

Codebook

Corruption



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Based on Demscore
Version 4.0

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Summary of Table of Contents

1 Explanatory Notes	9
1.1 Release Notes v4	9
1.2 New in Demscore version 4	9
1.3 The Demscore Codebook	10
1.4 Methodology	10
1.5 Citations	10
1.6 Missing Data	10
1.7 Download ID	11
1.8 Unit Identifier Variables	11
1.9 Thematic Dataset	11
1.10 Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit	11
2 QoG	12
2.1 QoG EQI Regional Level 2021 (with all NUTS2 regions)	12
2.1.1 Regional Level Variables	12
2.2 QoG European Quality of Government Index CATI - Country Level (2021)	13
2.2.1 Country Level Variables	14
2.3 QoG European Quality of Government Index Regional Level (2010, 2013, 2017 & 2021)	14
2.3.1 Regional Level Variables	15
2.4 QoG EU Regional Dataset Long Data	16
2.4.1 Quality of Government	17
2.5 QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series	18
2.5.1 Quality of Government	19
2.5.2 Judicial	37
2.5.3 Political System	46
2.5.4 Media	50
2.5.5 Private Economy	52
2.5.6 Public Economy	52
3 REPDEM	54
3.1 REPDEM PAGED Basic	54
3.1.1 Cabinet Information	55
3.2 REPDEM PAGED Western, Central and Eastern Europe	55
3.2.1 Information on the Cabinets	56
4 V-DEM	57
4.1 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v14	57
4.1.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices	57
4.1.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices	59
4.1.3 V-Dem Indicators - Elections	61
4.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive	66
4.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary	68
4.1.6 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty	71
4.1.7 V-Dem Indicators - The Media	73
4.1.8 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space	74
4.1.9 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Accountability	75
4.1.10 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Neopatrimonialism	79

4.1.11 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties	81
4.1.12 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption	83
4.1.13 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Rule of Law	85
4.1.14 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections	85
4.1.15 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom	86
4.1.16 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Ordinal Versions of Indices	87
4.1.17 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - World Bank Governance Indicators .	89
4.1.18 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Others	90
4.1.19 Varieties of Indoctrination	91

5 Bibliography **93**

Table of Contents

1	Explanatory Notes	9
1.1	Release Notes v4	9
1.2	New in Demscore version 4	9
1.3	The Demscore Codebook	10
1.4	Methodology	10
1.5	Citations	10
1.6	Missing Data	10
1.7	Download ID	11
1.8	Unit Identifier Variables	11
1.9	Thematic Dataset	11
1.10	Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit	11
2	QOG	12
2.1	QoG EQI Regional Level 2021 (with all NUTS2 regions)	12
2.1.1	Regional Level Variables	12
2.1.1.1	Corruption pillar (corruptionp21_n2)	13
2.2	QoG European Quality of Government Index CATI - Country Level (2021)	13
2.2.1	Country Level Variables	14
2.2.1.1	People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic public services. (need_cor)	14
2.3	QoG European Quality of Government Index Regional Level (2010, 2013, 2017 & 2021)	14
2.3.1	Regional Level Variables	15
2.3.1.1	European Quality Index (EQI) (eqi)	15
2.3.1.2	Corruption pillar (corruptionp)	15
2.3.1.3	Corruption perception sub-pillar (corruption_subexp)	16
2.3.1.4	Corruption experience sub-pillar (corruption_subper)	16
2.4	QoG EU Regional Dataset Long Data	16
2.4.1	Quality of Government	17
2.4.1.1	Corruption pillar, country centered and z-score standardized (eqi_zcorruption)	17
2.4.1.2	Corruption perceptions index (corruption sub-pillar) z-score stand. (2017 only) (eqi_zcorruptper)	17
2.4.1.3	Corruption experiences index (corruption sub-pillar) z-score stand. (2017 only) (eqi_zcorruptexp)	18
2.4.1.4	Corruption perceptions index (corruption sub-pillar) min-max (0- 100)(2017) (eqi_norm_corruptper)	18
2.4.1.5	Corruption experiences index (corruption sub-pillar) min-max (0-100) (2017) (eqi_norm_corruptexp)	18
2.5	QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series	18
2.5.1	Quality of Government	19
2.5.1.1	Access to Information and Openness sub-index (aai_aio)	19
2.5.1.2	Public management sub-index (aai_pubm)	20
2.5.1.3	Law: corruption is criminalized as a specific offense (aai_q10)	20
2.5.1.4	Practice: appointees to bodies investigating pubsec corruption support independ. (aai_q14)	21
2.5.1.5	Law: civil servants are required to report cases of alleged corruption (aai_q35)	21

2.5.1.6	Law: there are formal rules to prevent conflict of interest, nepotism, etc. (aai_q37)	22
2.5.1.7	The Bayesian Corruption Indicator (bci_bci)	22
2.5.1.8	Anti-Corruption Policy (bti_acp)	23
2.5.1.9	Corruption Commission Present in Constitution (ccp_cc)	23
2.5.1.10	Functioning of Government (fh_fog)	24
2.5.1.11	Corruption Perception: Business (gcb_pb)	24
2.5.1.12	Corruption Perception: Education (gcb_ped)	24
2.5.1.13	Corruption Perception: Judiciary/Legal System (gcb_pj)	25
2.5.1.14	Corruption Perception: Medical Services (gcb_pmed)	25
2.5.1.15	Corruption Perception: Media (gcb_pmedia)	25
2.5.1.16	Corruption Perception: Military (gcb_pmil)	25
2.5.1.17	Corruption Perception: NGOs (gcb_pngo)	26
2.5.1.18	Corruption Perception: Political Parties (gcb_ppa)	26
2.5.1.19	Corruption Perception: Parliament (gcb_pparl)	26
2.5.1.20	Corruption Perception: Registry and permit services (gcb_pper)	26
2.5.1.21	Corruption Perception: Police (gcb_ppol)	27
2.5.1.22	Corruption Perception: Religious Bodies (gcb_prel)	27
2.5.1.23	Corruption Perception: Tax Revenue (gcb_ptax)	27
2.5.1.24	Corruption Perception: Utilities (gcb_putil)	27
2.5.1.25	ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government (icrg_qog)	28
2.5.1.26	Anti-corruption Score (iiag_corr)	29
2.5.1.27	Corruption Perceptions Index (ti_cpi)	29
2.5.1.28	Corruption Perceptions Index (old methodology) (ti_cpi_om)	29
2.5.1.29	Academic Freedom Index (vdem_academ)	30
2.5.1.30	Political corruption index (vdem_corr)	30
2.5.1.31	Election vote buying (vdem_elvotbuy)	31
2.5.1.32	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (vdem_exbribe)	32
2.5.1.33	Public sector corrupt exchanges (vdem_excrtps)	33
2.5.1.34	Executive corruption index (vdem_execorr)	34
2.5.1.35	Executive embezzlement and theft (vdem_exembez)	34
2.5.1.36	Public sector corruption index (vdem_pubcorr)	35
2.5.1.37	Control of Corruption, Estimate (wbgi_cce)	36
2.5.1.38	CPIA public sector management and institution cluster average (wdi_psm)	36
2.5.1.39	CPIA transparency-accountability-corruption in public sector rating (1-6) (wdi_tacpsr)	37
2.5.2	Judicial	37
2.5.2.1	Law: there are indep. bodies to investigate cases of pubsec. corruption (aai_q11)	37
2.5.2.2	Practice: corruption allegations are investigated by independent body (aai_q12)	38
2.5.2.3	Practice: bodies investigating pubsector corruption allegations are effective (aai_q13)	39
2.5.2.4	Law: companies guilty of procurement violations can't participate in future bid (aai_q27)	39
2.5.2.5	Practice: companies guilty of violations cannot participate in future bids (aai_q28)	39
2.5.2.6	Law: civil servants who report corruption cases are protected (aai_q36)	40
2.5.2.7	Independent Judiciary (bti_ij)	41

2.5.2.8	Prosecution of Office Abuse (bti_poa)	41
2.5.2.9	Independence of the Judiciary (ciri_injud)	42
2.5.2.10	Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (panel data) (fi_legprop_pd)	42
2.5.2.11	Robust Democracy: Rule of Law - Corruption Prevention (sgi_qdrlc)	43
2.5.2.12	Judicial corruption decision (vdem_jucorrdc)	43
2.5.2.13	Absence of Corruption (wjp_abs_cor)	44
2.5.2.14	ADRs are Accessible, Impartial, and Effective (wjp_adr)	44
2.5.2.15	Civil Justice (wjp_civ_just)	44
2.5.2.16	Civil Justice is Free of Corruption (wjp_cj_cor)	45
2.5.2.17	Criminal System is Free of Corruption (wjp_crsys_cor)	45
2.5.2.18	Executive Branch do not use Public Office for Private Gain (wjp_exec_br)	45
2.5.2.19	Transition of Power is Subject to the Law (wjp_trans_pow)	46
2.5.3	Political System	46
2.5.3.1	Accountability Transparency (diat_ati)	46
2.5.3.2	Information Transparency (diat_iti)	46
2.5.3.3	HRV Index (hrv_index)	47
2.5.3.4	Good Governance (sgi_go)	47
2.5.3.5	Electoral component index (vdem_edcomp_thick)	48
2.5.3.6	Electoral democracy index (vdem_polyarchy)	49
2.5.4	Media	50
2.5.4.1	Economic Influences over Media Content (2001-2016) (fhp_mcei5)	50
2.5.4.2	Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp_mceib3)	50
2.5.4.3	Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp_mceib4)	50
2.5.4.4	Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp_mceip3)	51
2.5.4.5	Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp_mceip4)	51
2.5.4.6	Press Freedom Index: Economic Context Component (rsf_eci)	51
2.5.5	Private Economy	52
2.5.5.1	Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (current) (fi_legprop)	52
2.5.6	Public Economy	52
2.5.6.1	Open Budget Index (ibp_obi)	52
3	REPDEM	54
3.1	REPDEM PAGED Basic	54
3.1.1	Cabinet Information	55
3.1.1.1	Ministers' parliamentary accountability (pmpower_minaccount)	55
3.2	REPDEM PAGED Western, Central and Eastern Europe	55
3.2.1	Information on the Cabinets	56
3.2.1.1	Ministers' parliamentary accountability (pmpower_minaccount)	56
4	V-DEM	57
4.1	V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v14	57
4.1.1	V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices	57
4.1.1.1	Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy)	58

4.1.2	V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices	59
4.1.2.1	Additive polyarchy index (v2x_api)	59
4.1.2.2	Multiplicative polyarchy index (v2x_mpi)	59
4.1.2.3	Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair)	60
4.1.2.4	Equality before the law and individual liberty index (v2xel_rol)	61
4.1.3	V-Dem Indicators - Elections	61
4.1.3.1	Fraud allegations by Western election monitors (v2elwestmon)	62
4.1.3.2	Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)	63
4.1.3.3	Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)	63
4.1.3.4	Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)	64
4.1.3.5	Subnational elections free and fair (v2elffehr)	65
4.1.4	V-Dem Indicators - The Executive	66
4.1.4.1	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe)	66
4.1.4.2	Executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez)	67
4.1.4.3	Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrtps)	68
4.1.5	V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary	68
4.1.5.1	Judicial purges (v2jupurge)	69
4.1.5.2	Government attacks on judiciary (v2jupoatck)	70
4.1.5.3	Judicial accountability (v2juacct)	70
4.1.5.4	Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)	71
4.1.6	V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty	71
4.1.6.1	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw)	72
4.1.6.2	Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)	72
4.1.7	V-Dem Indicators - The Media	73
4.1.7.1	Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)	73
4.1.8	V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space	74
4.1.8.1	Campus integrity (v2casurv)	74
4.1.9	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Accountability	75
4.1.9.1	Accountability index (v2x_accountability)	75
4.1.9.2	Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc)	76
4.1.9.3	Diagonal accountability index (v2x_diagacc)	77
4.1.9.4	Horizontal accountability index (v2x_horacc)	78
4.1.10	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Neopatrimonialism	79
4.1.10.1	Neopatrimonial Rule Index (v2x_neopat)	79
4.1.10.2	Clientelism Index (v2xnp_client)	80
4.1.10.3	Regime corruption (v2xnp_regcorr)	80
4.1.11	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties	81
4.1.11.1	Physical violence index (v2x_clphy)	81
4.1.11.2	Political liberties index (v2x_clpol)	82
4.1.12	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption	83
4.1.12.1	Political corruption (v2x_corr)	83
4.1.12.2	Executive corruption index (v2x_execorr)	83
4.1.12.3	Public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr)	84
4.1.13	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Rule of Law	85
4.1.13.1	Rule of law index (v2x_rule)	85
4.1.14	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections	85
4.1.14.1	Electoral Component Index (v2x_edcomp_thick)	85

4.1.15	Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom	86
4.1.15.1	Academic Freedom Index (v2xca_academ)	86
4.1.16	Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Ordinal Versions of Indices	87
4.1.16.1	Political corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_corr_3c)	87
4.1.16.2	Executive corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_execorr_3c)	87
4.1.16.3	Public sector corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_pubcorr_3c)	88
4.1.16.4	Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (e_v2xcl_rol_3c)	88
4.1.17	Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - World Bank Governance Indicators .	89
4.1.17.1	Control of corruption — estimate (e_wbgi_cce)	89
4.1.17.2	Voice and accountability — estimate (e_wbgi_vae)	89
4.1.18	Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Others	90
4.1.18.1	Democratic breakdown (Bernhard et al.) (e_bnr_dem)	90
4.1.18.2	Corruption perception index (e_ti_cpi)	91
4.1.19	Varieties of Indoctrination	91
4.1.19.1	Political influence, non state-owned media (v2medpolnonstate) . . .	91

5 Bibliography

93

1 Explanatory Notes

1.1 Release Notes v4

Demscore provides worldwide free access to harmonized data on Democracy, Environment, Migration, Social Policy, Conflict and Representation from several of the world's most prominent social science research institutes. The interdisciplinary nature of Demscore data facilitates large-scale comparative analyses. This is essential to advance adequate policy responses to complex societal challenges associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and beyond, facing Sweden, Europe, and the world today.

With a firm commitment to transparency and openness, Demscore v4 enables users to gain comprehensive insights into various topics across the social sciences. The joint infrastructure ensures data integrity and quality at the highest international standards and maximizes usability in the measurement of contextual data with 25.000 variables across nearly all countries in the world, from 1750 to the present.

This creates critical time- and cost saving advantages in data collection, management, distribution, and not the least for end-users in the scientific community. This collaborative effort between leading Swedish universities pushes the scale of social science data to a new level and offers unprecedented possibilities for interdisciplinary research and knowledge advancement.

These are the key features of Demscore:

1. **Customized Download:** A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a user-friendly web-based interface for users to generate custom-designed datasets and codebooks for download.
2. **Translations and Data Merges:** Demscore currently offers more than 1000 merge options between datasets.
3. **Metadata:** Demscore takes information on and organization of metadata to new heights with the inclusion of customized codebooks, a detailed methodology document, and a comprehensive handbook.
4. **Handling of Missing Data:** Demscore pioneers in developing an innovative approach to tackle missing data. Researchers can now account for missing values with increased precision, leading to more robust and reliable analyses.
5. **Merge Scores:** Demscore introduces a unique merge mechanism. This powerful tool enables researchers to combine datasets effortlessly, uncovering connections and patterns that were previously hidden in isolated data silos.
6. **Thematic Datasets:** Demscore provides researchers with curated thematic datasets, each focused on a specific topic. These datasets bring together relevant variables from across the Demscore partners, facilitating in-depth investigations and comprehensive analyses of specific domains.
7. **Interactive Web Portal:** In addition to all the above, Demscore's web portal offers interactive visualization tools, user support and additional information on all partners and data sources.

For more information, please visit <https://www.demscore.se/> or contact contact@demscore.se.

1.2 New in Demscore version 4

A detailed description of changes and additions made for version 4 compared to version 3 can be found in the Methodology Document.

1.3 The Demscore Codebook

The autogenerated Demscore Codebook lists variable entries for those variables chosen by the user along with citation guidelines and licenses per variable.

The meta data is extracted from the codebooks per dataset stored in a table in the Demscore PostgreSQL database with one row per variable for all datasets. This table includes codebook entries, variable tags, labels, and other variable information in LaTeX format used to generate an automated codebook.

Demscore maintains a single set of standard entries for metadata across all datasets, to which all project members contribute their information. Additionally, variables within different datasets may have varying sets of additional information requirements specific to each dataset. These dataset-specific entries are also included, but they are presented as variable-specific metadata beneath the standard entries.

At the outset of the harmonization process, Demscore underwent a thorough variable name cleanup. This involved tasks such as replacing spaces or dots in variable names with underscores and converting all letters to lowercase. Notably, the original tags remain preserved and stored in the PostgreSQL table. Each variable in Demscore is accessible in both short and long forms. The short form comprises the cleaned version of the original variable tag, while the long form starts with the dataset name from which it originates, followed by the cleaned variable name.

For instance, the original name of the variable *MinisterPersonalID* from the H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset is included as *ministerpersonalid* (short form) and *hdata_fomin_ministerpersonalid* (long form) in Demscore.

In addition, each dataset includes Demscore unit-identifier variables which are named according to the following naming scheme: Beginning with *u_*, followed by the name of the primary unit and finally the variable tag. The *year-* variable from the COMPLAB SPIN The Out-of-Work Benefits Dataset (OUTWB), which is part of the primary unit *u_complab_country_year* has the Demscore unit identifier name *u_complab_country_year_year*.

1.4 Methodology

For details on our methodology please see the Demscore Methodology document available for download on the Demscore website.

1.5 Citations

The Demscore project does not have a formal citation of its own. Hence, when using Demscore, we suggest that you cite the respective projects and datasets. We indicate how every dataset is to be cited in the autogenerated codebook you retrieve with your data download, both in the dataset description and the codebook entry for each variable. Most often it is sufficient to cite the dataset a variable originates from, but sometimes there is a variable specific citation listed in the codebook entry in addition to that. For these cases, please also add the variable specific citation to the reference list of your publication. Full references are linked in the codebook entries of the variables and listed in the codebook's bibliography. We suggest you to also cite the Demscore Methodology Document when using data retrieved through Demscore.

1.6 Missing Data

Demscore indicates different types of missingness for observations in the customized datasets:
Missing in original data = Whenever an observation in the original variable is a missing (NA, missing code such as 7777, blank cell), we preserve this missing value. When the original source has special codes for various types of missing, those are preserved.

Missing code: -11111 = Demscore code for observation is missing due to the translation/merge, i.e., missing data due to no data being included for this combination of identifiers in the end Output Unit.

Missing code: -22222 = No observation is merged/translated, but the original data contains information for these identifier combinations elsewhere. For these cases, we use a different code. The

user needs to consult the reference documents (Methodology Document Section 5.1. or the Demscore Handbook) to clarify why the translation to the identifier combinations in the end Output Unit was not possible.

Please note that an observation that is missing in its original output unit does not take the value -11111, but appears as NA/blank cell in the customized dataset.

1.7 Download ID

The download ID can be shared with other users for replication purposes. A user can type the download ID into the Demscore website and retrieve the same download selection and files as the original user. This ID is autogenerated for each download from the Demscore website and will always retrieve the same data, even if the Demscore version was updated in the meantime.

Download ID:

1.8 Unit Identifier Variables

An Output Unit is defined as an output format in which variables can be retrieved from one or more datasets through a strictly defined output grid. A unit table defining this output grid contains unit identifier columns with `u_` prefixes and the table is sorted based on these unit identifier columns and has a fixed number of rows. Unit columns are based on the columns that constitute the unit of analysis in a dataset. They are added to the original dataset and marked by a unit prefix (consisting of a `u_` and the dataset unit name) before the original variable name. Unit columns can contain slightly modified data, e.g., missing values are replaced by a default value. Sometimes we add additional columns to the unit table, for instance if a dataset includes both a `country_id` column with a numeric country code, we add the variable storing the full country name to the unit table as well for better readability.

1.9 Thematic Dataset

This thematic dataset offers a comprehensive overview of corruption-related variables, covering a wide range of issues including fraudulent practices, municipal corruption, corruption perceptions, and various sub-pillars such as public sector corruption, executive bribery, and judicial accountability. The dataset also includes information on the perception and experience of corruption across different sectors such as education, healthcare, media, and politics. Variables related to the enforcement of anti-corruption laws, public trust in institutions, and mechanisms for preventing corruption are also included. The dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners interested in studying the mechanisms, patterns, and consequences of corruption. By providing comprehensive and structured variables, this thematic dataset allows users to easily access top-quality data for social science research, without the need to merge or source variables independently.

1.10 Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit

`u_demscore_country_year_country`:

`u_demscore_country_year_code`:

`u_demscore_country_year_year`:

2 QOG

The **Quality of Government (QoG)** Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an independent research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. QoG is comprised of about 30 researchers who conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. QoG's award-winning datasets focus on concepts related to quality of government, transparency, and public administration. The main objective of QoG's research is to address the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained. A second objective is to study the effects of Quality of Government on a number of policy areas, such as health, the environment, social policy, and poverty. The QoG datasets draw on a number of freely available datasources. More information on how the variables are compiled for different QoG datasets can be found in the respective QoG codebooks available on their website. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government>

2.1 QoG EQI Regional Level 2021 (with all NUTS2 regions)

Dataset tag: qog_eqi_agg21

Output Unit: QoG NUTS2 Region, i.e., data is collected per NUTS2 region. That means there is one row for each region in the dataset. The unit is expressed through the column `region_code` but can also be expressed through the column name.

Description: This index focuses on both perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality in the EU.

Dataset citation: Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, and Monika Bauhr. 2021. Sub-national Quality of Government in EU Member States: Presenting the 2021 European Quality of Government Index and its relationship with Covid-19 indicators. University of Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper Series 2021:4.

Link to original codebook

https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_eqi_21.pdf

License: The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution, commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/european-quality-of-government-index>

2.1.1 Regional Level Variables

EQI variables for the regional level.

2.1.1.1 Corruption pillar (corruptionp21_n2)

Long tag: qog_eqi_agg21_corruptionp21_n2

Original tag: corruptionp21_n2

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2021)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 5, Percent: 0.02

Description:

Corruption pillar, country centered and z-score standardized. We aggregate the individual scores ('survey question') to the corresponding regional level, so that each of question assessing corruption in the provision of public services is now a regional 'indicator'. After normalizing each of corruption indicators (through z-score standardization) so that they share a common range, the corruption indicators are aggregated into two sub-pillars, called 'experience' and 'perceptions'. They respectively represent question items reflecting personal experience with petty corruption versus perception of corruption in various other areas. These two sub-pillars are aggregated using equal weighting.

2.2 QoG European Quality of Government Index CATI - Country Level (2021)

Dataset tag: qog_eqi_cati_long

Output Unit: QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year. That means there is one row for each combination of country and year in the dataset. This unit is identified using the cname column and the year column.

Description: This index focuses on both perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality in the EU.

Dataset citation: Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr. 2021. Sub-national Quality of Government in EU Member States: Presenting the 2021 European Quality of Government Index and its relationship with Covid-19 indicators. University of Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper Series 2021:4.

Link to original codebook

https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_eqi_21.pdf

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/european-quality-of-government-index>

2.2.1 Country Level Variables

EQI variables for the country level.

2.2.1.1 People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic public services. (need_cor)

Long tag: qog_eqi_cati_long_need_cor

Original tag: Need_cor

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2012)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 48, Percent: 0.31

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 48, Percent: 0.16

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "Strongly disagree" and 10 means "Strongly agree".

2.3 QoG European Quality of Government Index Regional Level (2010, 2013, 2017 & 2021)

Dataset tag: qog_eqi_long

Output Unit: QoG NUTS Region-Year, i.e., data is collected per European NUTS region and year. This means that every row in the dataset can be identified through a combination of region and year. The unit can be expressed using the columns `region_code` and `year`. The unit can also be expressed through a combination of the columns `nuts0`, `nuts1`, `nuts2` and `year` or `name` and `year`.

Description: This index focuses on both perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality in the EU.

Dataset citation: Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr. 2021. Sub-national Quality of Government in EU Member States: Presenting the 2021 European Quality of Government Index and its relationship with Covid-19 indicators. University of Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper Series 2021:4.

Link to original codebook

https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_eqi_21.pdf

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:
<https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/european-quality-of-government-index>

2.3.1 Regional Level Variables

This section includes QoG EQI regional-level variables.

2.3.1.1 European Quality Index (EQI) (eqi)

Long tag: qog_eqi_long_eqi

Original tag: EQI

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Description:

Final EQI index (centered around WGI), all units. The construction of EQI Index starts by taking the country average from the WGI data for four indicators: ‘control of corruption’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘voice and accountability’ and combine the four into one composite index (equal weighting). Then, the combined WGI data is standardized for the EU sample. This figure is used as country’s mean score in the EQI for all 30 countries⁴.

In previous rounds, we then took the standardized sample mean for 2015 WGI data and set each country’s national average as such. A key difference in this round (and retrospectively in other two rounds) we now aggregate to the WGI at the pillar levels of corruption impartiality and quality in order to better make use of these three distinct concepts empirically.

The regional data itself combines 18 survey questions about QoG in the region. In building the regional index, we re-score each variable so that higher numbers equate to higher QoG and then the 18 questions/indicators to three pillars based on factor analysis, then we averaged these three pillars together to form the final index figure for each region. After each stage of aggregation, the data are standardized.

For data for the regional pillars’ score for each of the countries included in the 2017 regional survey, weighting each region’s score by their share of the national population. This figure is thus used to explain regional variation only within each country included (not absolute levels of QoG). We then subtract this mean score from each region’s individual pillar score from the regional study, which shows if the region is above or below its national average and by how much. This figure is then added to the national level, WGI data, so each region has an adjusted score for each of the three pillars, centered on the respective WGI indicators. It is worth mentioning that none of the regional variation from the regional index is lost during this merging process; the country mean of all regional scores is simply adjusted. The formula employed is the following:

$$EQI_{regionXincountryY} = WGI_{countryY} + (Rqog_{regionXincountryY} - CRqog_{countryY}) \quad (1)$$

where ‘EQI’ is the final score from each region or country in each pillar –corruption, impartiality and quality - of the EQI. ‘WGI’ is the World Bank’s national average for each country for each pillar, while ‘Rqog’ is each region’s score from the regional survey and ‘CRqog’ is the country average (weighted by regional population) of all regions within the country from the regional survey for each pillar. The EQI pillars are standardized so that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’. The three pillar scores are then aggregated using equal weighting.

2.3.1.2 Corruption pillar (corruptionp)

Long tag: qog_eqi_long_corruptionp

Original tag: corruptionp

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Description:

Corruption pillar, country centered and z-score standardized. We aggregate the individual scores (‘survey question’) to the corresponding regional level, so that each of question assessing corruption in the provision of public services is now a regional ‘indicator’. After normalizing each of corruption indicators (through z-score standardization) so that they share a common range, the corruption indicators are aggregated into two sub-pillars, called ‘experience’ and ‘perceptions’. They respectively represent question items reflecting personal experience with

petty corruption versus perception of corruption in various other areas. These two sub-pillars are aggregated using equal weighting.

2.3.1.3 Corruption perception sub-pillar (corruption_subexp)

Long tag: qog_eqi_long_corruption_subexp

Original tag: corruption_subExp

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Description:

Corruption perceptions index, z-score standardized. It constitutes one of the sub-pillars of corruption pillar.

2.3.1.4 Corruption experience sub-pillar (corruption_subper)

Long tag: qog_eqi_long_corruption_subper

Original tag: corruption_subPer

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Description:

Corruption experiences index, z-score standardized. It constitutes one of the sub-pillars of corruption pillar.

2.4 QoG EU Regional Dataset Long Data

Dataset tag: qog_eureg_long

Output Unit: QoG NUTS Region-Year, i.e., data is collected per European NUTS region and year. This means that every row in the dataset can be identified through a combination of region and year. The unit can be expressed using the columns `region_code` and `year`. The unit can also be expressed through a combination of the columns `nuts0`, `nuts1` `nuts2` and `year`.

Description: The QoG EU Regional dataset is a dataset consisting of more than 300 variables covering three levels of European regions - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS): NUTS0 (country), NUTS1(major socio-economic regions) and NUTS2 (basic regions for the application of regional policies).

The QoG Regional Data is presented in three different forms available in separate datasets. The variable are the same across all three dataset besides a varying suffix (`_nuts0`, `_nuts1`, `_nuts2`) indication which NUTS level is represented.

All datasets are available in time-series format. The first one (The QoG Regional Data - Long Form) is a dataset where data is presented in the long form. The list of units of analysis contains regions of all NUTS levels.

Two other datasets are presented in the wide form for multilevel analysis. In the second dataset (The QoG Regional Data - Wide Form NUTS1) includes NUTS1 level as the unit of analysis and variables represent the values for this level and corresponding lower level – NUTS0. As an example, in this dataset the data is presented only for East Sweden(Ostra Sverige SE1), as a unit of analysis and has values for lower levels of this region - Sweden (SE).

In the third dataset (The QoG Regional Data - Wide Form NUTS2) the unit of analysis is NUTS2 level regions and variables provide values as for every unit of analysis, as well as for corresponding lower NUTS levels: NUTS1 and NUTS0. One example of unit of analysis in this dataset is Stockholm (SE11) and data for every variable will be for Stockholm, as well as for lower level regions - East Sweden (Ostra Sverige SE1) and Sweden (SE).

Dataset citation: Charron, Nicholas, Stefan Dahlberg, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon Cem Mert Dalli. 2020. The Quality of Government EU Regional Dataset, version Nov20. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogeuiregnov20

Link to original codebook

https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_eureg_nov20.pdf

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/eu-regional-dataset>

2.4.1 Quality of Government

This category includes variables that are the core features of QoG (impartiality, bureaucratic quality and corruption) as well as measures that are broader (rule of law and transparency).

2.4.1.1 Corruption pillar, country centered and z-score standardized (eqi_zcorruption)

Long tag: qog_eureg_long_eqi_zcorruption

Original tag: eqi_zcorruption

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2020)

Variable citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 41, Percent: 0.14

Description:

EQI corruption pillar, country centered and z-score standardized. For its calculation, they aggregate the individual scores ('survey question') to the corresponding regional level, so that each of question assessing corruption in the provision of public services is now a regional 'indicator'. After normalizing each of corruption indicators (through z-score standardization) so that they share a common range, the corruption indicators are aggregated into two sub-pillars, called 'experience' and 'perceptions'. They respectively represent question items reflecting personal experience with petty corruption versus perception of corruption in various other areas. These two sub-pillars are aggregated using equal weighting.

2.4.1.2 Corruption perceptions index (corruption sub-pillar) z-score stand. (2017 only) (eqi_zcorruptper)

Long tag: qog_eureg_long_eqi_zcorruptper

Original tag: eqi_zcorruptper

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2020)

Variable citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent:

Description:

EQI corruption perceptions index, z-score standardized. It constitutes one of the sub-pillars of corruption pillar.

2.4.1.3 Corruption experiences index (corruption sub-pillar) z-score stand. (2017 only) (eqi_zcorruptexp)

Long tag: qog_eureg_long_eqi_zcorruptexp

Original tag: eqi_zcorruptexp

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2020)

Variable citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent:

Description:

EQI corruption experiences index, z-score standardized. It constitutes one of the sub-pillars of corruption pillar.

2.4.1.4 Corruption perceptions index (corruption sub-pillar) min-max (0-100)(2017) (eqi_norm_corruptper)

Long tag: qog_eureg_long_eqi_norm_corruptper

Original tag: eqi_norm_corruptper

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2020)

Variable citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent:

Description:

Corruption perceptions index (corruption sub-pillar), min-max (0-100) standardized.

2.4.1.5 Corruption experiences index (corruption sub-pillar) min-max (0-100) (2017) (eqi_norm_corruptexp)

Long tag: qog_eureg_long_eqi_norm_corruptexp

Original tag: eqi_norm_corruptexp

Dataset citation: Charron et al. (2020)

Variable citation: Charron et al. (2014, 2015, 2019)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0, Percent: 0

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent:

Description:

Corruption experiences index (corruption sub-pillar) min-max (0-100) standardized.

2.5 QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series

Dataset tag: qog_std_ts

Output Unit: QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year. That means there is one row for each combination of country and year in the dataset. This unit is identified using the cname column and the year column.

Description: The QoG Standard dataset is our largest dataset. It consists of approximately 2100 variables from more than 100 data sources related to Quality of Government. In the QoG Standard TS dataset, data from 1946 to 2023 is included and the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g., Sweden-1946, Sweden-1947, etc.).

Dataset citation: Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli, Rafael Lopez Valverde Paula Nilsson. 2024. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan24. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogstdjan24

Link to original codebook

https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_std_jan24.pdf

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More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:
<https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/standard-dataset>

2.5.1 Quality of Government

This category includes variables that are the core features of QoG (impartiality, bureaucratic quality and corruption) as well as measures that are broader (rule of law and transparency).

2.5.1.1 Access to Information and Openness sub-index (aii_aio)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_aio

Original tag: aii_aio

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Access to Information and Openness. This sub-index from 0 to 100 is composed of:

10. In law, corruption is criminalized as a specific offense.
11. In law, there is an independent body/bodies mandated to receive and investigate cases of alleged public sector corruption.
12. In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.

13. In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.
14. In practice, appointments to the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption support/s the independence of the body.
15. In law, the head of state and government can be investigated and prosecuted while in office if evidence suggests they committed a crime.
16. In practice, heads of state and government are investigated and prosecuted while in office if evidence suggests they committed a crime.
17. In law, there is a mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force.
18. In practice, the mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.

2.5.1.2 Public management sub-index (aii_pubm)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_pubm

Original tag: aii_pubm

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Public Management. This sub-index from 0 to 100 is composed of:

35. In law, civil servants are required to report cases of alleged corruption.
36. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
37. In law, there are formal rules to prevent conflicts of interest, nepotism, cronyism, and patronage in all branches of government.
38. In practice, civil servants' work is not compromised by political interference.
39. In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.
40. In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after leaving the government.

2.5.1.3 Law: corruption is criminalized as a specific offense (aii_q10)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q10

Original tag: aii_q10

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 10. In law, corruption is criminalized as a specific offense.

A 100 score is earned where a national law criminalizes corruption as a specific offence(s) for at least three of the following: extortion, offering a bribe, accepting a bribe, kickbacks, using public resources for private gain, using confidential state information for private gain, money laundering, conspiring or attempting to commit any of the above, organized crime and trafficking.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists, or a law exists but it alludes to corruption in general terms without criminalizing specific offences.

2.5.1.4 Practice: appointees to bodies investigating pubsec corruption support independ. (aai_q14)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aai_q14

Original tag: aai_q14

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 14. In practice, appointments to the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption support/s the independence of the body.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) appointments follow a merit-based system,
- 2) appointees are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations or other biases, and
- 3) appointees are disciplined/removed/transferred only through due process by a peer panel/oversight body.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) appointments don't always follow the merit-based system,
- 2) appointees occasionally have conflicts of interest, or
- 3) appointees are occasionally disciplined/removed/transferred without observing due process by a peer panel/oversight body.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) appointments to positions in the body rarely follow a merit-based system,
- 2) individuals appointed usually have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations or other biases, or
- 3) due process by a peer panel/oversight body is rarely or never followed to discipline/remove/transfer the appointees.

2.5.1.5 Law: civil servants are required to report cases of alleged corruption (aai_q35)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aai_q35

Original tag: aai_q35

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 35. In law, civil servants are required to report cases of alleged corruption.

A 100 score is earned where the law creates a explicit legal requirement for civil servants to report any cases of alleged corruption they are aware of.

A 0 score is earned if no such law exists.

2.5.1.6 Law: there are formal rules to prevent conflict of interest, nepotism, etc. (aii_q37)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q37

Original tag: aii_q37

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 37. In law, there are formal rules to prevent conflicts of interest, nepotism, cronyism and patronage in all branches of government.

A 100 score is earned where at least two of the following three conditions are met:

- 1) the law prohibits conflicts of interest, nepotism, cronyism, and patronage (at least two of these offenses must be prohibited),
- 2) the law applies to all branches of government, including the civil service, and
- 3) it mandates mechanisms such as competitive recruitment and promotion procedures, safeguards against arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissal, and recusal procedures.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists. It also scores 0 if only one of the three conditions described in 100 is met.

2.5.1.7 The Bayesian Corruption Indicator (bci_bci)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_bci_bci

Original tag: bci_bci

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Standaert (2015)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 6336, Percent: 41.44

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 5744, Percent: 19.16

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 592 Percent: 9.34

Description:

The BCI index values lie between 0 and 100, with an increase in the index corresponding to a raise in the level of corruption. This is a first difference with CPI and WGI where an increase

means that the level of corruption has decreased.

There exists no objective scale on which to measure the perception of corruption and the exact scaling you use is to a large extent arbitrary. However, we were able to give the index an absolute scale: zero corresponds to a situation where all surveys say that there is absolutely no corruption. On the other hand, when the index is one, all surveys say that corruption is as bad as it gets according to their scale. This is another difference with CPI and WGI, where the scaling is relative. They are rescaled such that WGI has mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in each year, while CPI always lies between 0 and 100.

In contrast, the actual range of values of the BCI will change in each year, depending how close countries come to the situation where everyone agrees there is no corruption at all (0), or that corruption is as bad as it can get (100).

The absolute scale of the BCI index was obtained by rescaling all the individual survey data such that zero corresponds to the lowest possible level of corruption and 1 to the highest one. We subsequently rescaled the BCI index such that when all underlying indicators are zero (one), the expected value of the BCI index is zero (hundred).

2.5.1.8 Anti-Corruption Policy (bti_acp)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_bti_acp

Original tag: bti_acp

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Donner et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1152, Percent: 7.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1112, Percent: 3.71

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 40 Percent: 3.47

Description:

To what extent does the government successfully contain corruption? From 1 to 10.

1. The government fails to contain corruption, and there are no integrity mechanisms in place.
4. The government is only partly willing and able to contain corruption, while the few integrity mechanisms implemented are mostly ineffective.
7. The government is often successful in containing corruption. Most integrity mechanisms are in place, but some are functioning only with limited effectiveness.
10. The government is successful in containing corruption, and all integrity mechanisms are in place and effective.

2.5.1.9 Corruption Commission Present in Constitution (ccp_cc)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_ccp_cc

Original tag: ccp_cc

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Elkins & Ginsburg (2021)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10066, Percent: 65.83

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 8840, Percent: 29.49

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1226 Percent: 12.18

Description:

Does the constitution contain provisions for a counter corruption commission?

1. Yes
2. No
96. Other
97. Unable to determine

2.5.1.10 Functioning of Government (fh_fog)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fh_fog

Original tag: fh_fog

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 3485, Percent: 22.79

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3045, Percent: 10.16

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 440 Percent: 12.63

Description:

Functioning of Government - The variable examines to what extent the freely elected head of government and a national legislative representative determine the policies of the government, if the government is free from pervasive corruption, and if the government is accountable to the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 12 (best).

2.5.1.11 Corruption Perception: Business (gcb_pb)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pb

Original tag: gcb_pb

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 510, Percent: 3.34

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 503, Percent: 1.68

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 7 Percent: 1.37

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Business. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.12 Corruption Perception: Education (gcb_ped)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_ped

Original tag: gcb_ped

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 442, Percent: 2.89

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 436, Percent: 1.45

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6 Percent: 1.36

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Education. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.13 Corruption Perception: Judiciary/Legal System (gcb_pj)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pj

Original tag: gcb_pj

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 509, Percent: 3.33

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 502, Percent: 1.67

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 7 Percent: 1.38

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Judiciary/Legal system. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.14 Corruption Perception: Medical Services (gcb_pmed)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pmed

Original tag: gcb_pmed

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 346, Percent: 2.26

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 342, Percent: 1.14

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4 Percent: 1.16

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Medical services. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.15 Corruption Perception: Media (gcb_pmedia)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pmedia

Original tag: gcb_pmedia

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 510, Percent: 3.34

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 503, Percent: 1.68

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 7 Percent: 1.37

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Media. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.16 Corruption Perception: Military (gcb_pmil)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pmil

Original tag: gcb_pmil

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 434, Percent: 2.84

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 428, Percent: 1.43

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6 Percent: 1.38

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Military. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.17 Corruption Perception: NGOs (gcb_pngo)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pngo

Original tag: gcb_pngo

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 443, Percent: 2.9

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 437, Percent: 1.46

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6 Percent: 1.35

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? NGOs. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.18 Corruption Perception: Political Parties (gcb_ppa)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_ppa

Original tag: gcb_ppa

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 509, Percent: 3.33

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 502, Percent: 1.67

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 7 Percent: 1.38

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Political parties. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.19 Corruption Perception: Parliament (gcb_pparl)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pparl

Original tag: gcb_pparl

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 509, Percent: 3.33

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 502, Percent: 1.67

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 7 Percent: 1.38

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Parliament. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.20 Corruption Perception: Registry and permit services (gcb_pper)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_pper

Original tag: gcb_pper

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 241, Percent: 1.58

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 238, Percent: 0.79

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3 Percent: 1.24

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Registry and permit services. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.21 Corruption Perception: Police (gcb_ppol)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_ppol

Original tag: gcb_ppol

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 441, Percent: 2.88

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 435, Percent: 1.45

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6 Percent: 1.36

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Police. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.22 Corruption Perception: Religious Bodies (gcb_prel)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_prel

Original tag: gcb_prel

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 442, Percent: 2.89

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 436, Percent: 1.45

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6 Percent: 1.36

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Religious bodies. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.23 Corruption Perception: Tax Revenue (gcb_ptax)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_ptax

Original tag: gcb_ptax

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 241, Percent: 1.58

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 238, Percent: 0.79

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3 Percent: 1.24

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Tax revenue. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.24 Corruption Perception: Utilities (gcb_putil)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_gcb_putil

Original tag: gcb_putil

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 242, Percent: 1.58

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 239, Percent: 0.8

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3 Percent: 1.24

Description:

To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Utilities. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).

2.5.1.25 ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government (*icrg_qog*)

Long tag: *qog_std_ts_icrg_qog*

Original tag: *icrg_qog*

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: The PRS Group et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 5359, Percent: 35.05

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 5101, Percent: 17.02

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 258 Percent: 4.81

Description:

The mean value of the ICRG variables 'Corruption', 'Law and Order' and 'Bureaucracy Quality', scaled from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.

Corruption:

This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability into the political process. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment. Although the measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. According to ICRG, these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market. The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable.

Law and order:

Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating if it

suffers from a very high crime rate or if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).

Bureaucracy Quality:

The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

The component variables can be purchased at <https://epub.prsgroup.com/products/icrg>

2.5.1.26 Anti-corruption Score (iiag_corr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_iiag_corr

Original tag: iiag_corr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2020)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Anti-corruption is one of the four sub-categories that are used to calculate the Security and Rule of Law category score. It consists of five indicators from six data sources.

2.5.1.27 Corruption Perceptions Index (ti_cpi)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_ti_cpi

Original tag: ti_cpi

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2023a)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1927, Percent: 12.6

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1829, Percent: 6.1

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 98 Percent: 5.09

Description:

Corruption Perceptions Index. Scale of 0-100 where 0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption.

2.5.1.28 Corruption Perceptions Index (old methodology) (ti_cpi_om)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_ti_cpi_om

Original tag: ti_cpi_om

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2023a)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 2079, Percent: 13.6

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1986, Percent: 6.63

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 93 Percent: 4.47

Description:

Corruption Perceptions Index (Old methodology). Scale of 0-10 where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 10 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption.

2.5.1.29 Academic Freedom Index (vdem_academ)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_academ

Original tag: vdem_academ

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10280, Percent: 67.23

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 9930, Percent: 33.13

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 350 Percent: 3.4

Description:

Academic Freedom Index

Question: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

Clarification: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel).

The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach, freedom of academic exchange and dissemination, institutional autonomy, campus integrity, freedom of academic and cultural expression.

2.5.1.30 Political corruption index (vdem_corr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_corr

Original tag: vdem_corr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell,

Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10696, Percent: 69.95

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10300, Percent: 34.36

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Political corruption index

Question: How pervasive is political corruption?

Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt (0) to more corrupt (1) (unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation). The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

Aggregation: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index; (b) executive corruption index; (c) the indicator for legislative corruption; and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption. In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. V-Dem replaces missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of (a), (b) and (d).

2.5.1.31 Election vote buying (vdem_elvotbuy)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_elvotbuy

Original tag: vdem_elvotbuy

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 9126, Percent: 59.68

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 8843, Percent: 29.5

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 283 Percent: 3.1

Description:

Election vote buying

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., *quot;quot;porkbarrelquot;quot;*; legislation.

Responses:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these

offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

2.5.1.32 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (vdem_exbribe)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_exbribe

Original tag: vdem_exbribe

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges

Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Responses:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

2.5.1.33 Public sector corrupt exchanges (vdem_excrtps)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_excrtps

Original tag: vdem_excrtps

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Public sector corrupt exchanges

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges

for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

2.5.1.34 Executive corruption index (vdem_execorr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_execorr

Original tag: vdem_execorr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Executive corruption index

Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Aggregation: VDem estimates the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery and executive embezzlement.

2.5.1.35 Executive embezzlement and theft (vdem_exembez)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_exembez

Original tag: vdem_exembez

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Executive embezzlement and theft

Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and

cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Responses:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal

or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards

of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

2.5.1.36 Public sector corruption index (vdem_pubcorr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_pubcorr

Original tag: vdem_pubcorr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard,

Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Public sector corruption index

Question: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks,

or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is

opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

Aggregation: VDem estimates the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery and embezzlement.

2.5.1.37 Control of Corruption, Estimate (wbgi_cce)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wbgi_cce

Original tag: wbgi_cce

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (n.d.)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 4537, Percent: 29.67

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4038, Percent: 13.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 499 Percent: 11

Description:

Control of Corruption - Estimate: 'Control of Corruption' measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of 'additional payments to get things done', to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring 'grand corruption' in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in 'state capture'.

2.5.1.38 CPIA public sector management and institution cluster average (wdi_psm)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wdi_psm

Original tag: wdi_psm

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Bank (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1348, Percent: 8.82

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1144, Percent: 3.82

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 204 Percent: 15.13

Description:

The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector (1=low to 6=high).

2.5.1.39 CPIA transparency-accountability-corruption in public sector rating (1-6) (wdi_tacpsr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wdi_tacpsr

Original tag: wdi_tacpsr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Bank (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1348, Percent: 8.82

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1144, Percent: 3.82

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 204 Percent: 15.13

Description:

Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector assess the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests.

2.5.2 Judicial

This category includes judicial indicators, generally covering legal rights granted by a state to its citizens and their compliance, as well as measures of crimes and the overall state of the judicial system.

2.5.2.1 Law: there are indep. bodies to investigate cases of pubsec. corruption (aii_q11)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q11

Original tag: aii_q11

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 11. In law, there is an independent body/bodies mandated to receive and investigate cases of alleged public sector corruption.

A 100 score is earned where all of the following conditions are met:

- 1) a law mandates a specific body to receive and investigate citizens' allegations of public sector corruption, and
- 2) a law establishes that the body is independent from the Executive and Legislative branches.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists, or a law exists but it doesn't meet the two conditions described in 100.

2.5.2.2 Practice: corruption allegations are investigated by independent body (aii_q12)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q12

Original tag: aii_q12

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 12. In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) allegations against senior-level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated, and
- 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations work without fear or favor from other offices.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) not all allegations against senior-level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated, or
- 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations are occasionally subjected to positive/negative incentives to rule in favor/against a senior-level politician and/or civil servant.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) allegations against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are rarely or never investigated, or
- 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations routinely receive positive/negative incentives to rule in favor/against a senior level politician and/or civil servant.

2.5.2.3 Practice: bodies investigating pubsector corruption allegations are effective (aii_q13)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q13

Original tag: aii_q13

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 13. In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) the body has a functioning system in place to receive citizens' allegations of public sector corruption,
- 2) it investigates most of the allegations within three months of being reported, and
- 3) it exercises its own initiative to start investigations when/if needed.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) the system to receive citizens' allegations may not work for several days at a time,
- 2) not all cases reported are investigated or investigations take more than three months to start, or
- 3) the body rarely or never starts investigations out of its own initiative.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) there's no system to receive citizens' allegations, or
- 2) cases reported are rarely or never investigated.

2.5.2.4 Law: companies guilty of procurement violations can't participate in future bid (aii_q27)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q27

Original tag: aii_q27

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 27. In law, companies found guilty of violations of procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids.

A 100 score is earned where the law forbids companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) from participating in future bidding in the country, whether indefinitely or for a limited period of time.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists.

2.5.2.5 Practice: companies guilty of violations cannot participate in future bids (aii_q28)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q28

Original tag: aii_q28

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 540, Percent: 3.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 520, Percent: 1.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 28. In practice, companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are forbidden from participating in future bidding in the country, whether indefinitely or for a limited period of time, and

2) there is a registry of companies forbidden from bidding that citizens can access immediately or in less than two weeks upon request. A 100 is also earned if there is a registry in place that at the time of this research is empty because no company has violated the law.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are generally forbidden from participating in future bidding, but there is evidence that some exceptions exist, or

2) citizen access to the full list of companies forbidden from participating takes more than two weeks.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are rarely forbidden from participating in future bidding, or

2) there is no registry of companies forbidden from participating or it exists but it's not public.

2.5.2.6 Law: civil servants who report corruption cases are protected (aii_q36)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_aii_q36

Original tag: aii_q36

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 270, Percent: 1.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 36. In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

1) there is a law specifically created to protect public sector whistle-blowers, and

2) the law forbids termination, transfer, harassment or other negative consequences against whistle-blowers. Note: General protections for civil servants do not grant a 100.

A 0 score is earned if no such law exists.

2.5.2.7 Independent Judiciary (bti_ij)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_bti_ij

Original tag: bti_ij

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Donner et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1153, Percent: 7.54

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1113, Percent: 3.71

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 40 Percent: 3.47

Description:

To what extent does an independent judiciary exist? From 1 to 10.

1. The judiciary is not independent and not institutionally differentiated.
4. The independence of the judiciary is heavily impaired by political authorities and high levels of corruption. It is to some extent institutionally differentiated, but severely restricted by functional deficits, insufficient territorial operability and scarce resources.
7. The judiciary is largely independent, even though occasionally its decisions are subordinated to political authorities or influenced by corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, but partially restricted by insufficient territorial or functional operability.
10. The judiciary is independent and free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, and there are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.

2.5.2.8 Prosecution of Office Abuse (bti_poa)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_bti_poa

Original tag: bti_poa

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Donner et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1153, Percent: 7.54

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1113, Percent: 3.71

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 40 Percent: 3.47

Description:

To what extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized? From 1 to 10.

1. Office holders who break the law and engage in corruption can do so without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
4. Office holders who break the law and engage in corruption are not prosecuted adequately under the law, but occasionally attract adverse publicity.
7. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption generally are prosecuted under

established laws and often attract adverse publicity, but occasionally slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes.

10. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under established laws and always attract adverse publicity.

2.5.2.9 Independence of the Judiciary (ciri_injud)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_ciri_injud

Original tag: ciri_injud

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 7357, Percent: 48.11

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 6405, Percent: 21.37

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 952 Percent: 12.94

Description:

Independence of the judiciary indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. Important questions to consider include:

- Are judges safe from removal by other government officials?
- Can actions of other government branches be challenged in the courts?
- Are court hearings public?
- Are judicial officials generally free from corruption and intimidation?
- Are case outcomes protected from governmental interference?

Scoring Scheme:

As an institution, the judiciary is:

(0) Not Independent

(1) Partially Independent

(2) Generally Independent

2.5.2.10 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (panel data) (fi_legprop_pd)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fi_legprop_pd

Original tag: fi_legprop_pd

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Gwartney et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 3886, Percent: 25.41

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3736, Percent: 12.46

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 150 Percent: 3.86

Description:

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to “no judicial independence”, “no trusted legal framework exists”, “no protection of intellectual property”, “military interference in rule

of law”, and “no integrity of the legal system” and 10 corresponds to “high judicial independence”, “trusted legal framework exists”, “protection of intellectual property”, “no military interference in rule of law”, and “integrity of the legal system”. The index consists of the following indicators: Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute, Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations, Protection of intellectual property, Military interference in rule of law and the political process, Integrity of the legal system. Panel-data adjusted.

2.5.2.11 Robust Democracy: Rule of Law - Corruption Prevention (sgi_qdrlc)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_sgi_qdrlc

Original tag: sgi_qdrlc

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Schiller & Hellmann (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 328, Percent: 2.15

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 328, Percent: 1.09

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

Robust Democracy: Rule of Law - Corruption Prevention. To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests? This question addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption. (1, 2): Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity. (3, 4, 5): Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions. (6, 7, 8): Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions. (9, 10): Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.

2.5.2.12 Judicial corruption decision (vdem_jucorrdc)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_jucorrdc

Original tag: vdem_jucorrdc

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10696, Percent: 69.95

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10300, Percent: 34.36

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.7

Description:

Judicial corruption decision

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or

bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

Responses:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Not usually.

4: Never.

2.5.2.13 Absence of Corruption (wjp_abs_cor)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_abs_cor

Original tag: wjp_abs_cor

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

Absence of Corruption, Factor 2 of the WJP Rule of Law Index, measures the absence of corruption in government. The factor considers three forms of corruption: bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources. These three forms of corruption are examined with respect to government officers in the executive branch, the judiciary, the military, police, and the legislature.

2.5.2.14 ADRs are Accessible, Impartial, and Effective (wjp_adr)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_adr

Original tag: wjp_adr

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial, and effective. The variable measures if the ADRs are affordable, efficient, enforceable, and free of corruption.

2.5.2.15 Civil Justice (wjp_civ_just)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_civ_just

Original tag: wjp_civ_just

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

Civil Justice, Factor 7 of the WJP Rule of Law Index, measures whether ordinary people can resolve their grievances peacefully and effectively through the civil justice system. It measures whether civil justice systems are accessible and affordable as well as free of discrimination, corruption, and improper influence by public officials. It examines whether court proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delays and whether decisions are enforced effectively. It also measures the accessibility, impartiality, and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

2.5.2.16 Civil Justice is Free of Corruption (wjp_cj_cor)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_cj_cor

Original tag: wjp_cj_cor

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

Civil justice is free of corruption measures whether the civil justice system is free of bribery and improper influence by private interests.

2.5.2.17 Criminal System is Free of Corruption (wjp_crsys_cor)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_crsys_cor

Original tag: wjp_crsys_cor

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1184, Percent: 7.74

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1124, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.07

Description:

This variable measures whether the police, prosecutors, and judges are free of bribery and improper influence from criminal organizations.

2.5.2.18 Executive Branch do not use Public Office for Private Gain (wjp_exec_br)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_exec_br

Original tag: wjp_exec_br

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for private gain variable measures the prevalence of bribery, informal payments, and other inducements in the delivery of public services and the enforcement of regulations. It also measures whether government procurement and public works contracts are awarded through an open and competitive bidding process, and whether government officials at various levels of the executive branch refrain from

embezzling public funds.

2.5.2.19 Transition of Power is Subject to the Law (wjp_trans_pow)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_wjp_trans_pow

Original tag: wjp_trans_pow

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: World Justice Project (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1185, Percent: 7.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1125, Percent: 3.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 5.06

Description:

The variable measures whether government officials are elected or appointed in accordance with the rules and procedures set forth in the constitution. Where elections take place, it also measures the integrity of the electoral process, including access to the ballot, the absence of intimidation, and public scrutiny of election results.

2.5.3 Political System

This category includes variables describing the rules of the political system (presidential or parliamentary system), the chief executive (years in office), regime type, stability (age of present regime), and checks and balances as well as aspects of federalism.

2.5.3.1 Accountability Transparency (diat_ati)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_diat_ati

Original tag: diat_ati

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 4935, Percent: 32.27

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4632, Percent: 15.45

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 303 Percent: 6.14

Description:

Accountability Transparency. The author has 16 separate indicators for the Accountability Transparency Index (six for the measurement of a free media, four for fiscal transparency, and six for political constraints). 1980 is considered to be the base year. The Accountability Transparency Index has 115 countries in 1980, but rising to up to 189 countries towards the end of the period.

2.5.3.2 Information Transparency (diat_iti)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_diat_iti

Original tag: diat_iti

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 5343, Percent: 34.94

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4827, Percent: 16.1

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 516 Percent: 9.66

Description:

Information Transparency. Sub-indicators are constructed to reflect the nuances of this type of transparency. Specifically, three sub-components are constructed: (1) the existence of a free and independent media; (2) fiscal (budgetary) transparency; (3) political constraints.

The author has 13 separate indicators for the Information Transparency Index (six for the quantity of information, four for the processes that generate that information, and three for the infrastructure required to disseminate that information). 1980 is considered to be the base year. The Information Transparency Index (ITI) has scores for initially 153 countries in 1980, increasing over time to 191 by the year 2010.

2.5.3.3 HRV Index (`hrv_index`)

Long tag: `qog_std_ts_hrv_index`

Original tag: `hrv_index`

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Brosché & Sundberg (2023), Brosché et al. (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 3863, Percent: 25.26

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 3739, Percent: 12.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 124 Percent: 3.21

Description:

The point estimate of the HRV index. The HRV transparency index measures the availability of credible aggregate economic data that a country discloses to the public.

2.5.3.4 Good Governance (`sgi_go`)

Long tag: `qog_std_ts_sgi_go`

Original tag: `sgi_go`

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Schiller & Hellmann (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 328, Percent: 2.15

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 328, Percent: 1.09

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

This pillar of the SGI examines the good governance capacities of a political system in terms of its executive capability and accountability. Sustainable governance is defined here as the political management of public affairs that adopts a long-term view of societal development, takes into account the interests of future generations, and facilitates capacities for social change.

The Governance index examines how effective governments are in directing and implementing policies appropriate to these three goals. As a measuring tool grounded in practical evidence, the Governance index draws on 37 qualitative indicators posed in an expert survey that measure a country's institutional arrangements against benchmarks of good practices in governance. Governance in this context implies both the capacity to act ("executive capacity") and the extent to which non-governmental actors and institutions are endowed with the participatory competence to hold the government accountable to its actions ("executive accountability"). This includes citizens, legislatures, parties, associations and the media, that is, actors that monitor the government's activities and whose effective inclusion in the political process improve the quality of governance.

The dimension of Executive Capacity draws on the categories of steering capability, policy implementation and institutional learning. Steering capability questions explore the roles of strategic planning and expert advice, the effectiveness of interministerial coordination and regulatory impact assessments, and the quality of consultation and communication policies. Questions about implementation assess the government's ability to ensure effective and efficient task delegation to ministers, agencies or subnational governments. Questions on institutional learning refer to a government's ability to reform its own institutional arrangements and improve its strategic orientation.

The dimension of Executive Accountability is comprised of three categories corresponding to actors or groups of actors considered to be important agents of oversight and accountability in theories of democracy and governance. The questions here are designed to examine the extent to which citizens are informed of government policies, whether the legislature is capable of evaluating and acting as a "check" on the executive branch, and whether intermediary organizations (i.e., media, parties, interest associations) demonstrate relevance and policy know-how in exercising oversight. This approach is based on a dynamic understanding of governance in which power and authority is dispersed throughout the institutions, processes and structures of government. In order to account for the diversity of institutional arrangements, the index explicitly considers functional equivalencies in different countries, and pays equal attention to formal and informal as well as hierarchical and non-hierarchical institutional arrangements.

2.5.3.5 Electoral component index (vdem_edcomp_thick)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_edcomp_thick

Original tag: vdem_edcomp_thick

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Electoral component index

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive.

2.5.3.6 Electoral democracy index (vdem_polyarchy)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_vdem_polyarchy

Original tag: vdem_polyarchy

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 10729, Percent: 70.17

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 10333, Percent: 34.47

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 396 Percent: 3.69

Description:

Electoral democracy index

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers

responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy

is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average

of the indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation"; in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's subcomponents with the one exception of the non-electoral component.

2.5.4 Media

This category includes indicators on the freedom of the media in a given country (freedom of the press, regulation of the media) as well as the public access and confidence in the media.

2.5.4.1 Economic Influences over Media Content (2001-2016) (fhp_mcei5)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fhp_mcei5

Original tag: fhp_mcei5

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 3081, Percent: 20.15

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 2687, Percent: 8.96

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79

Description:

Economic Influences over Media Content (2001-2016). This category includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country or territory affects the development and sustainability of the media.

2.5.4.2 Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp_mceib3)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fhp_mceib3

Original tag: fhp_mceib3

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 550, Percent: 3.6

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 490, Percent: 1.63

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

Description:

Economic Influences over Media Content: Broadcast Media (1993-1995): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

2.5.4.3 Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp_mceib4)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fhp_mceib4

Original tag: fhp_mceib4

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 925, Percent: 6.05

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 825, Percent: 2.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

Description:

Economic Influences over Media Content: Broadcast Media (1996-2000): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

2.5.4.4 Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp_mceip3)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fhp_mceip3

Original tag: fhp_mceip3

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 550, Percent: 3.6

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 490, Percent: 1.63

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

Description:

Economic Influences over Media Content: Print Media (1993-1995): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

2.5.4.5 Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp_mceip4)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fhp_mceip4

Original tag: fhp_mceip4

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Freedom House (2017)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 925, Percent: 6.05

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 825, Percent: 2.75

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

Description:

Economic Influences over Media Content: Print Media (1996-2000): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

2.5.4.6 Press Freedom Index: Economic Context Component (rsf_eci)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_rsf_eci

Original tag: rsf_eci

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Reporters sans frontières (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 345, Percent: 2.26

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 327, Percent: 1.09

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 18 Percent: 5.22

Description:

Economic context component of Press Freedom Index. Questions asked for the economic context component aim to evaluate:

- economic constraints linked to governmental policies (including the difficulty of creating a news media outlet, favouritism in the allocation of state subsidies, and corruption);
- economic constraints linked to non-state actors (advertisers and commercial partners);
- economic constraints linked to media owners seeking to promote or defend their business interests.

A subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator. All of the subsidiary scores contribute equally to the global score. And within each indicator, all the questions and subquestions have equal weight.

2.5.5 Private Economy

This category includes variables characterizing the private sector in a country, inter alia: regulation of the private sector, indicators concerning economic characteristics of groups in the society, such as poverty and household consumption, as well as tax rates.

2.5.5.1 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (current) (fi_legprop)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_fi_legprop

Original tag: fi_legprop

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Gwartney et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 4343, Percent: 28.4

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4162, Percent: 13.89

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 181 Percent: 4.17

Description:

The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to “no judicial independence”, “no trusted legal framework exists”, “no protection of intellectual property”, “military interference in rule of law”, and “no integrity of the legal system” and 10 corresponds to “high judicial independence”, “trusted legal framework exists”, “protection of intellectual property”, “no military interference in rule of law”, and “integrity of the legal system”. The index consists of the following indicators: Judicial independence: The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute, Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations, Protection of intellectual property, Military interference in rule of law and the political process, Integrity of the legal system.

2.5.6 Public Economy

This category includes economic indicators that reflect the involvement of the government in the economy (taxes, tariff rates and government expenditures), economic key figures of a state (GDP, inflation, and economic inequality), and indicators that characterize the state of the economy (aid-flows, debt).

2.5.6.1 Open Budget Index (ibp_obi)

Long tag: qog_std_ts_ibp_obi

Original tag: ibp_obi

Dataset citation: Teorell et al. (2024)

Variable citation: ?

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 792, Percent: 5.18

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 787, Percent: 2.63

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 5 Percent: 0.63

Description:

The Open Budget Index (OBI) is a comparative measure of central government budget transparency. The OBI assigns countries covered by the Open Budget Survey a transparency score on a 100-point scale using 109 of the 140 questions on the Survey. These questions focus specifically on whether the government provides the public with timely access to comprehensive information contained in eight key budget documents in accordance with international good practice standards.

3 REPDEM

The **Representative Democracy Data Archive (REPDEM)** presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe. As a world-leading database for research on the competition for government in Europe, the archive contains unique data on governments, parliaments, political parties, length of government formation periods, bargain rounds, as well as procedures and mechanism for intra-coalition governance, etc. The latest updates were made in the research infrastructure project Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED). PAGED builds on REPDEM's previous international and comparative projects on European parliamentary democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <http://repdem.org>

3.1 REPDEM PAGED Basic

Dataset tag: repdem_basic

Output Unit: Repdem Cabinet-Date, i.e., data is collected per cabinet and date. The unit for this dataset is a cabinet and the day a cabinet started. That means each row in the dataset can be identified by a cabinet in combination with a date, using the columns `cab_name` and `date_in`. The unit can also be expressed using the columns `cab_id` and `date_in`.

Description: Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Basic dataset, is a research infrastructure project that aims to build a state-of-the-art database for comparative coalition research on political institutions, political parties, parliaments and governments.

This comparative dataset builds on previous datasets (Andersson et al 2020, Bergman et al 2019, Bergman et al 2021, Hellström et al 2021, Strøm et al 2008), and has been updated in-house to mid-2023. Some additional variables have also been added. However, the data does not contain the so-called governance variables (e.g., conflict management mechanisms), and other variables that require country experts on coalition politics.

The dataset provides detailed information on important aspects of government formation and government termination in 28 European countries from 1945 (or their democratic transitions) up to June 1st, 2023.

Dataset citation:

Hellström, Johan, Torbjörn Bergman, Jonas Lindahl, and Maciej Sychowiec (2023). Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Basic dataset, Version 2023.12. Available on <https://repdem.org>.

Comments:

For party abbreviations see party codebooks:

Western Europe: https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3737/party_codebook_we.pdf

Central and Eastern Europe: https://repdem.org/index.php/download/44/combined-dataset-europe/3736/party_codebook_cee.pdf

Link to original codebook

<https://repdem.org/index.php/download/91/basic-data-europe/4214/v1-paged-basic-dataset-codebook-2.pdf>

License: REPDEM presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe.

Repdem offers a range of datasets available for free (without even a demand for registration).

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://repdem.org/index.php/current-dataset/>

3.1.1 Cabinet Information

These variables provide information on the Cabinet.

3.1.1.1 Ministers' parliamentary accountability (`pmpower_minaccount`)

Long tag: repdem_basic_pmpower_minaccount

Original tag: pmpower_minaccount

Dataset citation: Hellström, Bergman, Lindahl & Sychowiec (2023)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 844, Percent: 98.03

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1477, Percent: 4.93

Description:

Ministers' parliamentary accountability:

0: direct

1: via PM only

2: via vote of no confidence against full cabinet only

3.2 REPDEM PAGED Western, Central and Eastern Europe

Dataset tag: repdem_wecee

Output Unit: Repdem Cabinet-Date, i.e., data is collected per cabinet and date. That means each row in the dataset can be identified by a cabinet in combination with a date, using the columns `cab_name` and `date_in`. The unit can also be expressed using the columns `cab_id` and `date_in`.

Description: Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset is a research infrastructure project that aims to build a state-of-the-art database for comparative coalition research on political institutions, political parties, parliaments and governments.

This comparative dataset merges the data from Hellström et al. (2021) and Hellström et al. (2024), collected for the volumes Bergman et al. (2021) and Bergman et al. (2024), and including variables produced for Hellström et al. (2023)

All data were meticulously collected by experts on coalition politics in their respective country using standardized coding instructions and interview guidelines. Specifically, the data were gathered from official documents (government, administration, and parliament) and party documents (election manifestos, coalition agreements), by conducting semi-structured interviews with (former) staff and cabinet members as well as a systemic analysis of media reports.

The combined dataset provides detailed information on important aspects of government formation, coalition governance, and government termination in 10 Central Eastern European from their democratic transitions up to June 1st, 2014, as well as 16 West European countries and Croatia up to 31st December 2019.

Dataset citation:

Hellström, Johan, Torbjörn Bergman, and Jonas Lindahl (2024). Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset. Version 2023.12. Available on <https://repdem.org>

And

Bergman, Torbjörn, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström (eds.). (2021). Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

And

Bergman, Torbjörn, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Johan Hellström (eds.) (2024). Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe: Governing in Times of Crisis. London: Routledge.

Comments:

For party abbreviations see party codebooks:

Western

Europe:

<https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/>

central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4266/
v1-party-codebook-wecee-dec-2023.pdf

Notes on coding principles: <https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4291/paged-notes-on-coding-principles-2.pdf>

Link to original codebook

<https://repdem.org/index.php/download/98/central-eastern-europe-and-western-europe-dataset/4606/v1-data-set-codebook-wecee-dec-2023-3.pdf>

License: REPDEM presents the comparative data collection efforts undertaken by various research and data infrastructure projects on political institutions, political parties, cabinets and governments in Europe.

Repdem offers a range of datasets available for free (without even a demand for registration).

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:
<https://repdem.org/index.php/current-dataset/>

3.2.1 Information on the Cabinets

These variables provide general information on each cabinet such as duration, cabinet composition and majority relations.

3.2.1.1 Ministers' parliamentary accountability (`pmpower_minaccount`)

Long tag: repdem_wecee_pmpower_minaccount

Original tag: pmpower_minaccount

Dataset citation: Hellström, Bergman & Lindahl (2023), Bergman et al. (2021, 2024), Hellström et al. (2021)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 773, Percent: 89.78

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1350, Percent: 4.5

Description:

Ministers' parliamentary accountability:

0: direct

1: via PM only

2: via vote of no confidence against full cabinet only

4 V-DEM

Based at the University of Gothenburg, the **Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)** Research Project takes a comprehensive approach to understanding democratization. This approach encompasses multiple core principles: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner V-Dem reconceptualizes democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes. In addition, V-Dem breaks down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately. Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society. Finally, each component is disaggregated into specific indicators. This fundamentally different approach to democratization is made possible by the V-Dem Database, which measures 450+ indicators annually from 1789 to the present for all countries of the world. The V-Dem approach stands out, first, as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise; second, as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy; and third, thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together. With five Principal Investigators, 19 Project Managers with special responsibility for issue areas covered in the V-Dem dataset, around 23 Regional Managers, 134 Country Coordinators and more than 4000 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the world's largest social science data collection projects on democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.v-dem.net/>

4.1 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v14

Dataset tag: `vdem_cy`

Output Unit: V-Dem Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year. That means each row in the dataset can be identified by one country in combination with a year, using the columns `country_name` and `year`. The unit can also be expressed through a combination of the columns `country_id` or `country_text_id` and `year`.

Description: All 500 V-Dem indicators and 245 indices + 57 other indicators from other data sources. For R users, we recommend to install our `vdemdata` R package which includes the most recent V-Dem dataset and some useful functions to explore the data.

Dataset citation: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Cecilia Borella, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorff, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2024. "V-Dem Codebook v14" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Link to original codebook

https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem_codebook_v14.pdf

License: CC-BY-SA 4.0 International

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

4.1.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and

lower-level indices.

4.1.1.1 Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_polyarchy

Original tag: v2x_polyarchy

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Teorell et al. (2019), v2x_freexp_altinf v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 95.89

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 88.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_freexp_altinf v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 1-14. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial compensation; in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the weakest link argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_polyarchy = .5 * MPI + .5 * API$$

$$\& = .5 * (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick *$$

$$\& * v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf)$$

$$\& + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair$$

$$\& + (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/8) * v2x_suffr$$

$$\& + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf)$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.2.1 Additive polyarchy index (v2x_api)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_api

Original tag: v2x_api

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Teorell et al. (2019), v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 95.89

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 88.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

DATA RELEASE: 6-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_api = (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf + (1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x_suffr$$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.2.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (v2x_mpi)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_mpi

Original tag: v2x_mpi

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Teorell et al. (2019), v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 95.89

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26595, Percent: 88.73

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

DATA RELEASE: 6-14.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr), or

$v2x_mpi = v2x_frassoc_thick * v2xel_frefair * v2x_freexp_altinf * v2x_elecoff * v2x_suffr$

CITATION: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.2.3 Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2xel_frefair

Original tag: v2xel_frefair

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x_elecreg

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27612, Percent: 99.56

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27612, Percent: 92.12

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are elections free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election

other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. If a country is recorded as an electoral regime (v2x_elecreg) at the beginning of the time series until the first election that we record, then the scores for this election are backfilled towards the beginning of the time series.

CLEANING: Set to 0 when v2x_elecreg is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.2.4 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (v2xcl_rol)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2xcl_rol

Original tag: v2xcl_rol

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl_acjst v2xcl_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl_slave v2clreleg v2clfmov v2xcl_dmov

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27616, Percent: 99.57

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27616, Percent: 92.14

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl_acjst v2xcl_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl_slave v2clreleg v2clfmov v2xcl_dmov

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clreleg), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovm, v2cldmovw).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

4.1.3 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections: Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a

prime minister, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

Non-election specific coding: The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

Election specific questions: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

Election specific questions – Historical clarification: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

Subnational elections and offices: This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

Lower chamber election: The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously *_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously *_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel_elecparl is 1.

4.1.3.1 Fraud allegations by Western election monitors (v2elwestmon)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2elwestmon

Original tag: v2elwestmon

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Hyde & Marinov (2012), IDEA; websites by Western election monitors

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 936, Percent: 3.37

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 936, Percent: 3.12

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

CLARIFICATION: If there were no Western monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

RESPONSES:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors.

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1945-2023

4.1.3.2 Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2elvotbuy

Original tag: v2elvotbuy

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 15660, Percent: 56.46

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 15660, Percent: 52.25

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

CLARIFICATION: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e. "porkbarrel" legislation.

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.3.3 Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2elirreg

Original tag: v2elirreg

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 15658, Percent: 56.46

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 15658, Percent: 52.24

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

CLARIFICATION: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

RESPONSES:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.3.4 Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2elfrfair

Original tag: v2elfrfair

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 15660, Percent: 56.46

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 15660, Percent: 52.25

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

CLARIFICATION: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were

largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.3.5 Subnational elections free and fair (v2elffelr)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2elffelr

Original tag: v2elffelr

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 18236, Percent: 65.75

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 18236, Percent: 60.84

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kelly McMann

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

quot;Free and fairquot; refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

RESPONSES:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category quot;5quot; is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin_ord is 0.

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - The Executive

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Executive:

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

4.1.4.1 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2exbribe

Original tag: v2exbribe

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27135, Percent: 97.84

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27135, Percent: 90.53

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

RESPONSES:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.4.2 Executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2exembez

Original tag: v2exembez

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 97.49

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 90.21

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

RESPONSES:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.4.3 Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2excrptps

Original tag: v2excrptps

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27276, Percent: 98.35

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27276, Percent: 91

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

CLARIFICATION: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

4.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - The Judiciary

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Judiciary: This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

4.1.5.1 Judicial purges (v2jupurge)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2jupurge

Original tag: v2jupurge

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19164, Percent: 69.1

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19164, Percent: 63.94

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

CLARIFICATION: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

RESPONSES:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.

1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.

2: There were limited arbitrary removals.

3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.

4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.5.2 Government attacks on judiciary (v2jupoatck)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2jupoatck

Original tag: v2jupoatck

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19269, Percent: 69.48

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19269, Percent: 64.29

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

CLARIFICATION: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

RESPONSES:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.

2: Attacks occurred more than once.

3: There were attacks, but they were rare.

4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

4.1.5.3 Judicial accountability (v2juacct)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2juacct

Original tag: v2juacct

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27422, Percent: 98.88

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27422, Percent: 91.49

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

RESPONSES:

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.5.4 Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2jucorrdc

Original tag: v2jucorrdc

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27358, Percent: 98.64

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27358, Percent: 91.28

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

RESPONSES:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Not usually.

4: Never.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.6 V-Dem Indicators - Civil Liberty

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Civil Liberty: The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

4.1.6.1 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2cltrnslw

Original tag: v2cltrnslw

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27273, Percent: 98.34

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27273, Percent: 90.99

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

RESPONSES:

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

4.1.6.2 Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2clrspct

Original tag: v2clrspct

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27393, Percent: 98.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27393, Percent: 91.39

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public

administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

RESPONSES:

0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.

2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.7 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Media: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

Historical clarification: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

4.1.7.1 Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2mecenefm

Original tag: v2mecenefm

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 20445, Percent: 73.72

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 20445, Percent: 68.21

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements,

prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

RESPONSES:

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.8 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

Civic and Academic Space:

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

4.1.8.1 Campus integrity (v2casurv)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2casurv

Original tag: v2casurv

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 14894, Percent: 53.7

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 14894, Percent: 49.69

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

CLARIFICATION: “Campus” refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.

1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and

intimidation, at times including violence or closures.

2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.

3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.

4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel and Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.9 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Accountability

The *Accountability Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.9.1 Accountability index (v2x_accountability)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_accountability

Original tag: v2x_accountability

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2020), v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csptrcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x_suffr v2xex_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 69.81

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 64.6

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon

v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit
v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csptrcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw
v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x_suffr v2xex_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x_veracc), horizontal (v2x_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.9.2 Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_veracc

Original tag: v2x_veracc

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2020), v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry
v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg
v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp
v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi
v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csptrcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss
v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x_suffr v2xex_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 69.81

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 64.6

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties — and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar
v2elfrfair v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2x_suffr v2exaphogp v2ex_hosw
v2x_suffr v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: Vertical accountability consists of two main components: elections and political parties. We operationalize electoral accountability with three components: 1) an aggregate measure the quality of elections; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is directly or indirectly elected. We model non-electoral regimes as having no suffrage and the quality of elections as a function of having an electoral regime (v2x_elecreg). Quality of elections consists of seven variables measuring different aspects of national elections for the executive and legislature. Specifically, we include autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) and (v2elembcap); accuracy of the voter registry (v2elrgstry), intentional irregularities conducted by the government and opposition (v2elirreg); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents (v2elintim); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (v2elmulpar); and an

overall measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (`v2elfrfair`). This is a modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (`v2xel_frefair`). We added the variable `v2elmulpar`, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed `v2elvotbuy` and `v2elpeace`, as they have low loadings.

We measure suffrage as the percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (`v2x_suffr`) to proxy the inclusivity of the exercise of electoral accountability. To account for the differences between states which have an executive subject to elections, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the head of the executive either the head of state or head of government — whoever has more relative power over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers as measured by `v2ex_hosw` is subjected to direct or indirect elections (`v2expathhs` `v2ex_legconhos` `v2expathhg` `v2exaphgp`).

The second form of vertical accountability focuses on political parties, which we model as a hierarchical node. This node includes variables that capture whether there are barriers to forming a party and how restrictive they are (`v2psparban`) and (`v2psbars`), as well as the degree to which opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (`v2psoppaut`).

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.9.3 Diagonal accountability index (`v2x_diagacc`)

Long tag: `vdem_cy_v2x_diagacc`

Original tag: `v2x_diagacc`

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2020), `v2mecenefm` `v2mecenefi` `v2meharjrn` `v2mecrit` `v2mebias` `v2merange` `v2meslfcen` `v2csptrcpt` `v2cseeorgs` `v2csreprss` `v2cldiscm` `v2cldiscw` `v2clacfree` `v2dlengage`

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 69.81

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 64.6

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: `*_osp`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by `*_osp`, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): `v2mecenefm` `v2mecenefi` `v2meharjrn` `v2mecrit` `v2mebias` `v2merange` `v2meslfcen` `v2csptrcpt` `v2cseeorgs` `v2csreprss` `v2cldiscm` `v2cldiscw` `v2clacfree` `v2dlengage`

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (`v2mecenefm`) and information on the Internet (`v2mecenefi`), as well as the extent to which government and other powerful actors harass journalists (`v2meharjrn`). The second dimension concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (`v2mecrit`); there is bias against opposition candidates

(v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme_altinf).

Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2cspcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.9.4 Horizontal accountability index (v2x_horacc)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_horacc

Original tag: v2x_horacc

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2020), v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam v2lgqstexp

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 69.81

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 19362, Percent: 64.6

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_codelow, *_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by *_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam v2lgqstexp

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.

The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem judicial

constraints on the executive index (v2x_jucon).

To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg_legcon): the degree to which: 1 the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgqstexp); and 2 a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity (v2lginvstp). We exclude the legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of vertical accountability.

Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.10 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Neopatrimonialism

The *Neopatrimonialism Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.10.1 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (v2x_neopat)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_neopat

Original tag: v2x_neopat

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017, 2018), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc v2x_elecreg

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26188, Percent: 94.43

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26188, Percent: 87.37

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

CLARIFICATION: Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimation. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc v2x_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp), high court independence (v2juhcind), low court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.10.2 Clientelism Index (v2xnp_client)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2xnp_client

Original tag: v2xnp_client

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x_elecreg

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 25490, Percent: 91.91

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 25490, Percent: 85.04

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

CLARIFICATION: Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.10.3 Regime corruption (v2xnp_regcorr)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2xnp_regcorr

Original tag: v2xnp_regcorr

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Sigman & Lindberg (2017), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2juccorrdc

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27230, Percent: 98.18

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27230, Percent: 90.85

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

CLARIFICATION: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices – and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2juccorrdc

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive embezzlement (v2exembez), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2juccorrdc).

CITATION: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.11 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties

The *Civil Liberties Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.11.1 Physical violence index (v2x_clphy)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_clphy

Original tag: v2x_clphy

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27611, Percent: 99.56

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27611, Percent: 92.12

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning
 ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd
 QUESTION: To what extent is physical integrity respected?
 CLARIFICATION: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.
 SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).
 SOURCE(S): v2cltort v2clkill
 DATA RELEASE: 6-14.
 AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).
 CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
 YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.11.2 Political liberties index (v2x_clpol)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_clpol

Original tag: v2x_clpol

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2xcl_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27393, Percent: 98.77

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27393, Percent: 91.39

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 6-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.12 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption

The *Corruption Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.12.1 Political corruption (v2x_corr)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_corr

Original tag: v2x_corr

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: McMann et al. (2016), v2x_pubcorr v2x_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26841, Percent: 96.78

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26841, Percent: 89.55

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: How pervasive is political corruption?

CLARIFICATION: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_pubcorr v2x_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.12.2 Executive corruption index (v2x_execorr)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_execorr

Original tag: v2x_execorr

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: McMann et al. (2016), v2exbribe v2exembez

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 97.49

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 90.21

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exbribe v2exembez

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembez).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.12.3 Public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_pubcorr

Original tag: v2x_pubcorr

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: McMann *et al.* (2016), v2excrptps v2exthftps

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27190, Percent: 98.04

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27190, Percent: 90.71

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2excrptps v2exthftps

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery (v2excrptps) and embezzlement (v2exthftps).

CITATION: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.13 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Rule of Law

The *Rule of Law Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.13.1 Rule of law index (v2x_rule)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_rule

Original tag: v2x_rule

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembez v2excrptps v2exthtfts v2juacct v2jucorrdc v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrnslw v2clrspct v2xcl_acjst

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27346, Percent: 98.6

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27346, Percent: 91.24

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembez v2excrptps v2exthtfts v2juacct v2jucorrdc v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrnslw v2clrspct v2xcl_acjst

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juacct), judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps), public sector theft (v2exthtfts), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.14 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections

The *Elections Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.14.1 Electoral Component Index (v2x_edcomp_thick)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2x_edcomp_thick

Original tag: v2x_EDcomp_thick

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26771, Percent: 96.53

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26771, Percent: 89.32

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

AGGREGATION: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$v2x_EDcomp_thick =$

$.125 * v2x_frassoc_thick + .125 * v2x_suffr + .125 * v2xel_frefair + .125 * v2x_elecoff + .5 * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_elecoff$

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.15 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom

The *Academic Freedom Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

4.1.15.1 Academic Freedom Index (v2xca_academ)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2xca_academ

Original tag: v2xca_academ

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 15155, Percent: 54.64

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 15155, Percent: 50.56

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

CLARIFICATION: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic

bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Spannagel and Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

4.1.16 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Ordinal Versions of Indices

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

4.1.16.1 Political corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_corr_3c)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_v2x_corr_3c

Original tag: e_v2x_corr_3C

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Lindberg (2016), v2x_corr

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 26841, Percent: 96.78

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 26841, Percent: 89.55

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

QUESTION: How pervasive is political corruption?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x_corr

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.16.2 Executive corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_execorr_3c)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_v2x_execorr_3c

Original tag: e_v2x_execorr_3C

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Lindberg (2016), v2x_execorr

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 97.49

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27038, Percent: 90.21

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem executive corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x_execorr

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.16.3 Public sector corruption index ordinal (e_v2x_pubcorr_3c)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_v2x_pubcorr_3c

Original tag: e_v2x_pubcorr_3C

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Lindberg (2016), v2x_pubcorr

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27190, Percent: 98.04

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27190, Percent: 90.71

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

QUESTION: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem public sector corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x_pubcorr

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.16.4 Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (e_v2xcl_rol_3c)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_v2xcl_rol_3c

Original tag: e_v2xcl_rol_3C

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Lindberg (2016), v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmovew v2cldmovew

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27616, Percent: 99.57

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27616, Percent: 92.14

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

AVAILABLE VERSIONS: *_3C, *_4C, *_5C

QUESTION: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

CLARIFICATION: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equality before the law and individual liberty index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavew v2clrelig v2clfmovew v2clmovem v2clmovew

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: Same transformation rule as for `quot;v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5Cquot;`.

CITATION: Lindberg (2016).

YEARS: 1789-2023

4.1.17 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - World Bank Governance Indicators

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

4.1.17.1 Control of corruption — estimate (e_wbgi_cce)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_wbgi_cce

Original tag: e_wbgi_cce

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2016)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 4174, Percent: 15.05

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4174, Percent: 13.93

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: `quot;Control of Corruptionquot;`; measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of `quot;additional payments to get things donequot;`, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring `quot;grand corruptionquot;` in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in `quot;state capturequot;`.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2022

4.1.17.2 Voice and accountability — estimate (e_wbgi_vae)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_wbgi_vae

Original tag: e_wbgi_vae

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Kaufmann & Kraay (2016)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 4177, Percent: 15.06

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 4177, Percent: 13.94

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: "Voice and Accountability"; includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

SOURCE(S): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

YEARS: 1996-2022

4.1.18 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Others

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

4.1.18.1 Democratic breakdown (Bernhard et al.) (e_bnr_dem)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_bnr_dem

Original tag: e_bnr_dem

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein et al. (2024)

Variable citation: Bernhard et al. (2001), Teorell et al. (2022)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 2868, Percent: 10.34

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 2868, Percent: 9.57

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0"; When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1"; and exit from the dataset.

SCALE: Dichotomous.

SOURCE(S): Bernhard *et al.* (2001). Taken from Quality of Government Standard Dataset version Jan22 *et al.* (2022).

NOTES: If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005. The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria. Competitiveness: Like Przeworski *et al.* we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the

population were banned. Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies. Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

CITATION: Bernhard *et al.* (2001), Teorell *et al.* (2022).

YEARS: 1946-2005

4.1.18.2 Corruption perception index (e_ti_cpi)

Long tag: vdem_cy_e_ti_cpi

Original tag: e_ti_cpi

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Variable citation: Transparency International (2023b)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 1883, Percent: 6.79

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 1883, Percent: 6.28

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: E

CLARIFICATION: The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

SOURCE(S): Transparency International (2022).

NOTES: The data spans 2012–present due to the methodological incomparability with the data prior 2012.

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

CITATION: Transparency International (2022).

YEARS: 2012-2022

4.1.19 Varieties of Indoctrination

The Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset is constructed based on an expert survey fielded in collaboration with V-Dem and led by the ERC-funded project “Democracy under Threat: How Education can Save it” (DEMED). The dataset contains indices and indicators that measure indoctrination efforts in education and the media across 160 countries from 1945 to 2021. The indices capture broad dimensions of indoctrination such as indoctrination potential and indoctrination content, while the indicators cover topics related to the curriculum, teachers, schools, and the media. The principal investigators are Anja Neundorf, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, Ksenia Northmore-Ball, Katerina Tertychnaya, and Wooseok Kim. For more information, please visit <https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/democracyresearch/>.

4.1.19.1 Political influence, non state-owned media (v2medpolnonstate)

Long tag: vdem_cy_v2medpolnonstate

Original tag: v2medpolnonstate

Dataset citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein *et al.* (2024)

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr

QUESTION: For the print and broadcast media outlets NOT owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these cover political issues?

CLARIFICATION: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence the coverage of non-state owned outlets both directly and indirectly. Indirect forms of control might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities (e.g. subsidized newsprint) and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, and prohibitive tariffs. They might also include tax privileges, bribery, and cash payments. Indirect forms of control may also include the intimidation of owners, advertisers, and editors, through the use of threats and violence.

RESPONSES:

0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of key political issues.

1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of key political issues.

2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of key political issues.

3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 4.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 4.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series 2023*: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series 2024*:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

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