, Pion-Berlin (2017) has convincingly demonstrated that whether or not military policing leads to human rights abuses depends on the type of operation and whether it aligns with a military's capabilities and training. Nevertheless, on balance, military policing seem to be "ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst" (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, p. 534). Moreover, military policing and other domestic deployments may negatively impact the quality of governance in the long term by disincentivizing the state from developing necessary civilian capacities, including police reforms (Jenne and Martínez 2022).

While the *effects* of military policing have received considerable attention, its *causes* remain theoretically and empirically underdeveloped. Existing research on the causes of military policing can best be summarized by grouping its explanations into three interrelated clusters: (i) the shift from military pushing to civilian pulling, (ii) the proximate causes of military policing, and (iii) the distal causes of military policing. I will briefly discuss each of these clusters of explanations in turn.

1) From pushing to pulling. Throughout the 20th century, Latin American militaries

frequently pushed their way into politics by staging coups (Finer 1962; Nordlinger 1977). However, this has changed since the end of the Cold War. Now, civilian leaders are pulling their militaries into new missions and roles to which they were previously unaccustomed to, including military policing (Bayer et al. 2025; Harig and Ruffa 2022; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020). Thus, the fact that no fewer than 70 countries deployed their armed forces for some form of military policing in 2020 (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 830) is predicated on at least some degree of civilian control, i.e., the ability of civilian leaders to make their own preferences prevail over those of the military by pulling them into these new missions (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020, p. 153). Finally, although the military was historically the main perpetrator of democratic breakdowns (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, p. 1104), we now observe a new pattern whereby the military is being pulled into politics as an accomplice during civilian-led episodes of autocratization (Croissant and Kuehn 2024a; Croissant and Kuehn 2024b).

2) The proximate causes of military policing. Domestic military deployments, including military policing, often seem to be driven by pragmatic problem-solving incumbents who consider their options and decide that requesting military assistance is the most practical solution (Pion-Berlin 2016, pp. 27–28). Therefore, the decision to deploy the military for civilian policing tasks may simply be a result of insufficient civilian state capacity (Jenne and Martínez 2022). A related motivation are incumbents' calculations about electoral gain and political expediency. In many situations where civilian leaders engage in pragmatic problem-solving, they stand to gain by implementing 'tough measures' and demonstrating strength and resolve in the face of adversity (Bove et al. 2020; Ivey 2024). In Latin America for example, the demand for tough-on-crime measures associated with punitive populism (Bonner 2018), coupled with the fact that the public trusts the military more than the police (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017, p. 5), has largely legitimized military policing operations (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, p. 522).

3) The distal causes of military policing. The pragmatic motivations discussed above only provide an incomplete explanation of military policing unless we also consider the underlying societal conditions. The two most frequently cited root causes of military policing are high levels of violence and disarray resulting from the illicit activities of transnational criminal organizations and terrorist attacks. The former is almost exclusively discussed in small-*N* case studies of Latin America (e.g., Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2024; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021; Harig 2022; Magaloni and Rodriguez 2020; Passos 2021; Pion-Berlin 2017; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017). This strand of research highlights that police forces are often part of the problem as they are "inept, corrupt, outnumbered, and outgunned by lethal criminal syndicates

with sufficient resources to purchase police docility or connivance" (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017, p. 7). As a result, the civilian leadership makes the pragmatic decision that, in the absence of a police force capable of addressing violent crime, military policing is the best solution (Jenne and Martínez 2022, p. 58; Pion-Berlin 2016, pp. 27–28). In contrast, the 'war on terror' explanation is most frequently cited in reference to France, Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom, where the armed forces were deployed for short- and long-term operations following terrorist attacks (Bove et al. 2020; Ivey 2024; Wilén and Strömbom 2022).

This review of previous research highlights that mass mobilization has received strikingly little attention as an explanatory factor. The only notable exception in this regard is a series of journal articles by Pion-Berlin et al. (2022; 2014; 2010). However, these studies primarily focus on *military responses* to deployment orders rather than on the conditions under which these orders are issued. Moreover, in their most recent paper on the topic, Pion-Berlin and Acácio (2022) do not clearly distinguish between what appear to be cases of military peace preservation (e.g., Bolivia 2008, Peru 2006-2018) and endgame-like scenarios in democracies (e.g., Bolivia 2019, Ecuador 1997-2007). To be sure, understanding the causes of varying military responses is crucial to explaining our outcome of interest – regardless of whether that is military peace preservation or endgame-like scenarios in democracies. However, an equally important aspect is understanding how and under which conditions mass mobilization events lead incumbents to issue these deployment orders in the first place. This aspect remains overlooked and underdeveloped in the existing literature. This thesis attempts to address this research gap, and to this end, chapter 3 proposes a theoretical model that explains how and under which conditions pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents across different regime types to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks.

3 Theoretical Framework

Mass mobilization events frequently attract significant public and scholarly attention, not least because they can have major political consequences (e.g., Amenta et al. 2010; Hale 2013; Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023; Marks 2024). In recent months alone, millions have gathered in cities around the world to voice their demands, including the nationwide "No Kings" protests on June 14, 2025, in the United States (Levy et al. 2025), and the ongoing anti-government protests in Türkiye (Guzel and Fraser 2025) and Serbia (Stojanovic 2025). This chapter employs a social mechanisms approach (Hedström and Swedberg 1998) and proposes a new theoretical model to explain how and under which conditions pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents across different regime types to deploy their armed forces for military peace preservation.

3.1 A Social Mechanisms Approach

Hedström and Swedberg (1998) persuasively argue that, in order to be explanatory, social theory ought to "explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations between events" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 1). They outline three types of mechanisms necessary for this endeavor. Together, these mechanisms show "how macro-level events or conditions affect the individual (Step 1), how the individual assimilates the impact of these macro-level events (Step 2), and how a number of individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate macro-level outcomes (Step 3)" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, pp. 21–22). These mechanisms are actor-centered and "always [refer] directly to causes and consequences of individual action oriented to the behavior of others" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 24). Therefore, to explain how one macro-level event (e.g., mass mobilization) causes another macro-level event (e.g., military peace preservation), we must conceptualize the links between the macro and micro-level. The three types of mechanisms necessary for this endeavor are a situational mechanism, an action-formation mechanism, and a transformational mechanism:

1. *Situational mechanisms* provide a link between macro-level events and micro-level actors. This type of mechanism is internal to the individual actor who "is exposed to a specific social situation", and which "will affect him or her in a particular way" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 23).

2. *Action-formation mechanisms* provide a link between the psychological effects of the first mechanism and the specific micro-level action that is thereby generated: "This type of mechanism shows how a specific combination of individual desires, beliefs, and action opportunities generate a specific action" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 23).

3. *Transformational mechanisms* provide the link between micro-level behavior and the macro-level outcome of interests by showing how how the interaction of a number of individual actors is "transformed into some kind of collective outcome" (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 23).

Any theoretical model necessarily works with simplification and analytical abstraction. The guiding criterion is *not* realism. Instead, one should aim to highlight and accentuate those aspects of a situation that are relevant to model the causal mechanism at hand (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, p. 15). Keeping this in mind, the next section proposes a new theoretical model of military peace preservation.

3.2 Explaining Military Peace Preservation

The proposed theoretical model consists of three causal mechanisms. The first is a situational mechanism that explains how mass mobilization events can trigger threat perceptions on the part of the incumbent. To explain under which conditions mass mobilization events trigger these threat perceptions, I differentiate between pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events and introduce the notion of regime incongruence, ideational incongruence, and episode incongruence. The second is an action-formation mechanism that explains how these threat perceptions generate specific action at the incumbent-level, namely orders for military peace preservation. The third is a transformational mechanism that explains the conditions under which these deployment orders are expected to elicit military compliance and lead to the macro-level outcome of interest, namely military peace preservation. Figure 3.1 summarizes and visually depicts these three causal mechanisms. Below, I discuss each of the three mechanisms in turn.

Figure 3.1: Summary of Theoretical Model



Note: This theoretical model of military peace preservation employs Hedström and Swedberg's (1998) social mechanisms approach.

3.2.1 How Incongruence Causes Threat Perceptions

The first mechanism in this theoretical model is a situational mechanism. It explains how mass mobilization events trigger threat perceptions. Previous research has often highlighted how dissent and contention lead to threat perceptions and repression (e.g., Carey 2004; Carey 2010; Davenport 1995; Earl 2003; Ritter and Conrad 2016). However, these studies often employ very broad conceptualizations of contention and repression. Moreover, none of these studies investigates military peace preservation as a distinct state response to mass mobilization.

To be perceived as a threat, mass mobilization events do not necessarily need to pose an immediate existential threat to the survival of the incumbent regime. To be sure, the size and frequency of mass mobilization events is expected to positively affect the magnitude of the perceived threat (Davenport 1995). However, I argue that the aim of mass mobilization events is equally important in explaining the magnitude of the perceived threat.[4] Building on Hellmeier and Bernhard (2023), I distinguish between pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events.

Whether an incumbent perceives a mass mobilization event as threatening depends,

[4]Building on research in cognitive psychology and behavioral science, I define threat perceptions as "[c]ognitions about a danger or harm that exists in an environment" (Popova 2012, p. 458).

at least in part, on whether the aims of that mass mobilization event are fundamentally at odds with the incumbent regime. More specifically, I argue that whenever the aims of mass mobilization events are incongruent with the current regime type *(regime incongruence)*, the incumbent's commitment to democratic norms *(ideational incongruence)*, or an ongoing episode of regime transformation *(episode incongruence)*, they are likely to be perceived as threatening. Therefore, by considering the aims of mass mobilization events, we can determine if they are congruent with the incumbent regime. This allows us to infer whether incumbents are likely to perceive them as threatening. Below, I discuss each of the three sources of incongruence in turn.

Regime incongruence is present when pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events take place in autocracies (democracies). In these two scenarios of regime incongruence, incumbents are expected to perceive mass mobilization events as threatening. In contrast, when pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events take place in democracies (autocracies), they are not expected to trigger threat perceptions. Democracies are conceptualized as regimes with *de-facto* free and fair multiparty elections, along with Dahl's (1998) institutional prerequisites that make elections meaningful (Lührmann et al. 2018, pp. 62–63). Autocracies, on the other hand, are conceptualized as regimes that either do not hold *de-facto* free and fair multiparty elections, or otherwise fail to meet Dahl's (1998) institutional prerequisites (Lührmann et al. 2018, p. 63). Table 3.1 summarizes this argument by visualizing the presence or absence of threat perceptions for the four logically possible configurations of regime (in)congruence.

Table 3.1: Threat Perceptions for Regime (In)congruence

		Regime Type	
		Democracy	Autocracy
Mass Mobilization	Pro-Democratic	No Threat	Threat
	Pro-Autocratic	Threat	No Threat

Ideational incongruence is present when pro-autocratic (pro-democratic) mass mobilization events take place during the tenure of incumbents that (do not) show a commitment to democratic norms. In these two scenarios of ideational incongruence, incumbents are expected to perceive mass mobilization events as threatening. In contrast, when pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events take place during the tenure of incumbents that (do not) show a commitment to democratic norms they are not expected to trigger threat perceptions. To distinguish between

incumbents with and without a commitment to democratic norms, I employ Medzihorsky and Lindberg's (2024) conceptualization of anti-pluralism, which defines a commitment to democratic norms as a commitment to "i) the democratic process as the legal means of gaining and losing power; ii) the legitimacy of political opponents; iii) peaceful resolution of disagreements and rejection of political violence; and iv) unequivocal support for civil liberties of minorities" (Medzihorsky and Lindberg 2024, pp. 422–423, italics in original). This introduces *some* conceptual overlap between regime incongruence and ideational incongruence because *most* incumbents in autocracies lack a commitment to democratic norms, while *many* incumbents in democracies are committed to democratic norms. However, as Medzihorsky and Lindberg (2024, pp. 424–425) show, there are quite a few autocracies with governing parties that are committed to democratic norms, and even more democracies with governing parties that are not committed to democratic norms (Medzihorsky and Lindberg 2024, p. 425). Table 3.2 summarizes this argument by visualizing the presence or absence of threat perceptions for the four logically possible configurations of ideational (in)congruence.

Table 3.2: Threat Perceptions for Ideational (In)congruence

		Ideational Commitment	
		Democratic	Non-Democratic
Mass Mobilization	Pro-Democratic	No Threat	Threat
	Pro-Autocratic	Threat	No Threat

Episode incongruence is present when pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events take place during episodes of autocratization (democratization). In these two scenarios of episode incongruence, incumbents are expected to perceive mass mobilization events as threatening. In contrast, when pro-democratic (pro-autocratic) mass mobilization events take place during episodes of democratization (autocratization) they are not expected to trigger threat perceptions. Episodes of regime transformation are defined as "periods when a country undergoes sustained and substantial changes along a democracy–autocracy continuum" (Maerz et al. 2024, p. 970).[5] Table 3.3 summarizes this argument.

[5]Based on the direction, as well as the start- and endpoint of episodes of regime transformation, numerous subtypes can be identified. For the present purposes I simply distinguish between episodes of democratization and episodes of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Maerz et al. 2024; Wilson et al. 2023).

Table 3.3: Threat Perceptions for Episode (In)congruence

		Episode Type	
		Democratization	Autocratization
Mass Mobilization	Pro-Democratic	No Threat	Threat
	Pro-Autocratic	Threat	No Threat

The magnitude of the perceived threat is expected to increase when incongruence is present on more than one dimension. Therefore, the greatest perceived threat is expected for large, frequent mass mobilization events that are incongruent with the current regime type, the incumbent's commitment to democratic norms, and an ongoing episode of regime transformation.

3.2.2 How Threat Perceptions Cause Incumbent-Level Action

The second mechanism in this theoretical model is an action-formation mechanism. It explains how threat perceptions generate specific action at the incumbent level, namely orders for military peace preservation. Because this mechanism explains how threat perceptions affect adaptive changes in behavior on the micro-level, it is inspired by cognitive psychology and behavioral science research. Specifically, I build on the assumptions from the Extended Parallel Process Model (e.g., Popova 2012; Witte 1992), which posits that individuals who perceive a message or event as threatening, and who also believe that they are able to avert this threat (high perceived efficacy), subsequently engage in a cognitive process called "danger control" which leads them to adapt changes in attitudes and behavior.

Given that incumbents are, by definition, at the levers of power, they are likely to perceive themselves as efficacious, regardless of actual empirical variation in the degree of executive constraints. However, a key factor in whether threat perceptions translate into deployment orders are incumbents' intuitions and calculations about *likely* military responses.[6] This is because the potential repercussions of issuing deployment orders that are openly defied can be disastrous. If protesters observe that the armed forces have withdrawn their support from the incumbent and are unwilling to comply with deployment orders, the threat to the incumbent's tenure increases drastically. Therefore, when incumbents are uncertain about likely

[6]Due to information constraints, incumbents are likely to rely on previous military responses as a heuristic. Put differently, incumbents are expected to refer to past military behavior as a predictor of future military behavior and a guide for current decisions.

military responses or anticipate defiance, they are expected to refrain from issuing deployment orders and rely on regular civilian protest policing instead.

In contrast, when incumbents feel threatened by mass mobilization events and anticipate military compliance, they are expected to take action by issuing deployment orders.[7] In this context, issuing deployment orders can be considered a problem-focused coping mechanism (Carroll 2020, p. 1747) which aims to resolve the stressful and unpleasant situation of feeling threatened through a self-assuring show of force. Put differently, it is an attempt to maximize the ratio of outwardly projected strength to perceived threat (Poe 2004). Importantly, however, unlike in endgame scenarios, the intent behind these deployment orders is not the deliberate use of the military as a tool of political repression, but rather to restore public order, project strength, and alleviate the incumbent's perceived threat.

3.2.3 How Civil-Military Relations Influence Military Responses

The third mechanism in this theoretical model is a transformational mechanism. It explains how civil-military relations influence military responses and, consequently, the likelihood of military peace preservation. Depending on the nature of civil-military relations within a political system, the military's response to deployment orders for military peace preservation is expected to range from full compliance to conditional or limited compliance, or even resistance or disobedience (Harig and Ruffa 2022; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022).

Previous research has highlighted several factors that influence the success of "knocking on the barracks' door" (Harig and Ruffa 2022). Based on the premise that the military is a rational actor that is first and foremost motivated by protecting its institutional interests and well-being (e.g., Croissant et al. 2024b; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2020; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014), some of the most important predictors of military responses appear to be (i) the perceived appropriateness of a mission, (ii) the legality of the deployment, (iii) the judicial risks in the event of human rights violations, (iv) the expected effects of the deployment on internal cohesion, (v) whether the military leadership's social identities align more closely with the incumbent government or the protesters, and (vi) the extent to which the military's material well-being is guaranteed by the incumbent government (Harig and Ruffa 2022; Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010).

[7] Incumbents do not always respond coercively to mass mobilization events. Even in autocracies, incumbents sometimes make concessions (e.g., Leuschner and Hellmeier 2024), and sometimes they even initiate "incumbent-guided transitions" to prevent revolutions (e.g., Djuve and Knutsen 2025).

Depending on these factors, the military's response to deployment orders for military peace preservation is expected to range from full compliance to conditional or limited compliance, or even resistance or disobedience. Informed by the above cited civil-military relations literature, the most conducive conjunction of conditions for bringing about the outcome military peace preservation is expected to be (i) alignment of the military's role conceptions with deployment orders, (ii) a constitutional or statutory basis for the deployment with clear rules of engagement, (iii) legal protections or immunity for potential human rights violations, (iv) broad agreement within the military leadership on deployment orders, (v) alignment of social identities between military leadership and incumbent government, and (vi) satisfaction of the military's material interests. In contrast, when none or only a few of these conditions are present, the expected military response is to stay quartered (Pion-Berlin et al. 2014; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010) or to comply under certain conditions, e.g., bargaining for favorable deployment terms beforehand or exploiting their wide tactical discretion once deployed to align the operation with their preferences (Pion-Berlin and Acácio 2022).

3.3 Summarizing the Argument

This chapter developed a theoretical model that explains how and under which conditions pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks. It applied the social mechanisms approach proposed by Hedström and Swedberg (1998) and conceptualized three causal mechanisms. The first mechanism explained how mass mobilization events trigger threat perceptions on the part of the incumbent. The second mechanism explained how these threat perceptions generate specific action at the incumbent-level, namely orders for military peace preservation. The third mechanism explained how these deployment orders are transformed into the macro-level outcome of interest, namely military peace preservation.

This theoretical model allows for a number of observable and falsifiable predictions to be derived. Note that the number of hypotheses that *could* be formulated based on this theoretical model exceed the number formulated below. Although the best practice is to test all of a theory's parts (Van Evera 1997, p. 35), this simply is not possible in this case due limited data availability.[8]

[8] In cases such as these, the important criterion for a good theory is that its predictions are, at least in principle, amenable to be tested and falsified (Hempel 1966, pp. 30–32).

H_1: In autocracies, pro-democratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-autocratic mass mobilization does not.

H_2: In democracies, pro-autocratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-democratic mass mobilization does not.

H_3: During episodes of autocratization, pro-democratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-autocratic mass mobilization does not.

H_4: During episodes of democratization, pro-autocratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-democratic mass mobilization does not.

H_5: During the incumbency of political leaders without an ideational commitment to democratic norms, pro-democratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-autocratic mass mobilization does not.

H_6: During the incumbency of political leaders with an ideational commitment to democratic norms, pro-autocratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-democratic mass mobilization does not.

The remainder of this thesis is devoted to testing these hypotheses. The next chapter describes the data and methods used to empirically test these hypotheses, chapter 5 presents and discusses the results, and chapter 6 builds on this large-N analysis and refines the proposed theoretical model by investigating a group of deviant cases from Latin America more closely.

4 Data and Methods

4.1 A Mixed-Methods Approach

All too often, qualitative and quantitative political science research proceed in relative ignorance of, or even hostility toward, each other, and attempts to unify the two have sparked considerable debate in the past (e.g., Caporaso 1995; Collier 1995; King et al. 1995; Laitin 1995; Rogowski 1995; Tarrow 1995). Nevertheless, many scholars seem to agree that mixed-methods approaches—that is, studies that combine qualitative and quantitative methodologies and leverage their respective strengths—offer the best of both worlds (e.g., Coppedge 1999; Lieberman 2005; Tarrow 1995). Lieberman (2005) for example proposes a mixed-methods approach, which he labels nested analysis, that "combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample" (Lieberman 2005, pp. 435–436).

As Lieberman (2005) explains, the workflow for a nested analysis begins with a large-N analysis, followed by either model-testing or model-building small-N analyses—which may in turn be followed by additional iterations of large-N and small-N analyses. Following this mixed-methods approach, I begin my empirical analysis with a quantitative hypothesis-testing section in which I compute a number of generalized linear mixed-effect models (GLMMs) (Bates et al. 2015; Brown 2021) that disentangle within-country effects from between-country effects (Bell et al. 2019; Bell and Jones 2015). Building on the results of this large-N analysis, I investigate more closely a group of deviant cases with the aim of refining the theoretical model (Levy 2008; Lieberman 2005; Lijphart 1971; Seawright and Gerring 2008).

The following two sections provide a more detailed discussion of these methodologies. The next section provides a brief introduction to GLMMs and discusses the operationalization of key concepts. The following section elaborates on the deviant case study design. As a whole, this chapter aims to transparently present the data sources and methods used such that interested readers may independently evaluate and replicate the conclusions reached in this thesis.

4.2 Large-N Analysis

In line with the mixed-methods approach described above, I begin the empirical analysis by computing a number of generalized linear mixed-effect[9] models that decompose time-varying covariates into within-country and between-country variation (Bell et al. 2019; Bell and Jones 2015). This section begins by outlining common issues that arise when analyzing time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. Then, it summarizes conventional modeling strategies for TSCS data and their limitations, before explaining why GLMMs are superior. It concludes by discussing the operationalization of key concepts.

4.2.1 Modeling Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data

Time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data—that is, repeated observations of a series of units over time—violate a core assumption of linear models: that observations are independent of one another. More specifically, TSCS data introduces two types of dependence, namely serial correlation, i.e., within-unit dependence over time, and contemporaneous correlation, i.e., between-unit dependence at the same point in time. Ignoring these dependencies will result in biased model estimates and overconfident standard errors, thereby increasing the likelihood of type I errors (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995). For anyone hoping to engage in rigorous research, this is a problem to be taken seriously.

The conventional wisdom provided to those wishing to analyze TSCS data is to either include a lagged version of the dependent variable as a predictor and compute "panel-corrected standard errors" (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995), or to include country- and year-fixed effects (Allison 2009; Imai and Kim 2021; Mummolo and Peterson 2018) and compute cluster-robust standard errors (Arellano 1987; Liang and Zeger 1986). Although these approaches are cognizant of the challenges involved in modeling TSCS data, they may still produce biased estimates (Cook et al. 2023; Esarey and Menger 2019; Jackson 2020; Wilson and Butler 2007). Therefore, over the years, these approaches have been refined and more recent contributions include the "spatiotemporal autoregressive distributed lag model" (Cook et al. 2023) and "cluster estimated standard errors" (Jackson 2020). But there is a much more elegant solution to modeling TSCS data!

[9] The term "mixed" in mixed-methods has nothing to do with that in generalized linear mixed-effect models. The former describes research designs that combine quantitative and qualitative methodology, while the latter describes regression models that compute fixed and random effects.

4.2.2 Generalized Linear Mixed-Effects Models (GLMMs)

What are generalized linear mixed-effect models?[10] To begin with, generalized linear mixed-effect models (GLMMs) are to linear mixed-effect models (LMMs) what generalized linear models (GLMs) are to linear models (LMs). Put simply, GLMs extend LMs by allowing the response variable to follow a distribution from the exponential family (e.g., binomial, Poisson), which is achieved by linking predictors to the outcome via a transformation, the link function (Nelder and Wedderburn 1972). GLMMs extend LMMs in the same way, allowing us to model non-normal outcomes (Bell et al. 2019, pp. 1066–1067), including the binary indicator of military peace preservation modeled in this thesis.

What is the difference between GLMs and GLMMs? GLMMs combine the flexibility of GLMs with the ability to model fixed effects and random effects (Bates et al. 2015, p. 1). This is crucial when modeling TSCS data for which "observations (at level 1) are clustered into groups of some kind (at level 2)" (Bell et al. 2019, p. 1053). For most comparative politics TSCS datasets, repeated country-year observations are nested within countries (Bell and Jones 2015, p. 135). Using LMs or GLMs and disregarding these dependencies would result in underestimated standard errors, thereby increasing the risk of type I errors (Bell et al. 2019, pp. 1058–1059). This is because "the effective sample size of such datasets is much smaller than a simple regression would assume: closer to the number of higher-level entities (individuals or countries) than the number of lower-level units (measurement occasions). As such, standard errors will be incorrect if this dependence is not taken into account" (Bell and Jones 2015, p. 135). This is where LMMs and GLMMs enter the stage.

LMMs and GLMMs explicitly model the clustered structure of TSCS data by computing separate intercepts and slopes for each country (the random effects), while also computing population level intercepts and slopes (the fixed effects). By computing both random intercepts and random slopes, within-unit dependence over time is captured by allowing each higher-level entity to have its own intercept, while between-unit heterogeneity is captured by allowing the effects of predictors to vary across entities through unit-specific slopes (Bell et al. 2019, p. 1055). The random

[10] Across scientific disciplines, these models are also know as hierarchical models and multi-level models. Political scientists, said to be unruly and difficult to discipline (Laitin 1995), frequently use the term random-effect models (e.g., Beck and Katz 2007; Bell et al. 2019; Bell and Jones 2015; Clark and Linzer 2015). To the best of my knowledge, this is a slightly inaccurate description, as these models estimate fixed *and* random effects—making the term mixed-effect models superior. Going forward, I will therefore refer to these models as GLMMs. This also applies to the within-between random-effect (REWB) models proposed by Bell and co-authors (2019; 2015) which I employ for my own analyses. For the reasons outlined above, I will refer to these models as within-between generalized linear mixed-effect models (WB-GLMMs).

effects therefore describe how much each higher-level entity deviates from the fixed effects—the average intercepts and slopes estimated across the entire population.[11] Therefore, random effects can be understood as residual variance left unexplained by the fixed effects.

Importantly, it is best practice to always include random intercepts *and* random slopes. Doing otherwise would imply the strong assumption that the association between predictor and response is exactly the same across all countries (Beck and Katz 2007, p. 183). This assumption is at the very least questionable. Moreover, Bell et al. (2019, p. 1052) "show that estimated standard errors are anti-conservative when random-slope variation exists but a model does not allow for it." Correctly specified LMMs and GLMMs produce correct standard errors (Bell and Jones 2015, p. 136), and simulations show that these models also produce more accurate standard errors than the more commonly used cluster-robust standard errors in two-way fixed-effect models (Bell et al. 2019, p. 1065).

For the empirical analysis in this thesis, I employ an extension of these GLMMs proposed by Bell et al. (2019; 2015). This extension allows me to estimate separate between- and within-country effects by decomposing the main time-varying predictors into between-country and within-country variation. This decomposition is achieved by dividing a time-varying country-level predictor into two variables: the higher-entity means which account for the between-country variation, and the deviation of individual observations from their respective higher-entity means which accounts for the within-country variation (Bell et al. 2019, pp. 1055–1056). This separation of within- and between-country effects is important because "it is the rule rather than the exception that within-group regression coefficients differ from between-group coefficients" (Snijders and Bosker 2011, p. 60). Note that Bell et al. (2019; 2015) refer to these models as within-between random-effect (REWB) models. However, for reasons outlined above (see footnote 10), I prefer the term within-between generalized linear mixed-effect models (WB-GLMMs).

To gain a deeper conceptual understanding of WB-GLMMs, it is helpful to express these models in mathematical notation.[12] First, as discussed above, TSCS data features repeated country-year observations i nested within countries j. Therefore, countries represent level 2 units, while country-years represent level 1 units. Second, the dependent variable military peace preservation is binary. The probability of its

[11] It is worth noting that, due to partial pooling, the estimated random effects for higher-level units with fewer observations are pulled more toward the fixed effects, thereby mitigating potential bias from outliers (Clark and Linzer 2015, p. 402).

[12] For the fixed and random components of the models, I follow the classical notation style of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002); for the expression of the within-between decomposition I follow the notation style used by Bell et al. (2019; 2015).

occurrence is estimated via WB-GLMMs with a binomial distribution and a logit link function. A general specification of these models is as follows:

$$\text{logit}\left(\hat{P}\right) = \log\left(\frac{\hat{P}}{1-\hat{P}}\right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\left(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j\right) + \beta_{2j}\bar{x}_j + \sum_{k=1}^{n}\beta_{k0}Z_{kij} \tag{4.1}$$

where

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} \tag{4.2}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \mu_{1j} \tag{4.3}$$

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} \tag{4.4}$$

$$\beta_{k0} = \gamma_{k0} \tag{4.5}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix}\mu_{0j}\\ \mu_{1j}\end{pmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\begin{bmatrix}0\\ 0\end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix}\sigma_0^2 & \sigma_{01}\\ \sigma_{01} & \sigma_1^2\end{bmatrix}\right) \tag{4.6}$$

In Equation 4.1, the dependent variable military peace preservation is modeled as a binary outcome with probability $\hat{P}$ of occurrence, that is, $\hat{P} = \Pr(y_{ij} = 1)$ where $y_{ij} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\hat{P})$. The main predictor x_{ij} is a time-varying (level 1) variable, decomposed into within-country variation $(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j)$ and between-country variation $\bar{x}_j$. These two components are modeled separately, with γ_{10} representing the average within-country effect, and $\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20}$ representing the average between-country effect. The parameter β_{0j} represents the random intercept for cluster j and it is equivalent to the sum of the fixed intercept γ_{00} and the deviation of each cluster's intercept from that fixed intercept μ_{0j} (see Equation 4.2). The parameter β_{1j} represents the random slope for cluster j and is equivalent to the sum of the fixed slope γ_{10} and the deviation of each cluster's slope from that fixed slope μ_{1j} (see Equation 4.3). The parameter $\beta_{k0} = \gamma_{k0}$ represents the fixed effect of the k^{th} control variable Z_{kij}. Finally, as indicated by Equation 4.6, the random effects are assumed to come from a bivariate Normal distribution where σ_0^2 and σ_1^2 are the variances of the random intercepts and random slopes, respectively, and σ_{01} the covariance between random intercepts and slopes indicating whether clusters with higher (or lower) intercepts also tend to have steeper (or flatter) slopes.

For clarity, only the main predictor (x_{ij}) of interest and its decomposition into within-country variation $(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j)$ and between-country variation $(\bar{x}_j)$ is shown here. Separate models are estimated in which this decomposition is applied to the two main predictors of interest, namely pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Furthermore, the actual models also include additional n time-varying

control variables Z_{kij}, each modeled with fixed effects only as indicated by $\beta_{k0}Z_{kij}$, as well as interaction effects (see chapter 3 for theoretical expectations about interaction effects) which are omitted from the above formulation for brevity.

Finally, substituting Equation 4.2 through Equation 4.5 into Equation 4.1 yields

$$\text{logit}\left(\hat{P}\right) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}\left(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j\right) + \gamma_{20}\bar{x}_j + \mu_{0j} + \mu_{1j}\left(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j\right) + \sum_{k=1}^{n} \gamma_{k0}Z_{kij} \tag{4.7}$$

which provides a compact summation of the models I fit to the data. Note that the same variance-covariance matrix specified in Equation 4.6 also applies here. Now, with a solid understanding of *how* I am going to model the data, I turn to discuss *which* data I will be modeling.

4.2.3 Operationalizing Key Concepts

The Dependent Variable

The outcome of interest in this thesis is military peace preservation, which is a specific manifestation of military policing (see chapter 2). The presence or absence of military peace preservation is captured by the binary *milpol_peace* indicator from the M^3-dataset for 95 countries between 1990 and 2020 (Bayer et al. 2025). From a conceptual point of view, the military engages in military peace preservation "by supervising and intervening in noncriminal behavior—through crowd control at public events and demonstrations, settling social disputes or regulating and controlling traffic" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 823).

In order to distinguish between positive and negative cases, a concept must clearly define what it is *not* (Goertz 2006, p. 30). For the concept of military peace preservation, perhaps the most pivotal definition is that of the military itself, as it directly affects which instances are coded as positive or negative cases. For practical reasons, I follow Bayer et al.'s (2025) definition of the military, which includes the three conventional branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Airforce), as well as all other uniformed armed organizations and "official units that operate under the direct command of the ministry of defense" (Bayer et al. 2025, p. 817). This last aspect is particularly important and merits closer attention.

This definition of the military implies that a number of paramilitary police forces, including the Italian *Arma dei Carabinieri*, are defined as being a formal part of

the military, much like the Army, Navy, and Airforce.[13] Although this definition not directly objectionable on the grounds of concept validity, it has important consequences for empirically measuring military peace preservation. Concretely, it results in the fact that out of 95 countries, 33 countries are coded as positive cases throughout the entire period of observation. Therefore, a third of the sample does not display any variation on the dependent variable—and that is before considering countries that are coded as negative cases over the entire period of observation.

This leads to a practical issue when estimating the predicted probability of military peace preservation. For many observations, the WB-GLMMs appear to correctly predict the presence of the outcome with high accuracy. However, some of these observations are from countries where military peace preservation is always present due to institutionalized paramilitary police forces under the command of the ministry of defense. In these cases, the GLMMs appear to explain something when, in reality, they explain nothing. This is because regardless of the values on the predictors, the outcome would have been observed. Put simply, no matter how large and frequent mass mobilization events would have been, no matter how rampant violence by organized crime groups would have been, no matter how prevalent terrorist attacks would have been, it would not have changed the fact that military peace preservation is observed—simply because countries like Italy have paramilitary police forces that are constantly deployed.

In addition, this coding rule obscures whether the reason for a constant positive coding is the presence of institutionalized paramilitary police forces, a continuous deployment of the the Army, Navy, or Airforce, or both. Surely all of this is relevant and interesting nuance, which unfortunately escapes our attention in the first version of the M^3-dataset. I discuss this point in more detail in the Conclusion (see chapter 7), but suffice it to say, a worthwhile future research endeavor would be a renewed data collection effort with minor refinements. Specifically, distinguishing between paramilitary police forces and constabularized militaries (see Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021) and providing two separate indicators would enable researchers to make their own informed decisions about the scope of the outcome under investigation. Those who wish to employ a more encompassing conceptualization of military policing could continue to do so by simply aggregating the two respective indicators using the maximum rule, and those who wish to make more fine-grained distinctions would also be able to do so.[14]

[13] Note that the Italian *Arma dei Carabinieri* is quite literally the fourth branch of the Italian Armed Forces and is under the command of a three-star general (Lutterbeck 2004, p. 48).

[14] While I recognize the importance of being economical when collecting data, particularly through expert surveys, I firmly believe that these additional indicators would be very valuable.

The Main Independent Variables

The main predictors in this thesis are pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events.[15] To measure the amount of strain imposed by mass mobilization, I use the two recently introduced interval-scale V-Dem indicators *v2cademmob* (pro-democratic mass mobilization) and *v2caautmob* (pro-autocratic mass mobilization) (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023).[16] This operationalization of mass mobilization includes repertoires such as "demonstrations, strikes, protests, riots, and sit-ins" (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023, p. 1866). The two subtypes are defined as follows:

> Pro-democratic mass mobilization events "are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech." (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 237)

> Pro-autocratic mass mobilization events "are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom." (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 238)

However, these two measures do not capture mass mobilization events that do not directly aim to either advance or protect democratic institutions or support non-democratic rulers. Protest events with demands for a more egalitarian distribution of resources or climate justice are therefore not captured. To address concerns that this operationalization fails to capture relevant mass mobilization events (false negatives) or captures irrelevant events (false positives), I will briefly highlight some major protest events from recent years and their respective values on these two indicators of mass mobilization.[17]

[15] This distinction in the aims of mass mobilization events is crucial because—contrary to the assumption of a fundamentally 'good' civil society—there is clear evidence that "mass movements do not always promote democracy" and that "[c]itizens can also be mobilized in support of authoritarian regimes or in support of the overthrow of democracy" (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023, p. 1882).

[16] Following a suggestion by Coppedge et al. (2025b, p. 31), the GLMMs in chapter 5 employ the point estimates from the V-Dem measurement model (Pemstein et al. 2024), while some of the tables below show the linearized original scale posterior predictions for a more intuitive understanding.

[17] I keep this discussion rather brief as Hellmeier and Bernhard (2023, pp. 1867–1872) have already conducted extensive data validation and found that these indicators perform well with regard to construct validity.

Table 4.1 suggests that concern over false negatives is not justified as all six examples of well-known pro-democratic mass mobilization events[18] (above the horizontal line) display exceptionally high values on the indicator of pro-democratic mass mobilization (well above the 95th percentile). Moreover, we can also see that there were non-negligible pro-autocratic (counter) protests in most cases (cf. Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020). Finally, the four examples below the horizontal line[19] show that concerns about false positives are also unfounded. All of these protests had more than 10,000 participants, yet their scores on the mass mobilization indicators are considerably lower than those of the cases above.

Table 4.1: Major Protest Events on the Mass Mobilization (MM) Indicators

Country	Year	Pro-Democratic MM	Pro-Autocratic MM
Armenia	2018	3.984	2.601
Bangladesh	2024	3.659	1.060
Belarus	2020	3.990	1.639
Serbia	2024	3.838	1.679
Ukraine	2004	3.925	2.234
United States	2020	3.802	1.584
Ecuador	2019	0.586	0.195
France	2018	1.186	0.238
Germany	2019	1.590	0.292
Uruguay	2018	0.812	0.030

Notes: Cases above the horizontal line are expected to have high values, while cases below it are expected to have low values. Values reflect the linearized original scale posterior predictions (scaled from 0 to 4) for easier interpretation (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 31); higher values indicate more frequent and large-scale mass mobilization events. Summary statistics: pro-democratic MM median = 0.87, 5th–95th percentile = 0.07–3.20; pro-autocratic MM median = 0.52, 5th–95th percentile = 0.04–3.12.

[18]The examples include the protests in Armenia (2018) that led to the Velvet Revolution (Lanskoy and Suthers 2019), the protests in Bangladesh (2024) that led to the ousting of PM Hasina (Chowdhury 2025), the protests in Belarus (2020) after the fraudulent presidential election (Way 2020), the ongoing anti-government protests in Serbia (Stojanovic 2025), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) (Kuzio 2005), and the BLM protests in the United States (2020) (Drakulich and Denver 2022).

[19]The examples include the fuel subsidy protests in Ecuador (2019) (Carnegie 2025), the Yellow Vest protests in France (2018) (Chamorel 2019), the Fridays for Future protests in Germany (2019) (Fabel et al. 2025), and the farmers' protests in Uruguay (2018) (Carnegie 2025).

Moderating Variables

The theoretical model of military peace preservation proposed in this thesis (see chapter 3) makes several claims about the effects of incongruence between aims of mass mobilization events and the incumbent regime. To test these hypotheses, I investigate if and how the relationship between the two main predictors and the response is moderated the regime type, incumbents' ideational commitment to democratic norms, and episodes of regime transformation. I will briefly discuss the operationalization of each moderating variable in turn.

1) Regime type. To operationalize whether a country-year classifies as a democracy or an autocracy, I employ the binary regime type measure from the ERT data (Edgell et al. 2024b). This measure builds on the the Regimes of the World (RoW) approach (Lührmann et al. 2018), which, in turn, builds on Dahl's (1998) conceptualization of polyarchy. The ERT approach codes country-years as follows:

> Autocracy. A country-year coded as autocracy on the RoW measure that has had an autocratic transition, i.e. (a) closed autocracy; or (b) electoral autocracy that has held an founding autocratic election ... and/or stayed autocratic for the tolerance period (e.g. 5 years).
>
> Democracy. A country-year coded as democracy on the RoW measure that has held a founding democratic election ... The year of the founding election is included. (Edgell et al. 2024a, p. 10)

2) Incumbents' ideational commitment to democratic norms. To operationalize whether an incumbent has an ideational commitment to democratic norms, I employ the anti-pluralism index from the V-Party dataset (Medzihorsky and Lindberg 2024) which builds on Linz's (1978, p. 29) "litmus test". The V-Party approach defines a commitment to democratic norms as a commitment to

> i) the democratic process as the legal means of gaining and losing power; ii) the legitimacy of political opponents; iii) peaceful resolution of disagreements and rejection of political violence; and iv) unequivocal support for civil liberties of minorities. (Medzihorsky and Lindberg 2024, pp. 422–423, italics in original)

Several data wrangling steps are necessary to obtain an indicator of incumbents' ideational commitment to democratic norms from this anti-pluralism index. First, I transform the V-Party dataset from its original unit of analysis—party-election-year observations—to country-years. To do so, I filter for party-election-year observations of parties that supported the government formed immediately after a given election

using the *v2pagovsup* variable. This allows me to operationalize incumbency. Second, I assume that an incumbent party's degree of anti-pluralism remains rather stable between elections and use 'last observation carried forward' (LOCF) to impute anti-pluralism values between election-years. This results in a dataset with country-years as the unit of analysis, providing information on incumbents' degree of anti-pluralism. Third, as suggested by Medzihorsky and Lindberg (2024, p. 425), is use 0.43 as a threshold for the cut-off between incumbents with and without ideational commitment to democratic norms.

3) Episodes of regime transformation. To operationalize whether a country-year experienced an episode of regime transformation, I employ the ERT dataset (Edgell et al. 2024b). Episodes of regime transformation are defined as "periods when a country undergoes sustained and substantial changes along a democracy–autocracy continuum" (Maerz et al. 2024, p. 970) that may or may not lead to regime transitions. In line with the previous two (binary) moderating variables, I distinguish between episodes of democratization and episodes of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Maerz et al. 2024; Wilson et al. 2023).

Control Variables

To mitigate concern over omitted variable bias and account for competing explanations of military policing (see section 2.4), I include a number of control variables. First, to account for the competing explanation of organized crime, I use data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and include a control variable that measures the homicide rate, that is the total number of intentional homicides in a country-year per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC 2023). Because this variables is heavily right-skewed, I log-transform it obtain a more normal distribution. Furthermore, were possible, I impute missing values via linear interpolation.

Second, to account for the competing explanation of terrorism, I include a binary control variable that captures whether an act of terrorism occurred in a country-year. To do so, I use data from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2021a) and specify the following inclusion criteria: (i) "[t]he violent act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal", (ii) "[t]here must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience", (iii) "[t]he action is outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, insofar as it targets non-combatants", (iv) "[t]here is essentially no doubt as to whether the incident is an act of terrorism", and (v) only attacks that actually took place, are included (START 2021b, pp. 16–17). While these inclusion criteria are strict, they are necessary to ensure both concept validity and measurement validity.

Third, to account for country-specific heterogeneity and further address concerns over omitted variable bias, I include a number of standard control variables. From the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2025a) I include population size and GDP per capita (see also Fariss et al. 2022). Because these variables are heavily right-skewed, I employ ordered quantile (ORQ) normalization to transform them into a normal distribution. Initially, I also tried the more conventional approach of log-transforming these control variables. However, through the use of the appropriate software[20] and a visual inspection of the transformed variables through histograms, it became apparent that ORQ normalization produced the best results. Next, I include a control for rentier states by including a covariate that measures fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports (WorldBank 2024). I use linear interpolation to impute missing values and ORQ normalization to transform the right-skewed distribution into a normal distribution. Finally, using UCDP/PRIO data, I include a control for intrastate conflict (Davies et al. 2024; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

4.3 Deviant Case Study Design

Following Lieberman's (2005) mixed-methods approach, I build on the results of the large-*N* analysis and conduct a model-building small-*N* analysis, specifically a deviant case study. The choice of a model-building small-*N* analysis is motivated by the fact that the proposed theoretical model is still new and the large-*N* analysis only provides partial support for its propositions (see the discussion in chapter 5). The purpose of this deviant case study is to refine the theoretical model by addressing the puzzle of (one or more) deviant cases and thereby increasing the amount of explained variance (Lieberman 2005, pp. 442–446).

A deviant case is an observation whose outcome does not align with theoretical predictions (Levy 2008; Mahoney 2007). In applied research, "regression analysis can be used to identify outlier cases that are then appraised with qualitative methods" (Mahoney 2007, p. 125). This is precisely what I do in this thesis. Based on the results of the GLMMs, I identify false negative predictions, that is, country-year observations for which these models estimate a low predicted probability of military peace preservation despite us observing the presence of military peace preservation, and then investigate some of these empirical anomalies more closely.

The aim of a deviant case study is to "[explain] *why* the case deviates from theoretical expectations and in the process refining the existing theory and generating additional

[20] The *R* package *bestNormalize*.

hypotheses" (Levy 2008, p. 13). In practice, this means that a deviant case study is expected to reach one of two conclusions. The first and preferred result of a deviant case study is the identification of causal factors or processes that help explain this and other deviant cases like it. "This means that in most circumstances, a deviant case study culminates in a general proposition—one that may be applied to other cases in the population" (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 302). The second and less preferred result of a deviant case study is the "[conclusion] that the [deviant] case does not violate the theory's core predictions—because of measurement error, inappropriate operationalization of key concepts, failure to incorporate important contextual variables, recognition that the case falls outside of the theory's scope conditions, or for other reasons" (Levy 2008, p. 13).

Therefore, the first task of a deviant case study is to verify that the key variables have been measured correctly, thereby ruling out measurement error as a cause of deviance. The second task is to identify an explanation for the deviance. The deviant case study in this thesis (see chapter 6) reaches the somewhat less preferred conclusion that a significant number of false negative predictions is explained by a mismatch between theory and data. Specifically, as illustrated by the cases of Argentina 2018, Chile 2010, Chile 2014, and Uruguay 2020, there is some discrepancy between what the indicator of military peace preservation measures and what the theoretical model describes. Due to limited data availability, this shortcoming can not be addressed at the current time—an unfortunate but quite common shortcoming of quantitative cross-country analyses (Lieberman 2005, p. 443; Sartori 2004, p. 786).

5 Descriptive and Inferential Analyses

5.1 The Sample of Cases

The main factor limiting the sample size for the analysis in this thesis is the number of countries with available data on military policing. Specifically, the M^3-dataset (Bayer et al. 2025) provides data on military policing for 2,668 country-year observations across 95 countries and 31 years (1990-2020). The second limiting factor is data availability for key predictors and control variables. Despite employing linear interpolation and last observation carried forward to impute missing values (see subsection 4.2.3), there are some countries for which no data at all is available. The anti-pluralism index[21] and the homicide rate[22] have the most missing data points, with nine and 13 countries, respectively, having no data at all. Since regression models use listwise deletion to remove rows with missing data, these countries will be automatically removed during the analysis. However, to avoid confusion, I manually remove them in the data cleaning stage beforehand.

The resulting dataset contains information on 2,058 country-years across 74 countries and 31 years (1990-2020). The median number of years a country is included is 31 years and the mean number of years a country is included is 27.8 years (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a complete list of the 74 countries included in the dataset and the time span for which they are included.) To address concerns about the representativeness of this sample and, by extension, the external validity of this thesis's findings, I compare this sample to the full population of 181 countries for which the Contemporary V-Dem Project provides data.

I start by assessing geographic representativeness. Table 5.1 provides an overview of geographic representativeness by grouping countries into regions and comparing

[21]Within the sample of 95 countries for which military policing data is available in the M^3-dataset, nine countries have completely missing data on the anti-pluralism index: Afghanistan, Belarus, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavia.

[22]Within the sample of 95 countries for which military policing data is available in the M^3-dataset, 13 countries have completely missing data on homicide rates: Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Laos, North Korea, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Sudan, The Gambia, Togo, and Yugoslavia.

the total number of countries in each region included in the V-Dem data to the number of countries in each region included in the analyzed sample. It shows that some regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean (68 percent) and East Asia and the Pacific (59.1 percent), are well represented, while others, notably Sub-Saharan Africa (19.6 percent) and the Middle East and North Africa (22.7 percent), are underrepresented. To address potential concerns over external validity, I conduct further comparisons between the analyzed sample and the full set of countries included in the V-Dem data. These comparisons are based on levels of mass mobilization, economic development, and democracy levels.

Table 5.1: Geographical Representativeness of Analyzed Sample

Region	**Total number of countries**	**Number of countries included**
East Asia and the Pacific	22	13
Eastern Europe	25	12
Latin America and the Caribbean	25	17
South and Central Asia	14	6
Sub-Saharan Africa	51	10
The Middle East and North Africa	22	5
Western Europe and North America	22	11

Notes: Total number of countries refers to the number of countries within that region included in the V-Dem dataset; number of countries included refers to the number of countries within that region included in the subset of 74 countries analyzed in this thesis.

Beginning with mass mobilization, Table 5.2 compares the distribution of the size and frequency of pro-democratic mass mobilization events between the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset and the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis. It shows that the two groups are nearly identical in terms of levels of pro-democratic mass mobilization, as measured by both central tendency and spread. Furthermore, a one sample *t*-test demonstrates that the overall mean of the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset is *not* statistically significantly different from the country-level means of the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis. Therefore, this comparison reduces concerns about sampling bias on this dimension.

Table 5.3 makes the same comparison for the distribution of the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization events. It shows that the two groups are nearly identical in terms of levels of pro-autocratic mass mobilization. A one sample *t*-test

Table 5.2: Comparing Levels of Pro-Democratic Mass Mobilization

Group	*n*	min	max	mean	SD	Q1	Q3
Total	5,488	0.02	3.99	1.57	1.12	0.54	2.52
Included	2,058	0.04	3.99	1.68	1.09	0.75	2.55

Notes: The summary statistics for pro-democratic mass mobilization (*v2cademmob_osp*) are computed based on the linearized original scale posterior predictions (scaled from 0 to 4) for easier interpretation (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 31); higher values indicate more frequent and large-scale mass mobilization events.

once more demonstrates that the overall mean of the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset is *not* statistically significantly different from the country-level means of the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis. This comparison supports the claim that the results of the inferential analysis can be generalized beyond the sample.

Table 5.3: Comparing Levels of Pro-Autocratic Mass Mobilization

Group	*n*	min	max	mean	SD	Q1	Q3
Total	5,488	0.02	3.94	0.94	1.06	0.10	1.66
Included	2,058	0.02	3.86	0.88	1.07	0.09	1.50

Notes: The summary statistics for pro-autocratic mass mobilization (*v2caautmob_osp*) are computed based on the linearized original scale posterior predictions (scaled from 0 to 4) for easier interpretation (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 31); higher values indicate more frequent and large-scale mass mobilization events.

Table 5.4 contrasts the two groups based on economic development by comparing the distribution of GDP per capita. It shows that the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset and the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis are broadly similar in terms of economic development. Despite their similarities in central tendency and spread, the full set of countries appears to include more extreme observations, indicated by its greater range. Specifically, the set of countries analyzed in this thesis appears to exclude some observations with exceptionally high GDP per capita values. Nevertheless, the middle half of observations in the analyzed sample actually displays a higher GDP per capita, as indicated by the interquartile range (Q3-Q1). This suggests that the subset of the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis is somewhat skewed toward middle- and upper-middle-income countries, while excluding some outliers at the top end of the distribution. Finally, a one sample *t*-test shows that the overall mean of the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset is *not* statistically

Table 5.4: Comparing Levels of Economic Development (GDP Per Capita)

Group	*n*	min	max	mean	SD	Q1	Q3
Total	5,488	0.70	220.78	30.66	33.90	6.25	43.85
Included	2,058	1.73	144.27	34.66	31.81	9.72	51.84

Notes: The summary statistics for GDP p.c. are computed based on the point estimates from a latent variable model (Fariss et al. 2022). The summary statistics for the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset are computed for the time span between 1990-2020 to match the period of observation analyzed in this thesis.

significantly different from the country-level means of the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis. In short, while demonstrating that there are *some* differences in economic development, this comparison strengthens claims about external validity and reduces concerns about sampling bias on this dimension.

Finally, Table 5.5 compares the two groups based on the distribution of the Electoral Democracy Index. It shows that the observations from both groups cover a similar range of values, and the spread around the mean is also comparable. However, the mean and interquartile range suggest that the 74 countries analyzed in this thesis have higher average levels of electoral democracy. A one sample *t*-test shows that the overall mean of the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset *is* statistically significantly different $(p < 0.01)$ from the country-level means of the 74 countries examined in this thesis. Therefore, while demonstrating that the two groups cover a similar range of values, this comparison suggests the presence of sampling bias on this dimension. However, since the levels of mass mobilization and economic development are substantially similar, I maintain that the results of the inferential analysis are still generalizable–though perhaps with caution regarding countries with moderate to low democratic quality.

Table 5.5: Comparing Electoral Democracy Levels (Polyarchy)

Group	*n*	min	max	mean	SD	Q1	Q3
Total	5,488	0.01	0.92	0.50	0.27	0.26	0.76
Included	2,058	0.07	0.91	0.59	0.25	0.38	0.83

Notes: The summary statistics for *v2x_polyarchy* are computed based on the point estimates from the V-Dem measurement model (Pemstein et al. 2024). The summary statistics for the 181 countries included in the V-Dem dataset are computed for the time span between 1990-2020 to match the period of observation analyzed in this thesis.

Having described the sample of 74 countries analyzed in this thesis, and—despite minor caveats regarding democracy levels—having demonstrated its overall representativeness, I will now turn to discussing univariate trends and patterns in the data before turning to the inferential analysis in section 5.3.

5.2 A First Look at Military Peace Preservation

Of the 2,058 total country-year observations included in the present analysis, 46.3 percent (952 observations) display the presence of military peace preservation, while 53.7 percent (1,106 observations) display its absence. Breaking this down by regime type reveals that 40.6 percent of democratic country-years (532 observations) and 56.1 percent of autocratic country-years (420 observations) display the presence of military peace preservation. How are these observations of military peace preservation distributed across regions, and how has the number of countries deploying their armed forces for peace preservation changed during the period of observation? This section addresses these questions.

Figure 5.1: Military Peace Preservation Over Time by Regime Type



Notes: Autocracies are shown in red, democracies in blue.

Based purely on the number of countries that deploy their armed forces for peace preservation each year, one might quickly conclude that there is a steady increase. For example, in the first year of observation, 25 countries (14 autocracies and 11 democracies) display military peace preservation. In the final year of observation, this number had increased to a total of 39 countries (20 autocracies and 19 democracies). However, this is misleading because the dataset includes more countries over time (48 countries in 1990 compared to 70 countries in 2020). For this reason, proportions are much more informative than raw counts.

Figure 5.2: Proportions of Military Peace Preservation Over Time, by Region and Regime Type



Notes: Autocracies are shown in red, democracies in blue. Trend lines computed with Locally Estimated Scatterplot Smoothing (LOESS) to reduce noise. The panel for Western Europe and North America is omitted for simplicity (the region only includes democracies; the proportion of these democracies that deployed their armed forces for peace preservation remained constant at 50 percent throughout the entire observation period.

Figure 5.1 provides a much clearer picture by grouping observations by year and regime type, and plotting the proportion of countries in each group that deployed their armed forces for peace preservation on the y-axis. It shows that while the proportion of democracies with military peace preservation fluctuates modestly between 32 and 45 percent, the proportion of autocracies with military peace preservation changed dramatically between 1990 and 2020. In 1990, about 70 percent

of autocracies deployed their armed forces for peace preservation, presumably in connection with the political upheavals toward the end of the Cold War. This share then declined sharply in the post-Cold War era, reaching a low of 39 percent in 2004, before rising again and reaching 77 percent in 2020. What lies behind these time trends? A closer look at each region provides some answers.

Figure 5.2 (above) shows that the increase in the proportion of autocracies deploying their armed forces for peace preservation starting in 2005 is driven by three regions, namely Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe. This aligns well with what we know about military policing from the existing literature (see chapter 2). Having obtained a better sense of the trends and patterns regarding military peace preservation, it is time to investigate the relationship between mass mobilization and military peace preservation.

5.3 The Effects of Mass Mobilization on Military Peace Preservation

Before systematically testing the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model with GLMMs, it is helpful to visually explore the relationship between mass mobilization and military peace preservation. To this end, Figure 5.3 (below) shows the relationship between the size and frequency of pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events and military peace preservation. It shows that both pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events tend to be larger and more frequent in country-years with military peace preservation. Though no inferential claims can be made based solely on this plot, it does suggest the existence of an interesting empirical relationship that is worth investigating systematically.

To this end, the following two subsections discuss the results of the WB-GLMMs. First, I discuss the findings on the effects of pro-democratic mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation. Second, I repeat this analysis, this time using pro-autocratic mass mobilization as the main predictor. These analyses always start with what I will refer to as the full models. These models include the entire range of predictors, interaction terms, and control variables. Through an iterative process of comparing, evaluating, and re-specifying these models, I arrive at four reduced models: two with pro-democratic mass mobilization as the main predictor and two with pro-autocratic mass mobilization as the main predictor. I discuss the results of these models below.[23]

[23]The *R* script and dataset necessary to replicate the analyses can be obtained from the author.

Figure 5.3: Box Plot of Military Peace Preservation and Mass Mobilization



Notes: The shaded areas display density plots for additional nuance. Pro-democratic mass mobilization shown left (blue) and pro-autocratic mass mobilization shown right (red).

5.3.1 The Effects of Pro-Democratic Mass Mobilization

The full model predicting military peace preservation through pro-democratic mass mobilization is specified as follows. First, it includes the within-between decomposition of pro-democratic mass mobilization. Second, it includes the interaction terms necessary to test theoretical expectations about incongruence (see subsection 3.2.1). Third, it includes an interaction term between previous military peace preservation and pro-democratic mass mobilization as a proxy for the assumption that incumbents consider likely military responses before issuing deployment orders (see mechanism 2, Figure 3.1). Finally, it includes a number of covariates that control for competing explanations and confounding factors (see subsection 4.2.3).

The results of this full model are shown in Table 2 in the Appendix. Several findings are noteworthy. First, in years in which a country experiences more frequent and larger pro-democratic mobilization events than is typical for that country, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially higher. Second, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially lower in democracies than autocracies. Third, the marginal effect of within-country increases in size and frequency of

pro-democratic mass mobilization on the odds of military peace preservation are much weaker in democracies compared to autocracies. Fourth, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially higher in countries that have experienced such an operation in the previous three years. Finally, the interaction terms for ideational and episode incongruence are not significant at conventional levels.

These findings inform model re-specification. Specifically, I specify a reduced model (Model 1) by removing all non-significant interactions while keeping all control variables, regardless of their statistical significance. A comparison of the full model and the reduced model shows that the reduced model fits the data much better. Both the AIC and the BIC are are substantially lower for the reduced model, suggesting that the additional complexity in the full model is not warranted (cf. Kuha 2004). As a further refinement, I specify another reduced model (Model 2) using the continuous Electoral Democracy Index instead of the binary regime type measure used in Model 1. Referring once more to the AIC and BIC for model comparison shows that Models 1 and 2 fit the data equally well (see Table 5.7). Furthermore, the confusion matrices for these two models also demonstrate that they perform equally well in terms of predictive performance (see Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Predictive Performance (Model 1 and Model 2)

Model	Accuracy	Sensitivity	Specificity
Model 1	0.950	0.943	0.956
Model 2	0.951	0.941	0.959

Notes: **Accuracy**: proportion of correct predictions. **Sensitivity**: proportion of true positives correctly predicted. **Specificity**: proportion of true negatives correctly predicted.

The estimates for Models 1 and 2 (see Table 5.7) reveal several notable findings regarding the relationship between pro-democratic mass mobilization events and military peace preservation. Beginning with Model 1, the within-country effect of pro-democratic mass mobilization is an estimate of how changes in the size and frequency of such events, relative to a country's own long-term mean[24], are associated with the likelihood of military peace preservation. The estimate shows that, all else equal, a 1-unit increase in pro-democratic mass mobilization relative to a country's own long-term mean—which, to put it into context, corresponds to the difference between the long-term mean for Bolivia (1.14) and the country-year

[24]A country's "long-term mean" is simply the mean for that country over the period for which data is available. For most countries in the dataset this is either 30 or 31 years.

Table 5.7: Military Peace Preservation (MPP) Predicted by Pro-Democratic Mass Mobilization (Dem MM), Reduced Models

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
	Est.	**SE**	**Est.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.61	(0.57)	3.57	(3.79)
Dem MM (within)	4.31***	(1.80)	9.06***	(5.94)
Dem MM (between)	1.28	(0.91)	2.90	(2.51)
Regime type (RT)	0.11***	(0.07)		
Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			0.003***	(0.004)
Prev. MPP	11.80***	(3.25)	12.90***	(3.52)
Homicide rate (log-transformed)	1.27	(0.42)	1.43	(0.45)
Terrorist attack	1.03	(0.28)	0.99	(0.27)
GDP per capita (normalized via ORQ)	2.52†	(1.28)	3.02*	(1.49)
Population size (normalized via ORQ)	2.79	(2.00)	3.03†	(1.91)
Fuel exports (normalized via ORQ)	0.47*	(0.14)	0.48*	(0.14)
Intrastate Conflict	4.12**	(2.09)	4.28**	(2.12)
Dem MM (within) * RT	0.22**	(0.11)		
Dem MM (between) * RT	3.61†	(2.42)		
Dem MM (within) * EDI			0.05**	(0.05)
Dem MM (between) * EDI			0.69	(0.94)
Random Intercept Std. Deviation	5.06		4.63	
Random Slope Std. Deviation	1.30		1.33	
Correlation (Ran. Intercept/Slope)	0.53		0.60	
Number of observations (level 1)	2.058		2.058	
Number of clusters (level 2)	74		74	
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	873.6		872.0	
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	963.6		962.1	
Pseudo-R^2 (marginal)	0.23		0.26	
Pseudo-R^2 (conditional)	0.91		0.90	

Notes: Model estimates shown as odds-ratios. Significance codes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. All models are generalized linear mixed-effect models with a within-between decomposition of the main predictor of interest (WB-GLMMs). All models are estimated using the *glmer()* function in *R* with random intercepts and slopes at the country level.

observation for Bolivia[25] in 2008 (2.16)—is associated with more than a fourfold increase in the odds of military peace preservation (odds ratio = 4.31, $p < 0.001$). Put simply, in years in which a country experiences larger and more frequent pro-democratic mass mobilization events than is typical for that country, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially higher. Second, the estimate for regime type indicates that, all else equal, the odds of military peace preservation are roughly nine times lower in democracies compared to autocracies (odds ratio = 0.11, $p < 0.001$). Third, there is also a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) interaction effect between the within-country effect and regime type. In particular, the positive effect of pro-democratic mobilization events (within-effect) on the odds of military peace preservation is much much weaker in democracies compared to autocracies. This means that a 1-unit increase in within-country pro-democratic mass mobilization increases the odds of military peace preservation much more in autocracies than in democracies. Fourth, the estimate for previous military peace preservation indicates that the odds of military peace preservation are almost 12 times higher for countries that have experienced a military peace preservation operation in the previous three years (odds ratio = 11.80, $p < 0.001$). This aligns with the common wisdom that the best predictor of a phenomenon is its previous occurrence. Since this information is difficult to intuitively grasp in written form, Figure 5.4 provides a visualization.

Figure 5.4 visualizes the interaction effect between the within-effect and regime type by plotting the marginal effects of the within-country variation in pro-democratic mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation. This plot emphasizes the key finding from Model 1: In years in which an autocracy experiences average levels of pro-democratic mass mobilization relative to its own long-term mean, the predicted probability of military peace preservation is already quite high (51 percent). If, however, an autocracy experiences larger and more frequent pro-democratic mass mobilization events than is typical for that country, the predicted probability of military peace preservation increases sharply. More precisely, in years in which an autocracy experiences pro-democratic mass mobilization one standard deviation above its own long-term mean in terms of size and frequency, the predicted probability of military peace preservation increases from 51 to 73 percent. In contrast, for democracies, the predicted probability of military peace preservation given average levels of pro-democratic mass mobilization is at only 10 percent and does not increase as larger and more frequent pro-democratic mass mobilization events occur. In fact, the predicted probability of military peace preservation even decreases slightly to 9 percent.

[25] For interested readers: Pion-Berlin and Acácio (2022, pp. 233–234) discuss the protests in Bolivia (2008) in the context of civil-military relations.

Figure 5.4: Marginal Effects of Dem MM (Within) on Predicted Probability of MPP, by Regime Type



Notes: Autocracies are shown in red, democracies in blue. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

To leverage the full potential of WB-GLMMs, interested readers are inclined to turn their attention to Figure 5.5, which visualizes the same marginal effects as Figure 5.4 but also plots the random effects. Recall Equations 4.1 through 4.7: The thick black lines indicate the fixed effects, consisting of the fixed intercept γ_{00} and the fixed slope γ_{10}. The thin colorful lines indicate the cluster-level regression lines, consisting of the random intercepts β_{0j} and random slopes β_{1j} for cluster j. As is apparent, the deviation of each cluster's intercept and slope from the fixed effects, indicated by μ_{0j} and μ_{1j}, is at times non negligible. This indicates that there is rather substantial variation across the 74 countries in terms of their intercepts and slopes.

This country-level heterogeneity is also captured by the random intercept and slope standard deviation in Table 5.7, both of which are on the log-odds scale. The random intercept standard deviation indicates that countries differ substantially in their baseline probability of military peace preservation. The random slope standard deviation indicates that the effect of within-country variation in pro-democratic mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation also varies substantially across the 74 countries. This country-level heterogeneity also explains the wide confidence intervals in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.5: Random Intercepts and Slopes by Regime Type (Model 1)



Notes: Thick black lines indicate the fixed effects, thin colorful lines indicate the cluster-level regression lines with random intercepts and slopes.

Finally, as discussed with regard to the variance-covariance matrix (see Equation 4.6), WB-GLMMs allow for covariance between random intercepts and slopes. As shown in Table 5.7, there is a positive and moderately strong correlation between random intercepts and slopes ($\rho_{M1} = 0.53$, $\rho_{M2} = 0.60$), indicating that countries with higher baseline probabilities of military peace preservation also tend to display a stronger relationship between within-country variation on pro-democratic mass mobilization and military peace preservation. The importance of explicitly modeling this country-specific heterogeneity is further underlined by the marginal and conditional pseudo-R^2 reported in Table 5.7, which indicate that the fixed effects alone explain about 23 percent of the variance in military peace preservation—which, by social science standards, is a respectable amount—while the fixed and random effects combined explain 91 percent of the variance. All of these results strongly support the choice of WB-GLMMs over other modeling approaches which tend to sweep this type of country-level heterogeneity under the rug.

Model 2 corroborates the findings of Model 1 by substituting the binary regime type measure for the continuous Electoral Democracy Index, thereby assessing whether the results are robust to alternative operationalizations. As shown in Table 5.7,

the estimates of the two models are substantively similar, which is why I omit a detailed discussion thereof and instead immediately turn to a visualization of the key interaction effect. Figure 5.6 visualizes how democratic quality moderates the relationship between within-country variation in pro-democratic mass mobilization and the predicted probability of military peace preservation. The three panels in Figure 5.6 visualize this relationship for three levels of democratic quality: first, the sample mean of 0.59—which roughly corresponds to the levels of democratic quality observed in Bolivia (2018), Bulgaria (2020), and Indonesia (2019)—second, one standard deviation below the sample mean at 0.34—which roughly corresponds to the levels of democratic quality observed in Malaysia (2017), Nicaragua (2015), and Serbia (2020)—and thrid, one standard deviation above the sample mean at 0.84—which roughly corresponds to the levels of democratic quality observed in Chile (2020), the United States (2018), Spain (2016), and South Korea (2019).

Figure 5.6: Marginal Effects of Dem MM (Within) on Predicted Probability of MPP, by Democracy Levels



Notes: Plot faceted by representative levels of democratic quality. Yellow: sample mean = 0.59. Red: 1SD below sample mean = 0.34. Blue: 1SD above sample mean = 0.84. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5.6 confirms the key finding from Figure 5.4: In autocracies, the predicted probability of military peace preservation *increases* sharply if that country experiences above average levels of pro-democratic mass mobilization relative to its

own long-term mean, while the same increase in pro-democratic mass mobilization slightly *decreases* the predicted probability of military peace preservation in democracies. However, Figure 5.6 also provides some additional nuance. Examining the panel in the middle of Figure 5.6 reveals that in electoral democracies with moderate levels of democratic quality the predicted probability of military peace preservation also increases rather sharply if that country experiences above average levels of pro-democratic mass mobilization relative to its own long-term mean. Therefore, the relationship between pro-democratic mass mobilization and military peace preservation in electoral democracies with moderate democratic quality resembles the pattern observed in autocracies more closely than that observed in more consolidated democracies. Importantly, countries such as Bolivia (2018), Bulgaria (2020), and Indonesia (2019), which fit this description of electoral democracies with moderate democratic quality, are all classified as democracies by the binary regime type measure used in Model 1. Therefore, Model 2 reveals a pattern that was obscured by the binary regime type measure. This is reflected by the slight increase in the variance explained.

5.3.2 The Effects of Pro-Autocratic Mass Mobilization

As before, the starting point for the analysis is the full model (see Table 4 in the Appendix) which includes the within-between decomposition of pro-autocratic mass mobilization, all of the interaction terms, and a number of covariates that control for competing explanations and confounding factors. Two findings are particularly noteworthy. First, in years in which a country experiences larger and more frequent pro-autocratic mobilization events than is typical for that country, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially higher. Second, none of the interaction terms specified on the basis of the theoretical expectations about incongruence are significant at conventional levels.

These findings inform model re-specification. Model 3 omits all non-significant interactions while keeping all control variables. Model 4 substitutes the binary regime type measure with the the continuous Electoral Democracy Index. A comparison of the full model and these two reduced models shows that the reduced models fits the data much better. Both the AIC and the BIC are are lower for the reduced model, suggesting that the additional complexity in the full model is not warranted (cf. Kuha 2004). Between the two reduced models, Model 4 appears to fit the data best as indicated by the AIC value—though the BIC, which penalizes complexity to a greater extent, slightly prefers Model 3. In any case, both reduced models perform equally well with regard to predictive performance (see Table 5.8).

Table 5.8: Predictive Performance (Model 3 and Model 4)

Model	Accuracy	Sensitivity	Specificity
Model 3	0.953	0.949	0.957
Model 4	0.951	0.945	0.957

Notes: **Accuracy**: proportion of correct predictions. **Sensitivity**: proportion of true positives correctly predicted. **Specificity**: proportion of true negatives correctly predicted.

The estimates for Models 3 and 4 (see Table 5.9) reveal several notable findings regarding the relationship between pro-autocratic mass mobilization events and military peace preservation. Beginning with Model 3, the estimate of the within-country effect of pro-autocratic mass mobilization shows that, all else equal, a 1-unit increase in pro-autocratic mass mobilization relative to a country's own long-term mean—which, to put it into context, corresponds to the difference between the long-term mean for the United States (-1.13) and the country-year observation for the United States in 2017 (-0.08)—is associated with a more than a fivefold increase in the odds of military peace preservation (odds ratio = 5.73, $p < 0.05$). In other words, in years in which a country experiences larger and more frequent pro-autocratic mass mobilization events than is typical for that country, the odds of military peace preservation are substantially higher. Second, the estimate for regime type indicates that, all else equal, the odds of military peace preservation are roughly four times lower in democracies compared to autocracies (odds ratio = 0.24, $p < 0.01$). Third, the interaction term between pro-autocratic mass mobilization and previous military peace preservation ($p < 0.05$) suggests that, although countries with recent military peace preservation operations have high baseline odds of the outcome, the effect of increases in pro-autocratic mass mobilization on military peace preservation in these countries is weaker, that is, their slope is not as steep. This somewhat counterintuitive finding is presumably explained by a ceiling effect, whereby countries with previous military peace preservation already have a predicted probability close to 1 and hence cannot increase much further even in the case of large and frequent pro-autocratic mass mobilization events.

Model 4 largely confirms the findings of Model 3, indicating that the results are robust to alternative operationalizations. The main substantive difference is that Model 4 provides evidence ($p < 0.01$) that the Electoral Democracy Index moderates the relationship between between-country variation in pro-autocratic mass mobilization and military peace preservation. Specifically, it shows that the odds of military peace preservation increase much more sharply when comparing two

Table 5.9: Military Peace Preservation (MPP) Predicted by Pro-Autocratic Mass Mobilization (Aut MM), Reduced Models

	Model 3		**Model 4**	
	Est.	**SE**	**Est.**	**SE**
Intercept	0.65	(0.66)	12.70†	(17.80)
Aut MM (within)	5.73*	(3.92)	10.80*	(12.80)
Aut MM (between)	1.91	(1.16)	0.19	(0.21)
Regime type (RT)	0.24**	(0.11)		
Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)			0.01**	(0.01)
Incumbents' Ideational Commitment (IIC)	0.54	(0.23)	0.77	(0.36)
Prev. MPP	9.29***	(2.67)	8.44***	(2.49)
Homicide rate (log-transformed)	1.33	(0.47)	1.19	(0.46)
Terrorist attack	0.97	(0.27)	0.93	(0.27)
GDP per capita (normalized via ORQ)	2.76†	(1.45)	3.61*	(2.03)
Population size (normalized via ORQ)	5.73*	(4.02)	7.46*	(6.10)
Fuel exports (normalized via ORQ)	0.53†	(0.19)	0.58	(0.21)
Intrastate Conflict	3.72**	(1.77)	3.28*	(1.59)
Aut MM (within) * Prev. MPP	0.32*	(0.18)	0.36†	0.21
Aut MM (within) * EDI			0.24	0.42
Aut MM (between) * EDI			59.80**	92.3
Random Intercept Std. Deviation	5.74		6.23	
Random Slope Std. Deviation	3.12		2.79	
Correlation (Ran. Intercept/Slope)	0.68		0.53	
Number of observations (level 1)	2.058		2.058	
Number of clusters (level 2)	74		74	
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	849.8		841.9	
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	939.8		943.2	
Pseudo-R^2 (marginal)	0.19		0.24	
Pseudo-R^2 (conditional)	0.93		0.94	

Notes: Model estimates shown as odds-ratios. Significance codes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. All models are generalized linear mixed-effect models with a within-between decomposition of the main predictor of interest (WB-GLMMs). All models are estimated using the *glmer()* function in *R* with random intercepts and slopes at the country level.

countries with *higher* democracy levels and a 1-unit difference in long-term averages of pro-autocratic mobilization than when comparing two countries with *lower* levels of democratic quality and a 1-unit difference in long-term averages of pro-autocratic mobilization. Figure 5.7 visualizes this interaction effect.

Figure 5.7: Marginal Effects of Aut MM (Between) on Predicted Probability of MPP, by Democracy Levels



Notes: Plot faceted by representative levels of democratic quality. Yellow: sample mean = 0.59. Red: 1SD below sample mean = 0.34. Blue: 1SD above sample mean = 0.84. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5.7 visualizes the interaction effect between the between-effect and the Electoral Democracy Index by plotting the marginal effects of the between-country variation in pro-autocratic mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation. As previously, the three panels visualize this interaction effect for three levels of democratic quality, the sample mean and one standard deviation above (and below) the sample mean. The first insight gained from Figure 5.7 is that all predicted probabilities are associated with a considerable amount of uncertainty, as indicated by the wide 95 percent confidence intervals. Nevertheless, the results suggest that when comparing two countries with similarly low levels of democratic quality (1SD below the sample mean), the predicted probability of military peace preservation is *lower* for the country with the higher long-term average in pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Put simply, when comparing two

autocracies, the model predicts a *lower* probability of military peace preservation for the autocracy with the higher long-term average in pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Conversely, the results suggest that when comparing two countries with similarly high levels of democratic quality (1SD above the sample mean), the predicted probability of military peace preservation is *higher* for the country with the higher long-term average in pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Again, put simply, when comparing two democracies, the model predicts a *higher* probability of military peace preservation for the democracy with the higher long-term average in pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Finally, for electoral democracies with moderate levels of democratic quality, the model estimates a similar increase in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. However, the 95% confidence interval suggests that we cannot be very certain about this particular slope.

Finally, returning to Table 5.9, we see that Models 3 and 4—much like Models 1 and 2 above—find evidence of considerable country-level heterogeneity. The random intercept and random slope standard deviation for Models 3 and 4 indicate that the 74 countries differ substantially in their baseline probability of military peace preservation, as well as with regard to the effect of within-country variation in pro-autocratic mass mobilization on the probability of military peace preservation. Furthermore, the positive and moderately strong correlations between random intercepts and random slopes ($\rho_{M3} = 0.68$, $\rho_{M4} = 0.53$) indicate that countries with higher baseline probabilities of military peace preservation also tend to display a stronger relationship between within-country variation on pro-autocratic mass mobilization and military peace preservation. Moreover, the marginal and conditional pseudo-R^2 show that the variance explained by the fixed effects alone (19-24 percent) is much smaller than the variance explained by the combined fixed and random effects (93-94 percent). All of these results underscore the importance of explicitly modeling country-level heterogeneity with WB-GLMMs.

5.4 Summarizing the Results

The previous sections of this chapter presented and discussed the results of the generalized linear mixed-effect models (GLMMs). This section summarizes the results and evaluates them in light of the stated hypotheses. The first major takeaway is that, across all models, larger and more frequent mass mobilization events are associated with in increase in the likelihood of military peace preservation. Put simply, in years in which a country experiences larger and more frequent mass

mobilization events than is typical for that country, the likelihood of the armed forces being deployed for military peace preservation increases substantially.

The second major takeaway is that this is not the complete picture. Specifically, the results show that both regime type and more fine-grained measures of democratic quality moderate the effect of mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation. In short, Models 1 and 2 show that in autocracies, as well as electoral democracies with moderate levels of democratic quality, an increase in the size and frequency of pro-democratic mass mobilization events is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. In contrast, the same increase in the size and frequency of pro-democratic mass mobilization in democracies is associated with a decrease in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. Model 4 shows similar results regarding the effects of pro-autocratic mass mobilization. In short, it shows that in upper-bound electoral democracies and liberal democracies, an increase in the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization events is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. In contrast, the same increase in the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization in autocracies is associated with a decrease in the predicted probability of military peace preservation.

The third major takeaway is that all models find evidence of considerable country-level heterogeneity, both with regard to the baseline probability of military peace preservation, as well as with regard to the country-specific effects of mass mobilization on the predicted probability of military peace preservation. However, through the use of GLMMs, this heterogeneity is explicitly modeled, thereby avoiding the demonstrably untenable assumption of unit homogeneity.

The results provide enough empirical evidence to reject the null hypotheses regarding regime incongruence ($H_1 - H_2$). Put simply, the evidence suggests that, in autocracies, pro-democratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-autocratic mass mobilization does not (supporting H_1). Conversely, in democracies, pro-autocratic mass mobilization increases the predicted probability of military peace preservation, while pro-democratic mass mobilization does not (supporting H_2). However, there does not seem to be sufficient empirical evidence to reject the null hypotheses regarding episode and ideational incongruence ($H_3 - H_6$). The next chapter builds on these results and conducts a model building small-N analysis, specifically, a deviant case study.

6 Deviant Cases: A Tale of Paramilitary Police Forces

This chapter builds on the results of the large-*N* analysis and proceeds with a model building small-*N* analysis, specifically, a discussion of a group of deviant cases. As highlighted in the methods chapter (see chapter 4), a deviant case study can reach one of two conclusions. The first and preferred result of a deviant case study is the identification of causal factors that help explain this and other deviant cases like it. "This means that in most circumstances, a deviant case study culminates in a general proposition—one that may be applied to other cases in the population" (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 302). The second and less preferred result of a deviant case study is the "[conclusion] that the [deviant] case does not violate the theory's core predictions—because of measurement error, inappropriate operationalization of key concepts, failure to incorporate important contextual variables, recognition that the case falls outside of the theory's scope conditions, or for other reasons" (Levy 2008, p. 13). The conclusion of the present deviant case study leans more toward the second, less preferred conclusion. As the discussion below reveals, there is an unfortunate mismatch between theory and data. This mismatch implies that, in the absence of more appropriate data, the scope of the theory should be narrowed.

To identify deviant cases, I build on the results of the large-*N* analysis and select false negative predictions. That is, I select country-year observations for which the two best fitting WB-GLMMs estimate a low probability of military peace preservation, even though we have observed the presence of military peace preservation. In line with the discussions regarding model fit in section 5.3, I use Model 2 and Model 4 as the best fitting models. Out of 2,058 total country-year observations, Model 2 produced 56 false negative predictions, while Model 4 produced 52. However, there is substantial overlap between these two groups—for 44 country-year observations (from 24 distinct countries) both models produce false negative predictions. Since I cannot investigate all of these deviant cases, I necessarily have to make a selection.

Since much of the recent scholarship on expanding military missions and military policing is centered on Latin America (see chapter 2), I chose this as my selection

criterion. This leaves me with 12 country-year observations (from 9 distinct countries) that are shared false negative predictions in both Models 2 and 4. Notably, a third of these deviant cases—Argentina 2018, Chile 2010, Chile 2014, and Uruguay 2020—come from countries whose highest level of militarization of law enforcement are paramilitary police forces (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, p. 526). Moreover, aside from Costa Rica and Panama, which rely exclusively on militarized civilian police, Argentina[26], Chile, and Uruguay are the only three countries in the region with paramilitary police forces as their highest level of militarization of law enforcement. All other countries in the region have constabularized their armed forces (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, pp. 524–528).

It is not always a trivial undertaking to infer the underlying events from numerical, expert-coded indicators in retrospect. This is also the case for the indicators of military policing from the M^3-dataset (Bayer et al. 2025). Aside from this recent (cross-regional) data collection effort, Flores-Macías and Zarkin (2021) are the only ones to systematically take stock of military policing operations in Latin America and they find that 13 out of 18 countries in the region have constabularized their militaries. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are the only three countries in the region with paramilitary police forces as the highest level of militarization of law enforcement. The paramilitary police forces in question are the "National Gendarmerie" and the "Naval Prefecture" in Argentina, the the "Carabineros" in Chile, and the "Regimiento Guardia Nacional Republicana" in Uruguay (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2021, p. 526). To the best of my knowledge, none of the three conventional branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Airforce) were deployed in any of these three countries for civilian policing tasks during the period of observation. Therefore, I surmise that the instances of military peace preservation that led to the positive coding of these country-years in the M^3-dataset—and subsequently also the false negative predictions—is the deployment of these paramilitary police forces.

The fact that a substantial portion of false negative predictions from this region come from countries with only paramilitary police forces suggests that there is an unfortunate mismatch between theory and data, and that, in the absence of more appropriate data, the scope conditions of the proposed theoretical model need to be narrowed. Specifically, military peace preservation, as the outcome of interest, was defined and operationalized with reference to a novel data collection effort, the M^3-dataset (Bayer et al. 2025). Crucially, to differentiate between positive and negative

[26]The deployment of the armed forces for internal security missions has long been prohibited in Argentina due to the historical legacy of its military dictatorship (Pion-Berlin 2020). However, President Javier Milei has recently issued two decrees that allow the president to domestically deploy the military for civilian policing tasks (Jaureguy 2024). However, since the period of observation for this thesis is 1990-2020 I omit further discussion of these recent developments.

cases of military peace preservation, Bayer et al. (2025, p. 817) employ a definition of the armed forces that includes the three conventional branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Airforce), as well as all other uniformed armed organizations and "official units that operate under the direct command of the ministry of defense". Thereby, Bayer et al.'s (2025) definition of military peace preservation, and military policing more broadly, includes all cases which Flores-Macías and Zarkin (2021) call constabularized militaries, but crucially, also some—though not all—cases of what Flores-Macías and Zarkin (2021) call paramilitary police forces.

Considering that cases in which paramilitary police forces constitute the highest level of militarization of law enforcement are overrepresented among false negative predictions from Latin America, I conclude that the scope conditions of the theoretical model need to be narrowed. Specifically, the causal mechanism suggesting that regime incongruence leads to threat perceptions, which lead to deployment orders, which lead to military peace preservation, only appears to hold when the outcome of interest is properly and more narrowly specified as peace preservation by constabularized militaries. Therefore, modifying the theoretical model based on this deviant case study requires re-specifying the outcome of interest such that peace preservation by paramilitary police forces is no longer coded as a positive case. However, due to the limitations of currently available data, this re-specification is not feasible in the context of the present thesis. Instead, it constitutes a worthwhile endeavor for future research.

7 Concluding Remarks

This thesis investigates how and under which conditions pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events lead incumbents across different regime types to deploy their armed forces for civilian policing tasks, specifically crowd control. While previous research has made valuable contributions regarding the *effects* of military policing, its *causes* remain underdeveloped, with most studies referring to violence by organized crime groups or terrorist networks as the main causes. Aside from a series of journal articles by Pion-Berlin et al. (2022; 2014; 2010) investigating military (dis)obedience in the context of deployment orders to police (and suppress) civilian uprisings, there is a striking lack of research on the relation between mass mobilization and military policing. In an attempt to address this research gap, this thesis proposes a new theoretical model which attempts to explain how pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events affect the cognitions and actions of incumbents at the micro-level, and how these effects generate the macro-level outcome of interest, military peace preservation.

From this theoretical model, a number of observable and falsifiable predictions are derived. These hypotheses are empirically tested by fitting within-between generalized linear mixed-effect models to a time-series cross-sectional dataset covering 2,058 country-years across 74 countries between 1990 and 2020. The results provide partial support for the propositions of the theoretical model. Specifically, the results show that in autocracies and electoral democracies with moderate levels of democratic quality, the predicted probability of military peace preservation increases sharply as the size and frequency of pro-democratic mass mobilization events increases. In contrast, the same increase in the size and frequency of pro-democratic mass mobilization events in upper-bound electoral democracies and liberal democracies does not increase the predicted probability of military peace preservation—and if anything, even decreases it slightly. Similar findings are presented for the effects of pro-autocratic mass mobilization. Specifically, in upper-bound electoral democracies and liberal democracies, increases in the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization events are associated with sharp increase in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. In contrast, the the same increase in the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization events in autocracies leads to a slight

decrease in the predicted probability of military peace preservation. The effects of increases in the size and frequency of pro-autocratic mass mobilization in electoral democracies with moderate levels of democratic quality is associated with a degree of uncertainty that precludes inferences.

Based on these results, the short answer to the research question posed at the outset of this thesis is this: *When the aims of mass mobilization events are incongruent with the current regime type, they trigger threat perceptions on part of the incumbent, who then, as a self-assuring show of force, orders the military to deploy to the streets for the civilian policing task of peace preservation.* However, a closer inspection of a group of deviant cases from Latin America suggests that the scope of the theoretical model should be narrowed. While the models explain reasonably well how and under which conditions militaries are constabularized and tasked with peace preservation, they are shown to perform less well in instances in which paramilitary police forces are tasked with peace preservation. This suggests that the dependent variable, military peace preservation, needs to be re-specified such that cases of peace preservation by paramilitary police forces are excluded no longer coded as a positive cases.

This thesis is subject to two types of limitations: those concerning inferences and those arising from data availability. First, there are three limitations on inferences. (I) There is the danger that the causal arrow points the other way: military peace preservation operations might cause mass mobilization events. However, since protests against military policing are likely to be captured only by the indicator of pro-democratic mass mobilization, and the results of the empirical analysis show robust and comparable results for both pro-democratic and pro-autocratic mass mobilization events, this concern appears to be unwarranted. (II) The association between mass mobilization events and military peace preservation may be spurious: both might be independently caused by some unobserved third covariate, thereby creating the appearance of correlation despite the absence of a causal relationship. While this is a valid concern, it is mitigated by the inclusion of a range of control variables and the explicit modeling of country-level heterogeneity in the estimated models. (III) Finally, it is important to note that this thesis relies on observational data and does not employ a formal causal identification strategy, such as instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, or difference-in-difference designs. Therefore, the findings should be interpreted as associational rather than causal claims. Nevertheless, the proposed theoretical framework provides a solid basis for inferring causal relationships from these associations, and will hopefully guide future research aimed at causal identification.

Second, there are three limitations arising from data availability. (I) The empirical analysis is based on data from 74 countries, which raises legitimate concerns

about external validity. However, as the representativeness checks in section 5.1 demonstrate, these concerns appear to be overstated. (II) The indicators of military policing from the M^3-dataset include paramilitary police forces, which leads to some practical difficulties, and as highlighted by the deviant cases in chapter 6, the statistical models perform less well at predicting instances in which paramilitary police forces are tasked with peace preservation. Ideally, we would be able to code separate indicators for paramilitary police forces and constabularized militaries, and then separately estimate the effects of mass mobilization events on the predicted probability of their occurrence. (III) The data analyzed in this thesis, and in much of comparative politics, are based on repeated yearly measurements. However, to the estimate the effects of mass mobilization events on the predicted probability of military peace preservation more reliably, we would require data that is more temporally fine-grained. Perhaps, as our profession progresses, we will be able to collect and utilize such data more readily in the future.

This leaves me to suggest avenues for future research. Two potential endeavors stand out. First, research on military policing is still nascent and most of the existing knowledge in the field is based on single case studies and small-*N* comparative work. This is owed to the fact that, until recently, no comprehensive dataset was available. This changed with the M^3-dataset (Bayer et al. 2025), but limitations persist with regard to the number of countries for which data is available. Moreover, the broad conceptual definition of military policing employed obscures a considerable amount of interesting nuance. Thus, renewed data collection efforts are a promising and worthwhile avenue for future research.

A second avenue for future research is to investigate the link between episodes of autocratization and attempts by civilian incumbents to pull the military into new roles and missions, such as military policing. For instance, does the military act as an accomplice to autocratizing incumbents by respecting the norm of civilian supremacy and complying with deployment orders to police protests against autocratization?[27] Relatedly, can military shirking actually contribute to democratic resilience in as much as the armed forces refuse to comply with deployment orders for military peace preservation operations that potentially threaten the survival of a democracy? All of these questions are highly interesting and at the forefront of current research in the field of comparative politics. Scholars would be well advised to carefully consider these and similar questions in their future research.

[27] Take the deployment of Marines and National Guard troops in the United States in June 2025 as an example.

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Appendix

Table 1: Country Coverage and Temporal Scope in Analyzed Dataset

Country	Start Year	End Year	Years Covered
Albania	1990	2020	31
Argentina	1990	2020	31
Armenia	1995	2020	26
Australia	1990	2017	28
Austria	1990	2020	31
Azerbaijan	1995	2020	26
Bangladesh	1990	2020	29
Bolivia	1990	2020	31
Brazil	1990	2020	31
Bulgaria	1990	2020	30
Burma/Myanmar	1990	2020	31
Burundi	1990	2020	22
Cambodia	1990	2020	31
Canada	1990	2020	31
Chile	1990	2020	31
China	1990	2020	31
Croatia	1992	2020	29

(continued from previous page)

Country	Start Year	End Year	Years Covered
Cuba	2000	2020	21
Cyprus	2003	2020	18
Ecuador	1990	2020	28
El Salvador	1990	2020	31
Eritrea	2012	2012	1
Ethiopia	2012	2012	1
France	1995	2020	26
Georgia	1992	2020	29
Ghana	1992	2020	29
Greece	1990	2020	31
Guatemala	1990	2020	31
Haiti	1991	1991	1
Honduras	1990	2020	31
Hungary	1990	2020	31
India	1990	2020	31
Indonesia	1990	2020	31
Israel	1990	2020	31
Italy	1990	2020	31
Jamaica	2010	2020	11
Japan	1990	2020	31
Lebanon	1992	2020	29
Lesotho	1998	2020	23
Lithuania	1993	2020	28

(continued from previous page)

Country	Start Year	End Year	Years Covered
Malaysia	1998	2020	23
Mauritania	1992	2020	29
Mexico	1990	2020	31
Mongolia	1990	2020	31
Namibia	1991	2020	30
Nepal	1991	2020	30
Netherlands	1990	2020	31
Nicaragua	1990	2020	31
North Macedonia	1994	2020	27
Norway	1990	2020	31
Pakistan	1990	2020	31
Peru	1990	2020	31
Philippines	1990	2020	31
Portugal	1990	2020	31
Serbia	1993	2020	28
Sierra Leone	1990	2020	31
Singapore	1990	2020	31
Slovakia	1994	2020	27
Slovenia	1993	2020	28
South Africa	1990	2020	31
South Korea	1990	2020	31
Spain	1990	2020	31
Thailand	1990	2020	31

(continued from previous page)

Country	Start Year	End Year	Years Covered
Timor-Leste	2007	2020	14
Trinidad and Tobago	1990	2020	30
Tunisia	1990	2020	31
Türkiye	1990	2020	31
Turkmenistan	1994	2020	27
United States of America	1990	2020	31
Uruguay	1990	2020	31
Venezuela	1990	2020	31
Vietnam	1990	2020	31
Yemen	1993	2020	28
Zimbabwe	1990	2020	31

Table 2: Military Peace Preservation (MPP) Predicted by Pro-Democratic Mass Mobilization (Dem MM), Full Model

	Estimate	***p*-value**	**Std. Error**
Intercept	0.62	*n.s.*	(0.59)
Dem MM (within)	4.53	**	(2.26)
Dem MM (between)	1.44	*n.s.*	(1.03)
Regime Type (RT)	0.12	***	(0.08)
Incumbents' Ideational Commitment (IIC)	0.77	*n.s.*	(0.34)
Autocratization Episode (AE)	1.02	*n.s.*	(0.40)
Prev. Military Peace Preservation (MPP)	12.1	***	(3.41)
Homicide rate (log-transformed)	1.28	*n.s.*	(0.42)
Terrorist attack	1.02	*n.s.*	(0.28)
GDP per capita (normalized via ORQ)	2.59	†	(1.33)
Population size (normalized via ORQ)	2.86	*n.s.*	(1.98)
Fuel exports (normalized via ORQ)	0.49	*	(0.15)
Intrastate Conflict	4.38	**	(2.25)
Dem MM (within) * RT	0.17	**	(0.10)
Dem MM (between) * RT	4.17	†	(3.05)
Dem MM (within) * IIC	1.46	*n.s.*	(0.85)
Dem MM (between) * IIC	0.64	*n.s.*	(0.27)
Dem MM (within) * AE	0.96	*n.s.*	(0.48)
Dem MM (between) * AE	0.94	*n.s.*	(0.37)
Dem MM (within) * Prev. MPP	0.86	*n.s.*	(0.36)
Random Intercept Std. Deviation	5.02		
Random Slope Std. Deviation	1.34		
Correlation (Ran. Intercept/Slope)	0.56		

(continued from previous page)

	Estimate	***p*-value**	**Std. Error**
Number of observations (level 1)	2,058		
Number of clusters (level 2)	74		
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	884.5		
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	1014.0		
Pseudo-R^2 (marginal)	0.23		
Pseudo-R^2 (conditional)	0.91		

Notes: Model estimates shown as odds-ratios. Significance codes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. All models are generalized linear mixed-effect models with a within-between decomposition of the main predictor of interest (WB-GLMMs). All models are estimated using the *glmer()* function in *R* with random intercepts and slopes at the country level.

Table 3: Estimates of Random Intercepts and Slopes for Model 2 (log-odds)

Country	**Ran. Intercept**	**Ran. Slope (Dem MM within)**
Albania	-3.15	0.74
Argentina	-2.34	-0.72
Armenia	-2.71	0.23
Australia	2.16	0.62
Austria	5.93	1.02
Azerbaijan	-0.99	-1.27
Bangladesh	0.16	-0.46
Bolivia	2.08	1.16
Brazil	3.49	0.61
Bulgaria	0.51	-0.33
Burma/Myanmar	2.37	0.38
Burundi	4.72	0.42
Cambodia	0.01	-0.14
Canada	-1.35	-0.55
Chile	-0.03	0.77
China	-6.67	-1.15
Croatia	-1.00	0.56
Cuba	-1.23	-0.24
Cyprus	8.02	1.47
Ecuador	1.75	0.15
El Salvador	3.75	0.57
Eritrea	-1.25	-0.22

(continued from previous page)

Country	Ran. Intercept	Ran. Slope (Dem MM within)
Ethiopia	0.04	0.01
France	-3.44	-0.59
Georgia	-1.89	-0.55
Ghana	0.80	0.38
Greece	-3.15	-0.53
Guatemala	-2.36	-0.62
Haiti	0.59	0.10
Honduras	4.36	0.63
Hungary	5.77	0.94
India	2.36	0.41
Indonesia	3.18	0.52
Israel	-5.47	-0.90
Italy	3.90	0.66
Jamaica	6.54	1.16
Japan	-3.66	-0.58
Lebanon	2.52	0.39
Lesotho	-3.75	-0.72
Lithuania	-1.53	-0.26
Malaysia	-5.18	-0.52
Mauritania	-2.27	0.12
Mexico	2.23	0.37
Mongolia	-2.74	-0.55
Namibia	6.66	1.01

(continued from previous page)

Country	Ran. Intercept	Ran. Slope (Dem MM within)
Nepal	-0.70	0.18
Netherlands	6.18	1.02
Nicaragua	-0.15	0.21
North Macedonia	4.74	0.75
Norway	-1.29	-0.22
Pakistan	-3.20	-0.41
Peru	-4.78	-0.91
Philippines	1.48	0.26
Portugal	-1.87	-0.32
Serbia	-2.50	-0.37
Sierra Leone	-0.32	-0.68
Singapore	-0.57	-0.36
Slovakia	-2.33	-0.37
Slovenia	-1.37	-0.21
South Africa	-5.76	-1.00
South Korea	-4.06	-0.67
Spain	-2.46	-1.55
Thailand	1.96	0.26
Timor-Leste	-0.68	-0.12
Trinidad and Tobago	1.58	1.40
Tunisia	-1.35	0.17
Türkiye	-4.65	-0.35
Turkmenistan	-2.20	-0.39

(continued from previous page)

Country	**Ran. Intercept**	**Ran. Slope (Dem MM within)**
United States of America	2.09	0.35
Uruguay	0.37	0.06
Venezuela	-4.17	-2.47
Vietnam	3.87	0.66
Yemen	0.19	-0.39
Zimbabwe	2.24	0.09

Table 4: Military Peace Preservation (MPP) Predicted by Pro-Autocratic Mass Mobilization (Aut MM), Full Model

	Estimate	***p*-value**	**Std. Error**
Intercept	1.16	*n.s.*	1.33
Aut MM (within)	10.80	**	9.17
Aut MM (between)	1.69	*n.s.*	1.24
Regime Type (RT)	0.29	*	0.15
Incumbents' Ideational Commitment (IIC)	0.33	*	0.19
Democratization Episode (DE)	1.35	*n.s.*	0.49
Prev. Military Peace Preservation (MPP)	8.53	***	2.52
Homicide rate (log-transformed)	1.16	*n.s.*	0.44
Terrorist attack	0.96	*n.s.*	0.28
GDP per capita (normalized via ORQ)	3.06	*	1.68
Population size (normalized via ORQ)	6.17	*	4.71
Fuel exports (normalized via ORQ)	0.54	†	0.20
Intrastate Conflict	3.32	*	1.62
Aut MM (within) * RT	0.58	*n.s.*	0.48
Aut MM (between) * RT	2.20	*n.s.*	1.09
Aut MM (within) * IIC	0.45	*n.s.*	0.41
Aut MM (between) * IIC	0.70	*n.s.*	0.27
Aut MM (within) * DE	1.25	*n.s.*	0.82
Aut MM (between) * DE	1.23	*n.s.*	0.38
Aut MM (within) * Prev. MPP	0.28	*	0.17
Random Intercept Std. Deviation	6.13		
Random Slope Std. Deviation	3.11		
Correlation (Ran. Intercept/Slope)	0.70		

(continued from previous page)

	Estimate	***p*-value**	**Std. Error**
Number of observations (level 1)	2,058		
Number of clusters (level 2)	74		
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	858.3		
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)	987.8		
Pseudo-R^2 (marginal)	0.20		
Pseudo-R^2 (conditional)	0.94		

Notes: Model estimates shown as odds-ratios. Significance codes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. All models are generalized linear mixed-effect models with a within-between decomposition of the main predictor of interest (WB-GLMMs). All models are estimated using the *glmer()* function in *R* with random intercepts and slopes at the country level.

Table 5: Estimates of Random Intercepts and Slopes for Model 4 (log-odds)

Country	**Ran. Intercept**	**Rn. Slope (Aut MM within)**
Albania	-3.53	1.01
Argentina	-2.69	-1.81
Armenia	-2.41	0.07
Australia	3.29	0.77
Austria	6.37	1.50
Azerbaijan	-3.16	0.58
Bangladesh	-0.66	0.01
Bolivia	2.72	0.32
Brazil	4.37	0.48
Bulgaria	1.42	2.58
Burma/Myanmar	1.88	0.42
Burundi	6.75	0.55
Cambodia	-0.36	1.76
Canada	-1.01	-1.02
Chile	1.34	1.30
China	-10.83	-2.33
Croatia	-2.60	1.20
Cuba	-1.37	-2.96
Cyprus	12.09	2.84
Ecuador	0.71	-0.60
El Salvador	4.84	1.15
Eritrea	-5.13	-1.21

(continued from previous page)

Country	Ran. Intercept	Ran. Slope (Aut MM within)
Ethiopia	0.14	0.03
France	-4.18	-0.99
Georgia	-3.28	0.93
Ghana	3.61	0.84
Greece	-1.81	-0.44
Guatemala	-2.34	-0.44
Haiti	1.77	0.42
Honduras	5.30	0.91
Hungary	4.27	0.34
India	3.08	0.64
Indonesia	1.37	0.31
Israel	-3.63	-0.88
Italy	4.64	1.07
Jamaica	8.53	2.00
Japan	-6.58	-1.54
Lebanon	3.61	0.61
Lesotho	-3.48	-0.83
Lithuania	-0.90	-0.23
Malaysia	-5.71	-0.83
Mauritania	-1.45	-1.01
Mexico	1.39	0.25
Mongolia	-2.40	-0.76
Namibia	7.46	1.73

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Country	Ran. Intercept	Ran. Slope (Aut MM within)
Nepal	-0.91	-2.01
Netherlands	7.06	1.63
Nicaragua	-0.69	0.62
North Macedonia	6.82	1.23
Norway	-1.35	-0.32
Pakistan	-4.82	-0.66
Peru	-7.09	-2.37
Philippines	2.43	0.53
Portugal	-1.69	-0.40
Serbia	-2.46	0.47
Sierra Leone	-0.56	-3.91
Singapore	-3.99	-1.91
Slovakia	-2.42	-0.71
Slovenia	-0.85	-0.25
South Africa	-7.22	-2.23
South Korea	-6.01	-1.42
Spain	-1.95	1.59
Thailand	1.71	0.11
Timor-Leste	-0.21	-0.05
Trinidad and Tobago	3.56	0.92
Tunisia	-3.49	0.32
Türkiye	-6.26	-1.31
Turkmenistan	-3.64	-0.88

(continued from previous page)

Country	**Ran. Intercept**	**Ran. Slope (Aut MM within)**
United States of America	2.52	0.50
Uruguay	3.39	0.12
Venezuela	-10.24	-5.41
Vietnam	2.31	0.57
Yemen	-0.25	1.75
Zimbabwe	4.65	0.50

Erklärung über eigenständige Leistungen und die Nutzung KI-basierter Hilfsmittel

(Diese Erklärung ist unterschrieben in der Masterarbeit einzubinden)

I. Eigenständigkeitserklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich meine Masterarbeit zum Thema

"Boots on the Ground: The Effects of Mass Mobilization on Military Policing"

1. selbständig angefertigt habe und
2. keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe.
3. Sämtliche wörtlichen oder sinngemäß übernommenen Textstellen habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht.

Heidelberg, 14.08.2025 Niklas Wolf

Ort, Datum, Unterschrift

II. Angaben zu verwendeten KI-basierten elektronischen Hilfsmitteln

Zur Dokumentation der verwendeten Hilfsmittel ist der schriftlichen Ausarbeitung ein besonderer Anhang hinzugefügt, der eine Liste und Beschreibung aller verwendeter KI-basierter Hilfsmittel enthält. Der besondere Anhang zur Dokumentation der verwendeten Hilfsmittel erfüllt folgende Kriterien:

1. Auflistung der Ziele, für die die KI-basierte Hilfsmittel in der vorliegenden Arbeit eingesetzt wurden[1].
2. Dokumentation der Verwendungsweise der KI-basierten Hilfsmittel zur Gewährleistung der Reproduzierbarkeit.
3. Angabe der Kapitel und Abschnitte der vorliegenden Arbeit, in denen die KI-basierten Hilfsmittel eingesetzt wurden.

Der Gebrauch dieser Hilfsmittel inklusive Art, Ziel und Umfang des Gebrauchs wurde mit dem/der Prüfer*in bzw. Erstbetreuer*in Prof. Dr. Aurel Croissant abgesprochen.

Mir ist bewusst, dass insbesondere der Versuch einer nicht dokumentierten Nutzung KI-basierter Hilfsmittel als Täuschungsversuch entsprechend § 10 Abs. 4 der Prüfungsordnung der Universität Heidelberg für den Bachelorstudiengang Politikwissenschaft vom 20. März 2024 zu werten ist: „Versucht der Prüfling das Ergebnis der Prüfungsleistung durch Täuschung oder Benutzung nicht zugelassener Hilfsmittel zu beeinflussen, wird die betreffende Prüfungsleistung mit „nicht ausreichend“ (5) bewertet.“

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[1] Dies schließt insbesondere ein, ob technische Hilfsmittel nicht ausschließlich zur Korrektur (Orthographie, Interpunktion, Grammatik) selbst verfasster Texte verwendet, sondern eine KI für weitergehende Zwecke, insbesondere zu fremdsprachlichen Übersetzungszwecken, Paraphrasierung, Textgenerierung, Grafikgenerierung oder Recherche eingesetzt wurde.